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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-81002 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xdp: fix zero-copy frame layout xdp_convert_zc_to_xdp_frame() clones an XSK packet into an order-0 page and advertises PAGE_SIZE as its frame size. It allows the copied frame to occupy the page tail needed by skb_shared_info and records zero headroom even when metadata separates the frame header from packet data. An AF_XDP zero-copy packet redirected through cpumap can therefore make the skb overlap skb_shared_info or place it beyond the allocated page. Limit the copied layout to SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(PAGE_SIZE) and include the metadata length in frame headroom. Redirect callers already handle a NULL conversion result. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skb_gro_receive Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800cf37004 by task cpumap/1/map:1/146 Call Trace: skb_gro_receive (net/core/gro.c:174) udp_gro_receive (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:812) inet_gro_receive (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1539) dev_gro_receive (net/core/gro.c:515) gro_receive_skb (net/core/gro.c:633) cpu_map_kthread_run (kernel/bpf/cpumap.c:395) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:255) Kernel panic - not syncing: KASAN: panic_on_warn set ... | ||||
| CVE-2026-81001 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync() slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on them. sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which sl_setup() installs as dev->priv_destructor. priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting for the device refcount to drop: /* Snapshot list, allow later requests */ list_replace_init(&net_todo_list, &list); __rtnl_unlock(); ... if (dev->priv_destructor) dev->priv_destructor(dev); /* slip_devs[i] = NULL */ if (dev->needs_free_netdev) free_netdev(dev); ... /* Free network device */ kobject_put(&dev->dev.kobj); So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at all. sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and released the device: CPU0 (slip_open) CPU1 (slip_close) unregister_netdev() rtnl_unlock() netdev_run_todo() __rtnl_unlock() rtnl_lock() sl_sync() dev = slip_devs[i] priv_destructor(dev) slip_devs[i] = NULL kobject_put(&dev->dev.kobj) /* dev is freed */ sl = netdev_priv(dev) if (sl->tty || sl->leased) /* use-after-free */ BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sl_sync drivers/net/slip/slip.c:730 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in slip_open+0xef4/0x1210 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:806 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880712dac71 by task syz-executor.2/6506 CPU: 2 PID: 6506 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.1.134-syzkaller-00260-g0c8fc3469765 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: sl_sync drivers/net/slip/slip.c:730 [inline] slip_open+0xef4/0x1210 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:806 tty_ldisc_open+0xa2/0x120 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:433 tty_set_ldisc+0x324/0x720 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:564 tiocsetd drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2428 [inline] tty_ioctl+0x5f0/0x1530 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2712 Allocated by task 6502: alloc_netdev_mqs+0x98/0xfe0 net/core/dev.c:10719 sl_alloc drivers/net/slip/slip.c:756 [inline] slip_open+0x36d/0x1210 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:817 tty_ldisc_open+0xa2/0x120 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:433 tty_set_ldisc+0x324/0x720 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:564 Freed by task 6497: device_release+0xa2/0x240 drivers/base/core.c:2507 kobject_put+0x179/0x280 lib/kobject.c:729 netdev_run_todo+0x6c8/0xef0 net/core/dev.c:10509 slip_close+0x166/0x1c0 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:906 tty_ldisc_close+0x113/0x1a0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:456 tty_ldisc_kill+0x94/0x160 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:614 tty_ldisc_release+0xe3/0x2b0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:782 tty_release+0xbcc/0xe70 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1860 Commit e58c19124189 ("slip: Fix use-after-free Read in slip_open") fixed a different source of stale entries - a device left in slip_devs[] after slip_open() freed it on the registration error path - and does not address this race, which is why the report survives it. Drop the entry from ndo_uninit instead. unregister_netdevice() calls ndo_uninit under RTNL, before the device is queued to netdev_run_todo(), so an entry that sl_sync() can still see while holding RTNL belongs to a device that cannot be freed until RTNL is dropped. sl_free_netdev() stays only for the slip_open() error path, where register_netdevice() may have failed before ndo_init and ndo_uninit is then not called either. Both running for the same device is harmless: the ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-81000 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tun: bound receive headroom tun_get_user() uses tun->align both as skb headroom and when choosing how much packet data to keep linear. OVS can propagate an oversized headroom request from another port to TUN or TAP. When align is larger than the usable space in a one-page skb head, SKB_MAX_HEAD(align) underflows and the result becomes negative when stored in good_linear. That value later wraps when assigned to the size_t linear variable, and tun_alloc_skb() can place skb->data outside the allocated head. Bound the headroom stored by TUN to the one-page skb-head budget and the largest non-sentinel 16-bit skb header offset. Leave one linear byte for raw TUN and a complete Ethernet header for TAP, including NET_IP_ALIGN. Also pull the raw-TUN protocol byte and the TAP Ethernet header before accessing them, so these checks remain safe for nonlinear skbs supplied by other allocation paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80994 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: fix flow mask use-after-free on flow deletion The commit in the Fixes tag below made so flow->mask free is scheduled via RCU right after it is removed from the flow table. The pointer stays in the flow structure and it can be accessible while in the same RCU critical section. This is done to avoid requiring ovs_mutex for the ovs_flow_free(). However, while removing the flow during processing of CMD_DEL, we do not take RCU read lock before the removal, and ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info() uses the flow->mask pointer afterwards. The RCU read lock is taken, but it's already late at that point. The comment on that line acknowledges that the lock is cosmetic and doesn't serve a real purpose. This leads to use-after-free if the RCU grace period passes between removal and the filling. It is a short race window, but it is there and can lead to a real crash in case memory allocation for the info takes a bit longer: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ovs_nla_put_key net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:1996 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovs_nla_put_key+0x2463/0x2e30 net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:2250 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801ee89970 by task ovs_flow_del_ec/9487 Call Trace: <TASK> __ovs_nla_put_key net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:1996 ovs_nla_put_key+0x2463/0x2e30 net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:2250 ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info+0x420/0x9c0 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:930 ovs_flow_cmd_del+0x53a/0x970 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:1467 ... netlink_rcv_skb+0x156/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556 </TASK> Allocated by task 9487: mask_alloc net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:967 flow_mask_insert net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:1012 ovs_flow_tbl_insert+0xea2/0x1a90 net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:1084 ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x7e3/0xd90 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:1086 ... netlink_rcv_skb+0x156/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556 Freed by task 9485: rcu_free_sheaf+0x1e/0x100 mm/slub.c:5978 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2645 rcu_core+0x59c/0x10c0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897 handle_softirqs+0x1e4/0x9a0 kernel/softirq.c:622 ... instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 ovs_flow_tbl_remove() must be called after the ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info() to avoid this race. This also helps with cleaning up the forced cast and the cosmetic RCU read lock. Before the commit in the Fixes tag the order did not matter as long as the flow object itself was not freed. A wider RCU critical section could be another option, but we have a GFP_KERNEL allocation in the way. Reported by Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative as ZDI-CAN-32042. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80992 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ravb: avoid dereferencing an invalid PTP clock The PTP clock is unavailable before the first open, so querying its index can dereference a NULL pointer. Registration failures can also leave an error pointer in priv->ptp.clock. Cache the PHC index separately and report -1 while no clock is registered. Normalize registration errors to NULL and preserve the static timestamping capabilities. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80990 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 4.8 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: thunderbolt: Release the Rx HopID that was handed out on mismatch tb_xdomain_alloc_in_hopid() passes the wanted HopID to ida_alloc_range() as the lower bound, so a taken id is not an error there: the allocator returns the next free one above it. tbnet_connected_work() asks for the peer's transmit path, treats any other id as a failure and returns without releasing what it got, so that allocation stays live for the rest of the XDomain connection with nothing left holding a reference to it. Release the id when it is not the one we asked for, the same way the error unwind at the end of the function releases the expected one. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80989 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: thunderbolt: Mark the connection down when bringing it up fails Every failure path in tbnet_connected_work() undoes its own work and returns without clearing login_sent, so the connection still looks established. The next tbnet_tear_down() therefore takes its main branch and repeats a teardown that already happened: it stops rings that are already stopped, which is a dev_WARN() and fatal under panic_on_warn, and it releases net->remote_transmit_path even on the HopID mismatch path, where this connection never owned that id, silently freeing one that someone else is still using. Clear login_sent on those paths. That is enough for tbnet_tear_down() to leave the unwound state alone, and login_received has to stay set: it records that the peer has logged in and carries the transmit path it gave us, which nothing on this side can make the peer send again. Two things change beyond keeping the teardown out of the way: the logout request in that block is no longer sent, and the peer's next login request now re-queues our login work rather than connected_work, giving the connection a fresh login instead of a retry on stale state. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80988 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NTB: ntb_transport: Fail TX enqueue when the QP link is down Commit f195a1a6fe41 ("ntb: Drop packets when qp link is down") meant to make ntb_transport_tx_enqueue() drop packets submitted while the QP link is down, but it only returns 0 without consuming the packet. Zero means success by this function's contract, so ntb_netdev reports NETDEV_TX_OK and forgets the skb: nothing queued it, nothing frees it, and it leaks, one skb for every transmit racing a link-down. Return -ENOLINK instead, restoring the contract that a non-zero return leaves the buffer owned by the caller. With the preceding patch, ntb_netdev frees the skb on non-retryable enqueue failures and returns NETDEV_TX_OK, so a packet racing with link-down is dropped without leaking or entering a busy retry loop. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80987 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NTB: ntb_transport: Reject oversized TX buffers ntb_process_tx() handles an oversized buffer by calling tx_handler() with a NULL data pointer and returning success. ntb_netdev therefore neither frees the skb in its completion callback nor takes its enqueue error path, leaking it. Reject oversized buffers in ntb_transport_tx_enqueue() before acquiring a queue entry and return -EMSGSIZE. The caller retains ownership of the buffer, and the preceding netdev patch frees the skb when enqueue returns this permanent error. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80984 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: do not dereference an unset send buffer on the SMC-D teardown path smc_close_stream_wait() calls smc_tx_prepared_sends() from inside its sk_wait_event() condition, and sk_wait_event() evaluates that condition once with the socket lock released. smcd_buf_detach() clears conn->sndbuf_desc from smc_conn_kill() under lock_sock(), so a link group terminating while a socket waits there leaves the helper dereferencing NULL, faulting out of close(). SIOCOUTQ reads the field by hand, and smc_close_cancel_work() drops the lock across two cancel_*_sync() calls. Sample the pointer once in the helper, report nothing prepared while it is unset, and bound the ioctl the same way. The receive tasklet dereferences the field directly in smc_cdc_msg_recv_action(), not through this helper; 1/2 is what keeps it from running that late. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80983 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix socket refcount leak in smc_switch_conns() smc_switch_conns() takes a reference on the SMC socket before dropping lgr->conns_lock, so the connection stays alive while the CDC slot is fetched: sock_hold(&smc->sk); read_unlock_bh(&lgr->conns_lock); /* pre-fetch buffer outside of send_lock, might sleep */ rc = smc_cdc_get_free_slot(conn, to_lnk, &wr_buf, NULL, &pend); if (rc) goto err_out; The err_out label only drops the wr_tx link reference, so this early exit returns without the matching sock_put(). The second error exit is not affected, because sock_put() has already run by then. A leaked sk_refcnt means the smc_sock is never destroyed. Its send and receive buffers stay allocated, and for a user socket the reference held on the network namespace is never released, so the netns can no longer be torn down. smc_cdc_get_free_slot() fails when the target link goes down or when the connection has been killed while the switch is in progress. Both are reachable during the link failover this function implements, so the leak is triggered by the same hardware events that make smc_switch_conns() run in the first place. Restructure so there is a single sock_put() covering both outcomes, instead of adding a second one to the error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80982 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix use-after-free in smc_rx_pipe_buf_release() smc_rx_splice() hands RMB pages to a pipe and takes a socket reference per entry so the smc_sock stays alive until the reader finishes. The connection does not: a concurrent close runs smc_conn_free(), which releases the receive buffer back to the link group pool. smc_rx_pipe_buf_release() tests sk_state before taking the socket lock. The state can change between the test and the lock, and smc_rx_update_cons() then dereferences conn->rmb_desc and walks conn->lgr, which smc_conn_free() has already released. On the is_reg_err path smcr_buf_unuse() frees the descriptor outright, so this is a use-after-free. Take the socket lock first and test conn->freed instead. smc_conn_free() sets that flag before releasing anything, and every caller holds the socket lock. The two paths exclude each other: either the pipe release runs first with everything valid, or it sees the flag and skips the update. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80979 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: unregister the connection before draining the rx tasklet smc_conn_free() calls smc_ism_unset_conn() only while the link group is still on its device list, and never sets conn->killed. smc_lgr_terminate_sched() unlinks the group immediately and defers killing its connections to a work item, so a connection freed in that window keeps its smcd->conn[] slot with both gates in smcd_handle_irq() open, and the device can re-arm the receive tasklet after tasklet_kill() has returned. On the DMB-nocopy path the ghost send buffer is freed right after that drain, so the re-armed tasklet dereferences it. Unregister unconditionally and drain before the detach at both teardown sites, mirroring rmb_desc, which smc_buf_unuse() releases after the drain. Clear conn->sndbuf_desc before freeing it as well, so a reader that samples the pointer cannot get one that is already freed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80978 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: cap advertised IP tunnel headroom IP tunnel devices derive their advertised needed_headroom from lower output devices. A stack of user-created devices can make the derived value larger than the 16-bit skb header offsets can represent. Once IP output reserves it, skb head expansion can wrap those offsets. The runtime transmit path already caps a growing needed_headroom at 512. Apply the same cap when tunnel configuration publishes needed_headroom derived from a lower output device. Capping the advertised value is safe: IP tunnel transmit still expands the skb when a packet needs more headroom. A nonsensical stacked configuration can therefore incur an extra reallocation, but it cannot publish an unbounded reservation to upper layers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80977 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: don't touch shared zerocopy state in skb_tx_error() skb_tx_error() completes the zerocopy uarg and clears SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY, and skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed() clears SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS. Both live in skb_shinfo(), which every clone shares, while the caller only owns the reference it is about to drop. Through a clone it tells the producer its pages are free and drops SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG for an skb that is still in flight. Open vSwitch reaches this with a non-last OVS_ACTION_ATTR_RECIRC: clone_execute() sends a skb_clone() into ovs_dp_process_packet() while do_execute_actions() keeps forwarding the original, and skb_clone() does not privatise the frags here -- skb_orphan_frags() returns early on SKBFL_DONT_ORPHAN. A flow miss on the clone then strips the marker from the packet still being forwarded, and a later local ESP delivery decrypts in place over frags it does not own privately. Skip it for a cloned skb. Nothing is lost: skb_release_data() clears the zerocopy state once the last reference to the shared data goes. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80976 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seg6: reset IP6CB after IPv6 decapsulation decap_and_validate() pulls the outer SRv6 headers and makes the inner packet the skb network header. The IPv6 control block still contains values collected while parsing the outer packet, including nhoff and extension-header flags. End.DX6 and End.DT6 route the inner IPv6 packet directly to the IPv6 input path. An unprivileged user can reach End.DT6 from a user and net namespace by installing a local SID and injecting an outer packet with Hop-by-Hop and Destination Options headers followed by an SRH and a minimal inner IPv6 packet. The outer extension headers leave a large nhoff in IP6CB. After decapsulation, ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu() uses that stale offset on the inner packet and reads beyond the skb head. KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1118/0x1450 ip6_input_finish+0x11b/0x240 seg6_local_input_core+0xed/0x2e0 lwtunnel_input+0x1e9/0x4e0 ipv6_rthdr_rcv+0x525f/0x6c50 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xcb7/0x1450 Before clearing IP6CB for an inner IPv6 packet, save its incoming interface index and L3 slave state. Restore both after the clear and set nhoff to the inner IPv6 base-header nexthdr field. Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif because VRF processing can replace skb_iif with the L3 master while IP6CB keeps the receiving interface. Preserve IP6SKB_L3SLAVE for the same reason. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80973 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 6.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: 6fire: bound the MIDI event length from the device usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler() forwards a MIDI event using a length byte the device supplies, with no bound and no check that the transfer delivered that many bytes: if (!urb->status) { if (rt->receiver_buffer[0] == 0x10) /* midi in event */ if (midi_rt) midi_rt->in_received(midi_rt, rt->receiver_buffer + 2, rt->receiver_buffer[1]); } receiver_buffer is a 64-byte kzalloc() buffer (COMM_RECEIVER_BUFSIZE), so only 62 bytes follow the two-byte header. receiver_buffer[1] is a u8 the device chooses, so a device that answers with 0x10 and a length of 0xFF makes snd_rawmidi_receive() read 255 bytes starting two bytes into a 64-byte object. The bytes past the buffer are handed to userspace through the rawmidi read path. urb->actual_length is not consulted either, so a short transfer leaves both the type byte and the length byte at their previous values and the handler acts on stale data. The receiver URB is submitted from usb6fire_comm_init() at probe, so the read happens on plug with no user action; forwarding to userspace also needs a MIDI input substream open, since usb6fire_midi_in_received() only calls snd_rawmidi_receive() when rt->in is set. KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), single packet from an emulated device: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snd_rawmidi_receive Read of size 255 at addr ffff000009f64682 by task bash/183 __asan_memcpy snd_rawmidi_receive usb6fire_midi_in_received [snd_usb_6fire] usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler [snd_usb_6fire] Allocated by task 11: usb6fire_comm_init [snd_usb_6fire] usb6fire_chip_probe [snd_usb_6fire] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region [ffff000009f64680, ffff000009f646c0) Reject the event when the length exceeds the bytes that follow the header, and require the transfer to have delivered the header plus that many bytes. The receiver URB is submitted with a 64-byte transfer_buffer_length, so a genuine device cannot deliver an event longer than those 62 bytes and nothing valid is dropped. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <[email protected]> | ||||
| CVE-2026-80972 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 5.2 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: aloop: Check card index validity at probe aloop driver blindly trusts that the given devptr->id value is within the proper card index range at probe. It's OK for the devices the driver itself creates at the module probe time, but if the device is bound manually via sysfs interface, this could be -1 as "none", and this leads to OOB access for index[] and other parameters. Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a value out of the range. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80971 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: bcd2000: clear the URB pointers on disconnect bcd2000_free_usb_related_resources() frees both URBs and leaves the pointers behind: usb_kill_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb); usb_kill_urb(bcd2k->midi_in_urb); usb_free_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb); usb_free_urb(bcd2k->midi_in_urb); The rawmidi device outlives that call. A substream that is still open when the device is unplugged reaches bcd2000_midi_send() from the trigger path on close. That function writes to the freed URB and then hands it to the USB core: bcd2k->midi_out_urb->transfer_buffer_length = BUFSIZE; ... ret = usb_submit_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb, GFP_ATOMIC); usb_kill_urb() does not stop a later submission either, so a submit that races the disconnect can requeue the URB after it has been reaped. midi_in_urb is exposed the same way: bcd2000_input_complete() resubmits it from the completion handler. KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bcd2000_midi_send [snd_bcd2000] Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001827d388 by task bpoc/168 __asan_store4 bcd2000_midi_send [snd_bcd2000] bcd2000_midi_output_trigger [snd_bcd2000] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1 close_substream.part.0 Freed by task 168: usb_free_urb bcd2000_disconnect [snd_bcd2000] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usb_submit_urb Read of size 8 at addr ffff00001827d3b8 by task bpoc/168 Clear both pointers after freeing and test them on the paths that can still run. Poison the URBs before freeing them: usb_poison_urb() waits for a running completion handler and rejects any later submission, so after it returns the input path is quiesced and only the rawmidi trigger path can still reach bcd2000_midi_send(). No unpoison is needed; the URBs are freed on the next line. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <[email protected]> | ||||
| CVE-2026-80970 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-14 | 4.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace: buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size; void *resp __free(kfree) = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); ... if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size)) return -EFAULT; Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer: err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN, 0, private->bInterfaceNumber, step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size); if (err < 0) return err; usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success. snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally: buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); ... memcpy(data, buf, size); Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255: # init_on_alloc off, no spray step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255 000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01 010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232 # identical run, init_on_alloc=1 step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0 # all three runs step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62 a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region. Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <[email protected]> | ||||