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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-81685 | 1 Jahlives | 1 Openssl Encrypt | 2026-08-27 | 3.3 Low |
| openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.9 fail to sanitize recovery-slot metadata in the desktop GUI, allowing attackers to inject control characters and line separators into the irreversible-removal confirmation dialog. Attackers can craft encrypted files with malicious slot identifiers containing bidi overrides or line-separator characters to forge warning text and deceive users during file removal operations. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81683 | 1 Jahlives | 1 Openssl Encrypt | 2026-08-27 | 8.4 High |
| openssl_encrypt (pip package openssl-encrypt) versions 1.4.8 and earlier store an mTLS client private key in cleartext within a world-readable (0644) SharedPreferences file via the desktop GUI's Settings screen 'combined certificate and private key' PEM field. A local attacker with file system access can read the exposed private key. Version 1.4.9 writes the PEM to a dedicated 0600 file, keeps only its path in SharedPreferences, and migrates/scrubs existing cleartext values. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81681 | 1 Jahlives | 1 Openssl Encrypt | 2026-08-27 | 4.6 Medium |
| openssl_encrypt (pip package openssl-encrypt) versions <= 1.4.8 advertise a portable USB workspace as an 'Encrypted USB Workspace' with AES-256-GCM encryption and write a marker declaring the workspace encrypted, but the workspace directory is actually stored in cleartext and the derived encryption key is never applied to it. A user who trusts the branding and places files in the workspace leaves them unencrypted on the removable media, so an attacker with physical access to the media can read the sensitive files. Fixed in 1.4.9, which seals the workspace into an authenticated AES-256-GCM vault. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81680 | 1 Jahlives | 1 Openssl Encrypt | 2026-08-27 | 4 Medium |
| openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.9 fail to authenticate recovery-slot presence in envelope-format encrypted files, allowing attackers to remove recovery slots without re-encrypting the payload. Attackers can modify the file header to delete recovery-slot fields and bypass authentication, silently removing recovery paths the owner deliberately added. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81678 | 1 Wwbn | 1 Avideo | 2026-08-27 | 7.5 High |
| AVideo before 24.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the isSSRFSafeURL function that fails to extract embedded IPv4 addresses from NAT64, 6to4, and Teredo IPv6 transition address formats. Unauthenticated attackers can bypass SSRF protections via the LiveLinks proxy endpoint to reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints by encoding private IPv4 targets in transition address formats. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81335 | 1 Baserow | 1 Baserow | 2026-08-27 | 7.5 High |
| Baserow dispatches an Application Builder data source without acting on the result of its permission check. The dispatch and record-name views in backend/src/baserow/contrib/builder/api/data_sources/views.py are declared with a permission class that admits any caller, so a request carrying no credential reaches the handler. DataSourceService.dispatch_data_sources in backend/src/baserow/contrib/builder/data_sources/service.py then calls check_multiple_permissions without asking it to raise, and neither stores nor examines the mapping of denials it returns, so a denied check leaves execution to continue and the data source is dispatched whatever the caller's identity. The dispatch runs with the integration's own credentials, so an unauthenticated request naming a data source receives the rows and fields that source reads. Identifiers are small integers and can be enumerated. Version 2.3.1 passes raise_exception to the same call. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81334 | 1 Hank-ai | 1 Darknet | 2026-08-27 | 6.1 Medium |
| darknet subscripts its layer array with an index taken from a configuration file without checking it against the array's length. The array is allocated in src-lib/darknet_network.cpp as xcalloc(net.n, sizeof(Darknet::Layer)), sized to exactly the number of layer sections the file declares. The shortcut, scale_channels and sam sections supply that index through their from field and the route section through its layers field, and parse_shortcut_section in src-lib/darknet_cfg.cpp reads net.layers[index].outputs with no bounds check, which reads past the allocation. The dispatch loop in create_network then reuses the same index to assign net.layers[l.index].use_bin_output and net.layers[l.index].keep_delta_gpu, writing past the allocation at an offset the file controls, with a fixed one-byte value. Parsing a crafted configuration file is sufficient: the parse runs before any weights file is opened and needs no non-default option, so the result is a reliable crash and a write whose location, though not its value, is chosen by whoever supplied the file. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81101 | 2026-08-27 | 6.5 Medium | ||
| The configure command accepted any endpoint URL and stored it beside the user's access token. ConfigureCommand.execute in src/cli.ts persisted the value given to its endpoint option into the user profile without passing it through createSafeUrl in src/config.ts, the helper that already restricted the environment-variable form of the same setting to the vendor's own hosts over HTTPS. Because the connect path in src/mcp.ts attaches the stored token as a bearer credential on every request to the configured endpoint, a user who was persuaded to run configure with an endpoint of the attacker's choosing sent their personal access token to that destination on each subsequent invocation. Version 0.2.5 applies the same helper to the option. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81099 | 2026-08-27 | 6.8 Medium | ||
| tiger-slack started its MCP HTTP transport without enabling the host allow-list the underlying SDK provides. mcp/src/httpServer.ts called the shared httpServerFactory helper and never set the DNS-rebinding-protection option, so the transport accepted a request whatever host it named, and a page in a browser could point a name it controlled at the address the server was bound to and drive the locally reachable Slack MCP server through the visitor's browser. The fix passes the option explicitly alongside a dependency update; the update alone would not have closed it. The repository publishes no release that brackets the fix, so the affected boundary is the commit preceding it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81096 | 2026-08-27 | 10 Critical | ||
| ToolUniverse ran caller-supplied Python inside a sandbox that could be escaped, on a server that required no authentication. The executor behind the python_code_executor tool, in python_executor_tool.py, inspected the submitted source for a denied list of attribute names and calls but left the attribute-lookup builtins available and did not stop a dunder attribute reached through a string lookup or through a module already permitted, so a caller could walk from a literal's class to its base and enumerate subclasses to obtain a reference to the process and subprocess modules. A per-call argument also let the caller widen the import allow-list before the inspection ran. The HTTP and MCP servers in http_api_server.py and smcp_server.py bound to every interface with debugging enabled and no authentication, so any caller able to reach the port executed code as the server process. Version 1.3.0 adds bearer-token authentication, defaults the bind address to loopback, and hardens the attribute checks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81094 | 2026-08-27 | 9.1 Critical | ||
| The mcp-router CLI served its MCP aggregator on every interface and enforced authentication only when the operator asked for it. The serve command in apps/cli/src/commands/serve.ts defaulted its host to the all-interfaces address on a fixed port, and required a token only when the corresponding flag was supplied, so a default invocation exposed the aggregator, and every MCP server it fronted, to anyone able to reach the port. Release 0.6.3 defaults the host to the loopback address and refuses to start without a token whenever the host it is given is not a loopback address; no earlier release carries either check. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81091 | 2026-08-27 | 8.6 High | ||
| The proxy middleware in mcp-use's inspector forwards requests to a destination the caller names. mountMcpProxy in libraries/typescript/packages/inspector/src/server/proxy/mcp-proxy.ts read the target from the X-Target-URL header or the __mcp_target parameter and proxied to it without inspecting the host, so loopback, link-local and private addresses were all accepted, as were names that resolve to them, and the validation was not reapplied to a redirect the destination returned. A caller could therefore make the server issue requests to addresses reachable only from the host it runs on and read the responses. The current code calls isSafeProxyTarget, which checks the resolved address against private, loopback and link-local ranges before proxying and bounds the number of redirects followed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80213 | 2026-08-27 | 4 Medium | ||
| An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::MessageEncoder wrote a DNS label's length into a single octet without checking its range. A label longer than 255 octets had its length stored modulo 256 but the label data was written unchanged, and thus the bytes on the wire described a different name than the one the application asked to encode. RFC 1035 section 2.3.4 limits a label to 63 octets, and the two high bits of the length octet are reserved for compression pointers. put_string packed the length with put_pack("C", d.length) and put_label used it for labels, and thus any value from 0 to 255 could end up as a label length octet, including the reserved 0x40-0xBF range and the 0xC0-0xFF pointer range. Resolv::DNS::Name.create did not check per-label or total name length either, and thus an attacker-controlled hostname reached the encoder unchanged. An application that resolves an attacker-controlled hostname sends a query whose wire bytes name a domain the attacker chose. A hostname suffix that the application validates against an allowlist becomes padding that never appears on the wire, and thus allowlist and egress checks can be bypassed. The recursive resolver caches the response under the attacker's name, and DNS logs record that name rather than the one the application asked for. A label length whose low octet lands in the 0xC0-0xFF range produces a length octet that conforming parsers read as the start of a compression pointer, with the following attacker-controlled byte as the offset. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80212 | 2026-08-27 | 7.5 High | ||
| An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80210 | 1 Frontaccounting | 1 Frontaccounting | 2026-08-27 | 6.5 Medium |
| FrontAccounting through 2.4.20 generates a CSRF token in end_form() in includes/ui/ui_controls.inc and embeds it as the _token hidden field in every form it renders, but only admin/users.php and admin/change_current_user_password.php call check_csrf_token() to validate it. No financial transaction handler validates the token, including gl/gl_journal.php, gl/gl_bank.php, purchasing/supplier_invoice.php, sales/customer_invoice.php, sales/customer_payments.php and admin/company_preferences.php, so those endpoints act on POST data with no origin check. An attacker who gets an authenticated user to load a page under attacker control can auto-submit a cross-origin form to any of them and have the forged journal entry, invoice, customer payment, bank transaction or company configuration change recorded under the victim's session. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80209 | 1 Fonoster | 1 Fonoster | 2026-08-27 | 4.3 Medium |
| The updateWorkspace handler in mods/identity/src/workspaces/createUpdateWorkspace.ts in Fonoster through 0.22.7 invokes the gRPC callback with PERMISSION_DENIED when createIsWorkspaceMember reports that the caller is not a member of the target workspace, but it does not return. Execution continues into prisma.workspace.update, which is scoped by the workspace reference alone, so the rename commits before the second callback is issued and the caller receives a permission error for a write that already succeeded. The gRPC interceptor in mods/common/src/identity/createAuthInterceptor.ts binds the workspace accessKeyId to the caller's token only for paths in workspaceResourceAccess or workspaceResourceOwnerOrAdminAccess, and Identity/UpdateWorkspace is listed in fullIdentityAccess, which the base USER role holds. Any authenticated user can therefore rename an arbitrary workspace in the deployment. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80207 | 2026-08-27 | 5.3 Medium | ||
| APITable through 1.13.0-beta.1 annotates the create handler of InternalNotifyController with requiredLogin = false. ResourceInterceptor honours that annotation by returning before any session or API key is validated, and the nginx gateway shipped with the product proxies every /api request to the backend server, so POST /api/v1/internal/notification/create is reachable by any unauthenticated client that can reach the gateway. An attacker can persist arbitrary notifications in apitable_player_notification against any user ID they name, and because fromUserId can be set to 0 the message is stored with the system sender and renders in the victim's inbox as a legitimate system notification. The body extras content is stored verbatim and forwarded to the frontend. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79779 | 1 Rclone | 1 Rclone | 2026-08-27 | 5.3 Medium |
| rclone versions before v1.75.0 fail to reject transport downgrades in redirect handling, allowing Basic authorization and Cookie headers to be replayed over plaintext HTTP after same-host HTTPS-to-HTTP redirects. An on-path attacker observing the plaintext hop can capture and reuse credentials to perform WebDAV operations with the compromised account's permissions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79720 | 2026-08-27 | N/A | ||
| Reflected XSS in Netron versions <=9.1.2 on desktop application through unsanitized node names allows an attacker to hide certain nodes, perform port scanning or abuse a Chrome n-day to achieve Remote Code Execution. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79719 | 2026-08-27 | N/A | ||
| Reflected XSS in Netron versions <=9.1.2 on desktop application through unsanitized node names allows an attacker to hide certain nodes, perform port scanning or abuse a Chrome n-day to achieve Remote Code Execution. | ||||