A missing length validation in the Zephyr Bluetooth Host ISO receive path can be triggered by malformed HCI ISO data. In bt_iso_recv() (subsys/bluetooth/host/iso.c), when processing PB=START/SINGLE fragments, the code pulls a TS SDU header (8 bytes, ts=1) or a non-TS SDU header (4 bytes, ts=0) without first verifying that buf->len contains at least that many bytes. The outer HCI ISO length check in hci_iso() validates payload length consistency but not the minimum inner SDU header size, so a packet with payload length 1 passes hci_iso() and then reaches net_buf_pull_mem(), which asserts buf->len >= len. As a result, malformed ISO traffic deterministically triggers a kernel assert (denial of service) in assert-enabled builds, and in non-assert builds the same path may proceed with an undersized buffer, leading to out-of-bounds read behavior. The issue affects products using the Zephyr Host with CONFIG_BT_ISO_RX enabled, particularly where incoming HCI data can be influenced by a malicious or compromised controller or malformed forwarded ISO traffic.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Tue, 23 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-125 | |
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Tue, 23 Jun 2026 02:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Zephyrproject-rtos
Zephyrproject-rtos zephyr |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Zephyrproject-rtos
Zephyrproject-rtos zephyr |
Tue, 23 Jun 2026 00:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A missing length validation in the Zephyr Bluetooth Host ISO receive path can be triggered by malformed HCI ISO data. In bt_iso_recv() (subsys/bluetooth/host/iso.c), when processing PB=START/SINGLE fragments, the code pulls a TS SDU header (8 bytes, ts=1) or a non-TS SDU header (4 bytes, ts=0) without first verifying that buf->len contains at least that many bytes. The outer HCI ISO length check in hci_iso() validates payload length consistency but not the minimum inner SDU header size, so a packet with payload length 1 passes hci_iso() and then reaches net_buf_pull_mem(), which asserts buf->len >= len. As a result, malformed ISO traffic deterministically triggers a kernel assert (denial of service) in assert-enabled builds, and in non-assert builds the same path may proceed with an undersized buffer, leading to out-of-bounds read behavior. The issue affects products using the Zephyr Host with CONFIG_BT_ISO_RX enabled, particularly where incoming HCI data can be influenced by a malicious or compromised controller or malformed forwarded ISO traffic. | |
| Title | Bluetooth Host ISO RX Missing SDU Header Length Validation in bt_iso_recv() Leads to DoS | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Projects
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: zephyr
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-23T12:20:56.564Z
Reserved: 2026-06-02T15:24:35.422Z
Link: CVE-2026-10658
Updated: 2026-06-23T12:20:52.868Z
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-23T02:30:16Z
Weaknesses