{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-87119", "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "EEF", "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T18:00:02.032Z", "datePublished": "2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T12:02:31.484Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"affected": [{"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization'", "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription'"], "packageName": "mpp", "packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp", "product": "mpp", "programFiles": ["lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex", "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':verify/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':wallet_params/2"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':from_rpc/1"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription':verify/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp", "vendor": "ZenHive", "versions": [{"lessThan": "0.16.2", "status": "affected", "version": "0.14.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}, {"collectionURL": "https://github.com", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization'", "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription'"], "packageName": "zenhive/mpp", "packageURL": "pkg:github/zenhive/mpp", "product": "mpp", "programFiles": ["lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex", "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':verify/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':wallet_params/2"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':from_rpc/1"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription':verify/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp", "vendor": "ZenHive", "versions": [{"lessThan": "4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f", "status": "affected", "version": "db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78", "versionType": "git"}]}], "configurations": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires <code>subscription_access_key_private_key</code> in the Tempo <code>method_config</code>. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer's signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer.</p>"}, {"base64": false, "type": "text/markdown", "value": "Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires `subscription_access_key_private_key` in the Tempo `method_config`. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer's signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer."}], "value": "Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires subscription_access_key_private_key in the Tempo method_config. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer's signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer."}], "cpeApplicability": [{"nodes": [{"cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionEndExcluding": "0.16.2", "versionStartIncluding": "0.14.0", "vulnerable": true}], "negate": false, "operator": "OR"}], "operator": "AND"}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "finder", "value": "E.FU"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "remediation developer", "value": "E.FU"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "coordinator", "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"}], "dateAssigned": "2026-09-15T15:20:31.000Z", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.</p>\n<p>The payer signs a Tempo <code>KeyAuthorization</code> over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. <code>MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3</code> in <code>lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex</code> pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. <code>MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4</code> deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, <code>claim_activation</code> succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.</p>\n<p>This issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.</p>"}, {"base64": false, "type": "text/markdown", "value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo `KeyAuthorization` over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3` in `lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex` pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4` deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, `claim_activation` succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2."}], "value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo KeyAuthorization over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2."}], "impacts": [{"capecId": "CAPEC-60", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p>An attacker who obtains a payer's subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client's own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer's wallet and re-authorize the server's access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry.</p>"}, {"base64": false, "type": "text/markdown", "value": "An attacker who obtains a payer's subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client's own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer's wallet and re-authorize the server's access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry."}], "value": "An attacker who obtains a payer's subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client's own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer's wallet and re-authorize the server's access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry."}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV4_0": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseScore": 8.2, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-294", "description": "CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay", "lang": "en", "type": "CWE"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "shortName": "EEF", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z"}, "references": [{"name": "GitHub Advisory", "tags": ["related", "vendor-advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-p9fv-9w58-95x2"}, {"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-87119", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-87119.html"}, {"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-87119", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-87119"}, {"name": "Introducing commit db464df in ZenHive/mpp", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78"}, {"name": "Fix commit 4b6eaec in ZenHive/mpp", "tags": ["patch"], "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f"}], "source": {"discovery": "INTERNAL"}, "title": "mpp Tempo subscription key authorization is not bound to the issuing challenge, allowing a captured activation credential to be replayed"}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-09-22T12:02:12.184296Z", "id": "CVE-2026-87119", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T12:02:31.484Z"}}]}}

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "containers": {"adp": [{"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"id": "CVE-2026-87119", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-09-22T12:02:12.184296Z"}}}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T12:02:21.205Z"}}], "cna": {"title": "mpp Tempo subscription key authorization is not bound to the issuing challenge, allowing a captured activation credential to be replayed", "source": {"discovery": "INTERNAL"}, "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "finder", "value": "E.FU"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "remediation developer", "value": "E.FU"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "coordinator", "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"}], "impacts": [{"capecId": "CAPEC-60", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "An attacker who obtains a payer's subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client's own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer's wallet and re-authorize the server's access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p>An attacker who obtains a payer's subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client's own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer's wallet and re-authorize the server's access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry.</p>", "base64": false}, {"type": "text/markdown", "value": "An attacker who obtains a payer's subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client's own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer's wallet and re-authorize the server's access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry.", "base64": false}]}]}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "cvssV4_0": {"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "version": "4.0", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 8.2, "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}]}], "affected": [{"cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp", "vendor": "ZenHive", "modules": ["'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization'", "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription'"], "product": "mpp", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "0.14.0", "lessThan": "0.16.2", "versionType": "semver"}], "packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp", "packageName": "mpp", "programFiles": ["lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex", "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"], "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "programRoutines": [{"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':verify/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':wallet_params/2"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':from_rpc/1"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription':verify/2"}]}, {"cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp", "vendor": "ZenHive", "modules": ["'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization'", "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription'"], "product": "mpp", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78", "lessThan": "4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f", "versionType": "git"}], "packageURL": "pkg:github/zenhive/mpp", "packageName": "zenhive/mpp", "programFiles": ["lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex", "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"], "collectionURL": "https://github.com", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "programRoutines": [{"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':verify/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':wallet_params/2"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':from_rpc/1"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription':verify/2"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-p9fv-9w58-95x2", "name": "GitHub Advisory", "tags": ["related", "vendor-advisory"]}, {"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-87119.html", "name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-87119", "tags": ["related"]}, {"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-87119", "name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-87119", "tags": ["related"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78", "name": "Introducing commit db464df in ZenHive/mpp", "tags": ["related"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f", "name": "Fix commit 4b6eaec in ZenHive/mpp", "tags": ["patch"]}], "dateAssigned": "2026-09-15T15:20:31.000Z", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo KeyAuthorization over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.</p>\n<p>The payer signs a Tempo <code>KeyAuthorization</code> over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. <code>MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3</code> in <code>lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex</code> pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. <code>MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4</code> deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, <code>claim_activation</code> succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.</p>\n<p>This issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.</p>", "base64": false}, {"type": "text/markdown", "value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo `KeyAuthorization` over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3` in `lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex` pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4` deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, `claim_activation` succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.", "base64": false}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-294", "description": "CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay"}]}], "configurations": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires subscription_access_key_private_key in the Tempo method_config. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer's signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires <code>subscription_access_key_private_key</code> in the Tempo <code>method_config</code>. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer's signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer.</p>", "base64": false}, {"type": "text/markdown", "value": "Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires `subscription_access_key_private_key` in the Tempo `method_config`. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer's signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer.", "base64": false}]}], "cpeApplicability": [{"nodes": [{"negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "versionEndExcluding": "0.16.2", "versionStartIncluding": "0.14.0"}], "operator": "OR"}], "operator": "AND"}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "shortName": "EEF", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-87119", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T12:02:31.484Z", "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T18:00:02.032Z", "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "datePublished": "2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z", "assignerShortName": "EEF"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization'", "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription'"], "packageName": "mpp", "packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp", "product": "mpp", "programFiles": ["lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex", "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':verify/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':wallet_params/2"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':from_rpc/1"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription':verify/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp", "vendor": "ZenHive", "versions": [{"lessThan": "0.16.2", "status": "affected", "version": "0.14.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}, {"collectionURL": "https://github.com", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization'", "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription'"], "packageName": "zenhive/mpp", "packageURL": "pkg:github/zenhive/mpp", "product": "mpp", "programFiles": ["lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex", "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':verify/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':wallet_params/2"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':from_rpc/1"}, {"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription':verify/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp", "vendor": "ZenHive", "versions": [{"lessThan": "4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f", "status": "affected", "version": "db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78", "versionType": "git"}]}], "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo KeyAuthorization over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2."}], "id": "CVE-2026-87119", "lastModified": "2026-09-22T13:17:11.613", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV40": [{"cvssData": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 8.2, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-87119", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-09-22T12:02:12.184296Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-09-22T12:17:14.150", "references": [{"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-87119.html"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-p9fv-9w58-95x2"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-87119"}], "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "vulnStatus": "Received", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-294"}], "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "semver", "value": "[0.14.0,0.16.2)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 95.0, "confidence_source": "inferred", "scores": [{"score": 95.0, "source": "inferred"}, {"score": 100.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "mpp", "source": "cna", "vendor": "ZenHive"}, "product": "mpp", "vendor": "zenhive"}, {"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "code_commit", "value": "[db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78,4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 95.0, "confidence_source": "inferred", "scores": [{"score": 95.0, "source": "inferred"}, {"score": 100.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "mpp", "source": "cna", "vendor": "ZenHive"}, "product": "mpp", "vendor": "zenhive"}], "created": "2026-09-22T12:30:07.576653+00:00", "updated": "2026-09-22T12:30:07.843658+00:00", "vendors": ["zenhive", "zenhive$PRODUCT$mpp"]}