| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer, where a user could cause an out-of-bounds read via an unbounded string operation. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. |
| NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. |
| NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. |
| NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where a guest could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. |
| NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows contains a vulnerability in the kernel module through which an attacker might initiate an out-of-bounds read. Successful exploitation of this issue could lead to denial of service and information disclosure. |
| NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an unprivileged user could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. |
| NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. |
| DCMTK through 3.7.0 contains a heap over-read vulnerability in ConcatenationLoader that copies pixel data frames without validating the PixelData buffer length against the declared NumberOfFrames. Attackers can craft malicious DICOM instances declaring more frames than the buffer contains to trigger heap over-reads that crash the application or leak adjacent heap memory. |
| pageant provides a [PageantStream] type that implements [AsyncRead] and [AsyncWrite] traits and can be used to talk to a running Pageant instance. Prior to pageant 0.2.3, the Windows pageant crate's pageant/src/wmmessage.rs MemoryMap::read function trusts a peer-controlled u32 response length supplied through the 8192-byte Pageant shared-memory mapping reached by AgentClient::connect_pageant. A local process that impersonates the Pageant window can make query_pageant_direct allocate up to approximately 4 GiB and copy beyond the mapped view, reliably crashing a russh client and conditionally exposing adjacent committed memory. This issue is fixed in pageant 0.2.3. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup. When constructing a masked WebSocket client frame for a very large outgoing payload, size values passed to GByteArray allocation APIs could be truncated while the masking routine still used the full length, causing a heap buffer overflow. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup. When reassembling fragmented WebSocket messages into a GByteArray, libsoup did not adequately cap total message size against the limits of the underlying buffer type. A remote peer could send fragments that caused size truncation while the implementation still used the full length, leading to heap corruption or a crash. |
| The decoder in `readFromDataView` in lib0 before 0.2.119 can be tricked into reading more than it should from a buffer. The vulnerability allows reading past the decoders' view, thus exposing adjacent process memory. This can be anything that is currently in the head, for example credentials or logs. This is similar to but different from GHSA-r5c8-rf4w-qrq8. |
| A missing bounds check in the binary decoder in lib0, versions 0.2.1-0.2.117 and earlier and 1.0.0-rc.32 and earlier, lets any unauthenticated remote peer read adjacent process memory and receive it back. `readUint8Array` never compares the wire-supplied length against the decoder's own view, so one over-long length prefix returns whatever the host process allocated next: other tenants' document content, personal data, and live bearer session tokens**, recovered in full and at will. An attacker who can supply bytes to a lib0 decoder which means any peer that can open a socket, including before authentication reads adjacent process memory and, where the consumer echoes, stores or re-serves the decoded value, receives it back. This is patched in version 0.2.118 and 1.0.0-rc.33. |
| CTranslate2 before 4.8.1 contains an out-of-bounds heap read vulnerability in the binary model loader when deserializing string fields without null terminators. Attackers can craft malicious model files to trigger heap memory reads past buffer boundaries, causing crashes or disclosing adjacent heap memory contents. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup. The soup_uri_decode_data_uri() function incorrectly treated base64 data-URI payloads as NUL-terminated strings when calling g_base64_decode_inplace(). If the percent-decoded payload contained embedded NUL bytes, the decoded length could remain uninitialized and be used as the size of the returned GBytes. This can lead to an out-of-bounds read or application crash when processing a crafted data URI. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup. When max-incoming-payload-size is unlimited (0), SoupWebsocketConnection could grow its incoming GByteArray based on an attacker-controlled frame length until the length wrapped, causing a heap buffer overflow while reading frame data. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup. When the permessage-deflate WebSocket extension compresses a very large outgoing message, truncated size calculations used for GByteArray growth could wrap, causing zlib to write past the allocated buffer and resulting in a heap buffer overflow. |
| Two issues in the ThreadX loadable-module loader, reached when a device loads an attacker-controlled module object via `_txm_module_manager_memory_load` / `_txm_module_manager_in_place_load` — APIs that take ONLY a base pointer, no image length, so every size/offset field in `TXM_MODULE_PREAMBLE` is fully attacker-trusted: (1) a heap OOB **read** (`code_size` trusted as the source-image length in the code-copy loop), and (2) a control-flow-integrity / defense-in-depth gap (module entry/start/callback/stop pointers computed as `code_start + preamble_offset` with only a `!= 0` check, and the preamble `checksum` never verified). No controlled OOB write was found (honest — the copy destination is overflow-guarded). |
| On the first DTLS ClientHello, the parser copies a device-claimed session_id length and validates the
ciphersuite-list length against the total record length instead of the remaining bytes. An unauthenticated
peer drives an OOB source read of up to 255 bytes, and those bytes are echoed verbatim into the outgoing
ServerHello, disclosing adjacent process memory over the network. The crash variant fires on the first
packet. |
| The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than
four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not
against the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one
missing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.
The handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:
```c
/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */
status = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr,
server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);
...
fx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file),
packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,
packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4);
```
`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the
end of the first packet:
```
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5
#0 __interceptor_memcpy
#1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78
0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region
```
Those bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them
back, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.
The same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs
ceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the
attacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never
returns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and
the server thread suspended, and no later client is served.
Reject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,
and use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy. |
