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Tue, 29 Sep 2026 18:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Two issues in the ThreadX loadable-module loader, reached when a device loads an attacker-controlled module object via `_txm_module_manager_memory_load` / `_txm_module_manager_in_place_load` — APIs that take ONLY a base pointer, no image length, so every size/offset field in `TXM_MODULE_PREAMBLE` is fully attacker-trusted: (1) a heap OOB **read** (`code_size` trusted as the source-image length in the code-copy loop), and (2) a control-flow-integrity / defense-in-depth gap (module entry/start/callback/stop pointers computed as `code_start + preamble_offset` with only a `!= 0` check, and the preamble `checksum` never verified). No controlled OOB write was found (honest — the copy destination is overflow-guarded). | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-125 CWE-1284 CWE-345 |
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cvssV4_0
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Subscriptions
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: eclipse
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-29T17:38:22.171Z
Reserved: 2026-09-29T16:15:08.072Z
Link: CVE-2026-102711
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Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-29T18:17:10.163
Modified: 2026-09-29T18:17:10.163
Link: CVE-2026-102711
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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