Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse "..". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing ".." segments therefore resolves outside the download directory.
Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SANKO | Net::BitTorrent | unaffected |
|
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Solution
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Workaround
There is no fixed release. Validate metadata file path components on the peer and magnet ingest path as the .torrent-file path already does (reject components equal to '', '.', or '..' or containing '/' or '\'), and confirm each resolved path stays within the download directory before writing.
Tue, 30 Jun 2026 11:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata. Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse "..". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing ".." segments therefore resolves outside the download directory. Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host. | |
| Title | Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 | |
| References |
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: CPANSec
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-30T13:52:04.135Z
Reserved: 2026-06-23T18:20:33.513Z
Link: CVE-2026-57079
Vulnrichment
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NVD
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Redhat
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OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-30T12:30:13Z