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Search Results (378141 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-72433 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_meta_bridge: fix NFT_META_BRI_IIFPVID stack leak This needs to test for nonzero retval. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72432 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tpm_crb: Check ACPI_COMPANION() against NULL during probe Every platform driver can be forced to match a device that doesn't match its list of device IDs because of device_match_driver_override(), so platform drivers that rely on the existence of a device's ACPI companion object need to verify its presence. Accordingly, add a requisite ACPI_COMPANION() check against NULL to the tpm_crb driver. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72431 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: alloc_tag: fix use-after-free in /proc/allocinfo after module unload allocinfo_start() only reinitializes the codetag iterator at position 0. For subsequent reads (position > 0), it reuses cached iterator state from the previous batch. allocinfo_stop() drops mod_lock between read batches, which allows module unload to complete and free the module memory that the cached iterator still references: CPU0 (read) CPU1 (rmmod) ---- ---- allocinfo_start(pos=0) down_read(mod_lock) allocinfo_show() ... allocinfo_stop() up_read(mod_lock) codetag_unload_module() kfree(cmod) release_module_tags() ... free_mod_mem() allocinfo_start(pos=N) down_read(mod_lock) // reuses cached iter, skips re-init allocinfo_show() ct->filename <-- UAF After free_mod_mem() frees the module's .rodata, allocinfo_show() dereferences ct->filename, ct->function which point there. Save the iterator state in allocinfo_next() and resume from it in allocinfo_start() with codetag_next_ct(), which detects module removal via idr_find() returning NULL and skips to the next module. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72430 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_ct: fix nf_connlabels leak on two error paths tcf_ct_fill_params() calls nf_connlabels_get() (setting put_labels) when TCA_CT_LABELS is present, but two later error sites use a bare return instead of "goto err", skipping the err: nf_connlabels_put() cleanup. They also precede the "p->put_labels = put_labels" assignment, so the tcf_ct_params_free() fallback does not release the count either. Each failed RTM_NEWACTION on these paths leaks one nf_connlabels reference: net->ct.labels_used is incremented and never released. The action is reachable with CAP_NET_ADMIN over the netns, i.e. from an unprivileged user namespace on default-userns kernels. Impact: an unprivileged user with CAP_NET_ADMIN over a network namespace (e.g. via user namespaces) leaks one nf_connlabels reference per failed RTM_NEWACTION on the two error paths; net->ct.labels_used is never released. The err: label is safe to reach from both sites: p->tmpl is still NULL there (kzalloc'd, not yet assigned) and nf_ct_put(NULL) is a no-op, so no inline release is needed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72429 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: ioam: fix type confusion of dst_entry IOAM uses a dummy dst_entry(null_dst) to mark that the destination should not be changed after the transformation. This dst is stored in the IOAM lwt state and may be passed to dst_cache_set_ip6(). However, the IPv6 dst cache path eventually calls rt6_get_cookie(), which treats the dst_entry as part of a struct rt6_info. Since the null_dst was embedded directly as a struct dst_entry in struct ioam6_lwt, this resulted in an invalid cast and rt6_get_cookie() reading fields from the wrong object. In practice, the wrong cookie is not used while dst->obsolete is zero, but rt6_get_cookie() may also access per-cpu value when rt->sernum is zero. In this case, rt->sernum aliases ioam6_lwt::cache::reset_ts, which can become zero, making this a potential invalid pointer access. Fix this by embedding a full struct rt6_info for the dummy IPv6 route and passing its dst member to the dst APIs. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72428 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix stack slot index in nospec checks check_stack_write_fixed_off() computes the byte slot for a fixed-offset stack write as -off - 1, and records each written byte in slot_type[] with (slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE. The Spectre v4 sanitization pre-check uses slot_type[i] instead. For a 4-byte write at fp-8 after the lower half of fp-8 has been zeroed, the pre-check scans bytes 0..3 and sees STACK_ZERO while the actual write updates bytes 7..4. That can leave the second half-slot write without nospec_result even though the bytes being overwritten still require sanitization. Use the same slot index in the sanitization pre-check that the write path uses when updating slot_type[]. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72427 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix effective prog array index with BPF_F_PREORDER replace_effective_prog() and purge_effective_progs() located the slot in the effective array by walking the program hlist and counting entries linearly. That count does not match the array layout: compute_effective_ progs() places BPF_F_PREORDER programs at the front (ancestor cgroup first, attach order within a cgroup) and the rest after them (descendant cgroup first). So when a preorder program is present, the linear hlist position no longer equals the program's index in the effective array. For replace_effective_prog() (bpf_link_update()) this overwrote the wrong slot, corrupting the effective order. For purge_effective_progs(), it could dummy out a slot belonging to a different program and leave the detached program in the array while bpf_prog_put() drops its reference, i.e. a use-after-free. Fix both by replaying compute_effective_progs()'s placement (including the per-cgroup preorder reversal) in a shared effective_prog_pos() helper. Identify the entry by its struct bpf_prog_list pointer rather than by (prog, link) value, so the lookup resolves to exactly the attachment the syscall selected even when the same bpf_prog is attached to several cgroups in the hierarchy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72426 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Preserve pointer spill metadata during half-slot cleanup __clean_func_state() cleans dead stack slots in 4-byte halves. When the high half of a STACK_SPILL slot is dead and the low half remains live, cleanup converts the live low half to STACK_MISC or STACK_ZERO and clears the saved spilled_ptr metadata. That conversion is safe only for scalar spills. For a pointer spill, this metadata clear lets a later 32-bit fill from the still-live half avoid the normal non-scalar register-fill check and be treated as an ordinary scalar stack read. Leave non-scalar spill slots intact in this half-live shape. This is conservative for pruning and preserves the existing check_stack_read_fixed_off() rejection path for partial fills from pointer spills. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72425 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: fix FDIR CTRL VSI resource leak in ice_reset_all_vfs() Resetting all VFs causes resource leak on VFs with FDIR filters enabled as CTRL VSIs are only invalidated and not freed. Fix by using ice_vf_ctrl_vsi_release() instead of ice_vf_ctrl_invalidate_vsi() which aligns behavior with the ice_reset_vf() function. Reproduction: echo 1 > /sys/class/net/$pf/device/sriov_numvfs ethtool -N $vf flow-type ether proto 0x9000 action 0 echo 1 > /sys/class/net/$pf/device/reset | ||||
| CVE-2026-72424 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtc: msc313: fix NULL deref in shared IRQ handler at probe msc313_rtc_probe() calls devm_request_irq() with IRQF_SHARED and &pdev->dev as the cookie, but platform_set_drvdata() is only called later after the clock setup. With a shared IRQ line, another device on the same line can trigger the handler in that window. The handler does dev_get_drvdata() on the cookie, gets NULL, and dereferences priv->rtc_base in interrupt context. Pass priv as the cookie directly so the handler reads it from dev_id without the lookup, removing the dependency on probe order. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72423 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Guard conntrack opts error writes The conntrack lookup and allocation kfuncs take an opts pointer together with an opts__sz argument. The verifier checks only the memory range described by opts__sz, but the wrappers unconditionally write opts->error whenever the internal lookup or allocation helper returns an error. For an invalid size smaller than the end of opts->error, that write can land outside the verifier-checked range. Keep returning NULL for invalid arguments, but only report the error through opts->error when the supplied size includes the field. This preserves error reporting for the supported 12-byte and 16-byte layouts, and for other invalid sizes that still include opts->error. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72422 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix use-after-free of conn->preauth_info in concurrent SMB2 NEGOTIATE conn->preauth_info is shared connection state (struct preauth_integrity_info, kmalloc-96) that is allocated and freed by the SMB2 NEGOTIATE handler and read by the response send path. smb2_handle_negotiate() allocates conn->preauth_info, and on a deassemble_neg_contexts() failure kfrees it and sets it to NULL. Both the allocation and the free/NULL happen under ksmbd_conn_lock(conn) (the connection srv_mutex), which is held across the whole handler body. The response send path smb3_preauth_hash_rsp(), called from the send: block of __handle_ksmbd_work(), reads conn->preauth_info and dereferences conn->preauth_info->Preauth_HashValue (via ksmbd_gen_preauth_integrity_hash()) without taking conn_lock. When a client drives two SMB2 NEGOTIATE requests on the same connection, one worker can free conn->preauth_info on the failing-negotiate path while a concurrent send-path worker is reading it, producing a slab use-after-free read (KASAN-confirmed). The send-path read tested conn->preauth_info for NULL but raced with the free that occurs between the NULL check and the dereference, so the NULL guard alone does not close the window. Serialize the NEGOTIATE-branch read in smb3_preauth_hash_rsp() under ksmbd_conn_lock(conn) and re-check conn->preauth_info inside the lock. Because the negotiate handler holds conn_lock across its kfree + NULL assignment, a reader that also takes conn_lock either runs fully before the allocation or fully after the NULL store, and can never observe the freed-but-not-yet-NULLed pointer. ksmbd_gen_preauth_integrity_hash() takes no locks itself (it only computes a SHA-512 over the buffer), so no lock-ordering inversion is introduced, and conn_lock is a sleepable mutex which is safe on this send path (it already performs network I/O). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72421 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: fib: Don't ignore error route in local/main tables. When CONFIG_IP_MULTIPLE_TABLES is enabled but no rule is added, fib_lookup() performs route lookup directly on two tables. Since the first lookup does not properly bail out, the result of an error route in the merged local/main table could be overwritten by another route in the default table: # unshare -n # ip link set lo up # ip route add 192.168.0.0/24 dev lo table 253 # ip route add unreachable 192.168.0.0/24 # ip route get 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.1 dev lo table default uid 0 cache <local> Once a random rule is added, the error route is respected: # ip rule add table 0 # ip rule del table 0 # ip route get 192.168.0.1 RTNETLINK answers: No route to host Let's fix the inconsistent behaviour. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72420 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches KCSAN report a race in break_stripe_batch_list() vs. raid5_make_request() on sh->dev[i].flags (plain word write vs. atomic bit op).. and .. one possible scenario is: CPU1 CPU2 break_stripe_batch_list(sh1) -> handle sh2 -> lock(sh2) -> sh2->batch_head = NULL -> unlock(sh2) -> test_and_clear_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2->dev[i].flags) -> wake_up_bit(sh2->dev[i].flags) raid5_make_request() -> add_all_stripe_bios(sh2) -> lock(sh2) -> stripe_bio_overlaps(sh2) returns true batch_head is NULL, so new bio overlap exist bio on sh2 -> true -> set_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2->dev[i].flags) -> unlock(sh2) -> wait_on_bit(sh2->dev[i].flags) -> sh2->dev[i].flags = sh1->dev[i].flags & ~R5_Overlap No wait_up_bit(), CPU2 could be wait_on_bit() forever... Fix by : - Expand the protect zone. - Use batch_head's device flag's snaphot when no held head_sh->stripe_lock. - Move sh/head_sh->batch_head = NULL to the end of protected zone , and , any concurrent add_all_stripe_bios() grabs sh->stripe_lock now either: - see batch_head != null, and , is rejected by stripe_bio_overlaps() under the lock (no R5_Overlap wait ) , or , - sees batch_head == NULL, only after dev[i].flags has already been set and the prior R5_Overlap waiters worken. KCSAN report: ================================================ BUG: KCSAN: data-race in break_stripe_batch_list / raid5_make_request write (marked) to 0xffff8e89c8117548 of 8 bytes by task 4042 on cpu 0: raid5_make_request+0xea0/0x2930 md_handle_request+0x4a2/0xa40 md_submit_bio+0x109/0x1a0 __submit_bio+0x2ec/0x390 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x457/0x710 submit_bio_noacct+0x2a7/0xc20 submit_bio+0x56/0x250 blkdev_direct_IO+0x54c/0xda0 blkdev_write_iter+0x38f/0x570 aio_write+0x22b/0x490 io_submit_one+0xa51/0xf70 __x64_sys_io_submit+0xf7/0x220 x64_sys_call+0x1907/0x1c60 do_syscall_64+0x130/0x570 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e read to 0xffff8e89c8117548 of 8 bytes by task 4010 on cpu 5: break_stripe_batch_list+0x249/0x480 handle_stripe_clean_event+0x720/0x9b0 handle_stripe+0x32fb/0x4500 handle_active_stripes.isra.0+0x6e0/0xa50 raid5d+0x7e0/0xba0 md_thread+0x15a/0x2d0 kthread+0x1e3/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x37a/0x410 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 value changed: 0x0000000000000019 -> 0x0000000000000099 --> R5_Overlap | ||||
| CVE-2026-72419 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_nat: avoid invalid nat_net pointer use on failed nf_nat_init() We ran into below KASAN splat, which is mostly uninteresting, beside for having nf_nat_register_fn() in the call chain as a cause for the offending access: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_nat_register_fn+0x5f9/0x640 Read of size 8 at addr ffff890031e54c20 by task iptables/9510 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9510 Comm: iptables Not tainted 6.18.18-grsec-full-20260320181326 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> […] dump_stack_lvl+0xee/0x160 ffff88004117eeb8 […] print_report+0x6e/0x640 ffff88004117eee0 […] ? __phys_addr+0x8e/0x140 ffff88004117eef0 […] ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x51/0xe0 ffff88004117ef08 […] ? complete_report_info+0xec/0x1c0 ffff88004117ef20 […] ? nf_nat_register_fn+0x5f9/0x640 ffff88004117ef48 […] kasan_report+0xbc/0x140 ffff88004117ef50 […] ? nf_nat_register_fn+0x5f9/0x640 ffff88004117ef90 […] nf_nat_register_fn+0x5f9/0x640 ffff88004117eff8 […] ? nf_nat_icmp_reply_translation+0x6e0/0x6e0 ffff88004117f070 […] nf_tables_register_hook.part.0+0xa0/0x220 ffff88004117f080 […] nf_tables_addchain.constprop.0+0x1054/0x1fc0 ffff88004117f0b8 […] ? nft_chain_lookup.part.0+0x4ce/0xac0 ffff88004117f130 […] ? nf_tables_abort+0x3d80/0x3d80 ffff88004117f190 […] ? nf_tables_dumpreset_obj+0x100/0x100 ffff88004117f1c8 […] ? nft_table_lookup.part.0+0x255/0x300 ffff88004117f310 […] ? nf_tables_newchain+0x21a4/0x2fa0 ffff88004117f358 […] nf_tables_newchain+0x21a4/0x2fa0 ffff88004117f360 […] ? nf_tables_addchain.constprop.0+0x1fc0/0x1fc0 ffff88004117f458 […] ? nla_get_range_signed+0x4a0/0x4a0 ffff88004117f488 […] ? lock_acquire+0x16f/0x320 ffff88004117f490 […] ? find_held_lock+0x3b/0xe0 ffff88004117f4b0 […] ? __nla_parse+0x45/0x80 ffff88004117f500 […] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xbca/0x19a0 ffff88004117f550 […] ? nfnetlink_net_exit_batch+0x120/0x120 ffff88004117f618 […] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x63/0xe0 ffff88004117f720 […] ? gr_acl_handle_mmap+0x1c4/0x320 ffff88004117f7c0 […] ? nla_get_range_signed+0x4a0/0x4a0 ffff88004117f7e8 […] ? gr_is_capable+0x6f/0xe0 ffff88004117f830 […] ? __nla_parse+0x45/0x80 ffff88004117f860 […] ? skb_pull+0x103/0x1a0 ffff88004117f880 […] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3db/0x4a0 ffff88004117f8b0 […] ? nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x19a0/0x19a0 ffff88004117f8d8 […] ? netlink_lookup+0xe2/0x240 ffff88004117f900 […] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0xb00 ffff88004117f930 […] ? netlink_attachskb+0xb20/0xb20 ffff88004117f980 […] ? __check_object_size+0x3e/0xaa0 ffff88004117f998 […] ? security_netlink_send+0x51/0x160 ffff88004117f9c8 […] netlink_sendmsg+0xa03/0x1200 ffff88004117f9f8 […] ? netlink_unicast+0xb00/0xb00 ffff88004117fa70 […] ? netlink_unicast+0xb00/0xb00 ffff88004117fac8 […] ? ____sys_sendmsg+0xe2a/0x1040 ffff88004117faf8 […] ____sys_sendmsg+0xe2a/0x1040 ffff88004117fb00 […] ? kernel_recvmsg+0x300/0x300 ffff88004117fb60 […] ? reacquire_held_locks+0xe9/0x260 ffff88004117fbc8 […] ___sys_sendmsg+0x138/0x200 ffff88004117fbf8 […] ? do_recvmmsg+0x7e0/0x7e0 ffff88004117fc30 […] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x101/0x1e0 ffff88004117fc50 […] ? lock_acquire+0x16f/0x320 ffff88004117fd20 […] ? lock_acquire+0x16f/0x320 ffff88004117fd58 […] ? find_held_lock+0x3b/0xe0 ffff88004117fd70 […] __sys_sendmsg+0x17a/0x260 ffff88004117fdc8 […] ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x80/0x80 ffff88004117fdf0 […] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x15e/0x2c0 ffff88004117fe98 […] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x400 ffff88004117fec8 […] entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack+0x4a/0x60 ffff88004117fef8 </TASK> ================================================================== The out-of-bounds report, though, is a red herring as it is f ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-72418 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct Commit 69894e5b4c5e ("netfilter: nft_connlimit: update the count if add was skipped") introduced a regression where packets for valid connections are dropped when using connlimit for soft-limiting scenarios. The issue occurs when a new connection reuses a socket currently in the TIME_WAIT state. In this scenario, the connection tracking entry is evaluated as already confirmed. Previously, __nf_conncount_add() assumed that if a connection was confirmed and did not originate from the loopback interface, it should skip the addition and return -EEXIST. Skipping the addition triggers a garbage collection run that cleans up the TIME_WAIT connection. Consequently, the active connection count drops to 0, which xt_connlimit mishandles, leading to the false rejection of the perfectly valid new connection. Fix this by replacing the interface check with protocol-agnostic state checks. We now skip the tree insertion and preserve the lockless garbage collection optimization only if the connection is IPS_ASSURED. This allows early-confirmed setup packets (such as reused TIME_WAIT sockets or locally generated SYN-ACKs) to be properly evaluated and counted without falsely dropping. The goto check_connections path is maintained to ensure these setup packets are deduplicated correctly. This has been tested with slowhttptest and HTTP server configured locally to ensure we are not breaking soft-limiting scenarios for local or external connections. In addition, it was tested with a OVS zone limit too. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72417 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: flowtable: Validate iph->ihl in nf_flow_ip4_tunnel_proto() Add sanity check for iph->ihl field in nf_flow_ip4_tunnel_proto() before using it to compute the header size, avoiding out-of-bounds access with malformed IP headers. While at it, use iph->protocol instead of the hardcoded IPPROTO_IPIP constant when setting ctx->tun.proto and reference ctx->tun.hdr_size when updating ctx->offset. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72416 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_compat: ebtables emulation must reject non-bridge targets xtables targets return netfilter verdicts: NF_ACCEPT, NF_DROP, and so on. ebtables targets return incompatible verdicts: EBT_ACCEPT, EBT_DROP, ... We cannot allow fallback to NFPROTO_UNSPEC. ebtables doesn't permit this since 11ff7288beb2 ("netfilter: ebtables: reject non-bridge targets") but that commit missed the nft_compat layer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72415 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SDCA: Validate written enum value in ge_put_enum_double() ge_put_enum_double() passes the user-supplied enumeration index item[0] to snd_soc_enum_item_to_val() without checking it against the number of items in the enum: ret = snd_soc_enum_item_to_val(e, item[0]); snd_soc_enum_item_to_val() indexes the heap-allocated e->values[] array with that index (e->values is set from a devm_kcalloc() of e->items entries), so a control write with an out-of-range item[0] reads past the end of the values buffer. The bounds check in snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double() only runs afterwards, so it does not prevent the read here. Reject an out-of-range item before using it, matching the other enum put handlers. This issue was pointed out by the Sashiko AI review bot while reviewing a related enum-validation series: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ | ||||
| CVE-2026-72414 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dsa: sja1105: round up PTP perout pin duration pin_duration is converted from the user-provided period to SJA1105 clock ticks and is later passed as the cycle_time argument to future_base_time(). Very small period values may become zero after the conversion, which can lead to a division by zero in future_base_time(). Round zero pin_duration up to 1 tick so that the smallest unsupported periods use the minimum non-zero hardware duration instead of passing zero to future_base_time(). | ||||