| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, rabbit_pid_codec:decompose_from_binary/1 parses a caller-supplied ETF-encoded binary and calls binary_to_atom(Node, utf8) on the node-name field. It is reached from rabbit_volatile_queue:pid_from_name/2, which is invoked for any queue name / routing key beginning amq.rabbitmq.reply-to.. The CandidateNodes membership check happens after the atom is created, and the surrounding try/catch cannot reclaim atoms (they are never GC'd). binary_to_existing_atom is not used. Any authenticated AMQP client can crash the entire Erlang VM (all vhosts, all connections) with ~1M cheap requests. Preconditions include Authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 connection to any vhost No per-connection rate limit low enough to make ~1M operations infeasible. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, match_value/3 passes the user-supplied ?name= regular expression to re:run with no match_limit option, and executes it once per resource in the result set. OTP's default 10M match_limit caps each call at roughly 100-200ms, but the regex runs once per resource in the result set. With a large set, for example 5000 queues at 150ms each, a single request consumes 12 or more minutes of CPU. Parallel requests saturate the schedulers. The use_regex=true option is a supported feature on list endpoints, so this path is reachable through normal API use. Preconditions include Any user with the management tag can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, parse_array_primitive/2 for constructor 0x45 (list0) returns an element with byte-width B = 0. The enclosing array32 parser at line 148 reads a 4-byte Count from the wire and loops Count times consuming B bytes each , with B = 0, no input is consumed and the loop builds a list of Count empty elements bounded only by the 32-bit field. The SASL-mechanisms / SASL-init frame is parsed by amqp10_framing:decode_bin/1 from rabbit_amqp_reader.erl:412 before authentication completes. The pre-auth incoming_max_frame_size (default 8192 bytes) caps the frame, not the Count field, so a 19-byte payload with Count = 0xFFFFFFFF is accepted. No max_heap_size is set on the reader process. An unauthenticated network attacker can crash any RabbitMQ node that has the AMQP 1.0 listener enabled (default port 5672) by sending a single ~19-byte frame. The reader process attempts to build a list of ~4 billion empty elements, exhausting heap memory and terminating the Erlang VM. All tenants and protocols on the node lose service. Preconditions include Network reachability to the AMQP listener (port 5672, enabled by default) No authentication required. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, pattern_to_regex maps % -> .*? and _ -> ., then compiles ^...$ with only [unicode]; re:run is called with only [{capture, none}] - no explicit match_limit. A pattern like %_%_..._%X becomes ^.*?..*?.....*?.X$ with overlapping lazy quantifiers. The whole-expression cap is ?MAX_EXPRESSION_LENGTH=4096 chars / ?MAX_TOKENS=200; a LIKE string literal is one token, so ~2000 %_ pairs fit. SQL filters are accepted unconditionally at rabbit_amqp_session.erl:3264 (no feature flag). Evaluated per-message at rabbit_stream_queue.erl:1439. OTP's default 10M match_limit caps each match at ~100-200 ms (not seconds), and the re NIF yields to the scheduler. An authenticated AMQP 1.0 consumer with read+write on a stream queue can cause ~100-200 ms of CPU per delivered message via a crafted LIKE filter, multiplied across thousands of messages and parallel sessions - a substantial backtracking-driven CPU amplification. Preconditions include AMQP 1.0 with stream queues in use Attacker can attach a receiver with a filter (read permission) and publish messages with long property values (write permission). This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, The stream open handler calls only check_vhost_access; it omits the node/vhost/user connection-limit checks that rabbit_reader performs for AMQP. A developer %% FIXME comment at the cited line explicitly acknowledges the gap. No compensating enforcement exists in connection tracking or elsewhere in rabbitmq_stream. An authenticated tenant can fully bypass operator-configured per-user and per-vhost connection caps by connecting via port 5552 instead of 5672. Preconditions include rabbitmq_stream plugin enabled Authenticated stream-protocol credentials Operator relies on per-user/per-vhost connection limits for tenant isolation. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The cowboy WebSocket options at line 117 set compress => true, enabling RFC 7692 permessage-deflate negotiation. The handler does not set max_frame_size, so cowboy's default of infinity applies. cowlib's cow_ws:parse_payload/9 calls zlib:inflate/2 on the compressed payload with no output-size limit. An attacker can negotiate permessage-deflate during the WebSocket upgrade and send a frame containing a zlib bomb (e.g. 50 KB → 5 GB). Decompression occurs in the connection process before websocket_handle/2 ever sees the MQTT bytes. An unauthenticated attacker can crash a RabbitMQ node running the Web-MQTT plugin by sending a single highly-compressed WebSocket frame (a few KB on the wire) that inflates to gigabytes in memory. The cowboy WebSocket handler decompresses the entire frame before the MQTT CONNECT packet is processed, so no credentials are required. Preconditions include rabbitmq_web_mqtt plugin enabled (not default, but common for browser clients) Network reachability to port 15675/15676 No authentication required. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.0.22, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, accept_content/2 at line 56 calls rabbit_stream_manager:create_super_stream/... directly after is_authorized (which only checks the management tag + vhost access via is_authorized_vhost). The stream-protocol equivalent (rabbit_stream_reader.erl create_super_stream handler) calls rabbit_stream_utils:check_super_stream_management_permitted/4 which enforces configure on the exchange and each partition queue. The HTTP handler omits this call entirely. A user with management tag and vhost access , but no configure permission on any resource , can create super-streams (an exchange + N partition stream queues + bindings) via the HTTP API. The native stream-protocol path enforces configure on each resource; the HTTP path does not, creating a privilege escalation from 'can view' to 'can create persistent cluster-wide resources.' Preconditions include rabbitmq_stream_management plugin enabled management tag + vhost access (no resource permissions needed). This issue is fixed in versions 4.0.22, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The trust-store plugin installs a verify_fun that overrides {bad_cert, unknown_ca} / {bad_cert, selfsigned_peer} when the presented cert "matches" a whitelisted one. The match key is extract_issuer_id/1 → public_key:pkix_issuer_id/2 → {IssuerName, SerialNumber} , both fields are taken verbatim from the presented certificate body and contain no public-key, SKI, fingerprint or signature material. is_whitelisted/1 is a pure ets:member lookup; the stored full DER is used only for list/0 display and is never compared against the presented cert. cacerts is [], so the whitelisted cert is never used as a trust anchor for path validation either. TLS client-authentication bypass: an attacker who knows the issuer DN + serial of any whitelisted certificate can connect with a forged self-signed cert. Preconditions include rabbitmq_trust_store plugin enabled and used as the TLS verify_fun Attacker knows or can guess the {Issuer, Serial} of at least one whitelisted cert (non-secret; exposed via CLI/logs/any cert copy). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The AMQP 0-9-1 shovel calls amqp_uri:remove_credentials before storing its connection URI, but the AMQP 1.0 shovel stores the raw URI including the password. The stored URI is visible via GET /api/shovels and via rabbitmqctl shovel_status. Preconditions include The Shovel plugin must be in use with AMQP 1.0 shovels configured using URI-embedded credentials. Reading the exposed status requires the monitoring tag.. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15, The content-header BodySize (a uint64) was stored without validation against max_message_size. The size check ran only when assembly completed. By declaring body_size = 2^63-1 and then streaming fragments, a client ensured that check_msg_size never fired, so the accumulated body size went unbounded. A reader process accumulates memory until the memory alarm fires, degrading all publishers cluster-wide, or until the node runs out of memory. The memory alarm provides only partial mitigation, since it is reactive rather than preventive. AMQP 0-9-1 is the most widely used protocol, and any publisher can trigger this condition. Preconditions include Any authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 client with publish permission can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, is_authorized/2 calls rabbit_mgmt_util:is_authorized/2, which checks only the management tag, instead of is_authorized_vhost/2. The /api/queues/quorum/:vhost/:queue/status handler reads the vhost from the path without checking that the user can access it. Any management-tagged user can therefore read Raft status, including leader, members, term, and commit index, for quorum queues in inaccessible vhosts, exposing cross-tenant queue names and cluster topology. The management plugin must be enabled and the attacker must have a management tag. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, The management UI uses EJS 1.0 in which <%= ... %> does NOT HTML-escape. connection.ejs:135 renders <%= connection.ssl_details.peer_cert_subject %> (and peer_cert_issuer) directly into the page. The same pattern appears in streamConnection.ejs:102,106,110. The values come from rabbit_ssl:peer_cert_subject/1 which formats the DN as a string without HTML escaping. The verifier corrected the original researcher's claim: this is reachable only when the listener is configured with verify_peer (so the certificate must be signed by a CA in the broker's trust store, not arbitrary self-signed); however, in deployments using mTLS for client authentication, any user who can request a certificate from the organisational CA controls the Subject CN. An attacker who can obtain a TLS client certificate signed by a CA the broker trusts (with verify_peer enabled) can embed JavaScript in the certificate's Subject DN. When any administrator views that connection in the management UI, the script executes in the admin's browser session, allowing full account takeover (create users, export definitions, etc.). The management UI's CSP includes 'unsafe-inline', so inline script execution is not blocked. Preconditions include TLS listener configured with ssl_options.verify = verify_peer Attacker can obtain a CA-signed client certificate with attacker-chosen Subject (e.g. self-service corporate PKI, or rabbitmq_trust_store plugin in use) Administrator views the connection detail page. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1, The trace consumer constructs the output path as filename:join(TraceDir, Name ++ ".log") where Name comes from PUT /api/traces/:vhost/:name. No safe_relative_path / traversal check is applied on the write side, while the read side (rabbit_tracing_files.erl) does call rabbit_misc:safe_relative_path/1 , proving the omission is an oversight, not design. The .log suffix is forced and the endpoint requires administrator. A user with the administrator tag can write a .log-suffixed file to an arbitrary filesystem path writable by the rabbitmq user via the tracing plugin's name parameter, e.g. /etc/cron.d/x.log (if writable) or overwrite existing .log files outside the trace directory. Preconditions include rabbitmq_tracing plugin enabled administrator tag Target path writable by rabbitmq OS user. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, 4.3.0, When a binding is created on an x-jms-topic exchange, add_binding/3 reads the rjms_erlang_selector argument and passes it through erl_scan:string/1 then erl_parse:parse_term/1. erl_scan:string/1 interns every atom literal it tokenizes. validate_binding/2 is a no-op (-> ok.), there is no length cap, and the surrounding try/catch cannot reclaim atoms. The Java JMS client compiles selectors client-side, but the server does not enforce this , a raw AMQP client can send arbitrary selector strings. An authenticated low-privilege AMQP user confined to one vhost can crash the entire broker node (cross-tenant DoS) in <100 bind calls. Preconditions include rabbitmq_jms_topic_exchange plugin enabled (bundled; required for any JMS deployment) Authenticated AMQP user with read on an x-jms-topic exchange + write on a queue (or configure to declare both). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, When no CA bundle is available, ssl_options/1 falls back to [{verify, verify_none}] with no warning. An attacker in a man-in-the-middle position can forge the JWKS response, which leads the broker to accept arbitrary JWTs. Preconditions include The OAuth2 plugin must be in use with no cacertfile configured and the OS CA bundle empty or unreadable (for example, in a minimal container), and the attacker must hold a network man-in-the-middle position.. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1, get_chunk_selector/1 calls binary_to_atom on the raw client-supplied <<"chunk_selector">> property from post-auth subscribe and resolve_offset_spec frames, with no whitelist and no existing guard. An authenticated stream client with read access to any stream can crash the broker node. Preconditions include rabbitmq_stream plugin enabled Authenticated stream-protocol user with read access to at least one stream. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, validate_partitions only checks that the requested partition count is at least 1, with no upper bound. A large count such as lists:seq(0, 500000000) allocates roughly 8GB. Preconditions include The rabbitmq_stream_management plugin must be enabled. The caller needs the management tag and access to the target vhost.. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, The runtime-parameters lookup path coerces the URL :component segment to an atom with rabbit_data_coercion:to_atom/1 in lookup_component/1 (deps/rabbit/src/rabbit_runtime_parameters.erl), creating a new atom for any previously unseen value. A safe helper, rabbit_registry:binary_to_type/1, which uses binary_to_existing_atom with a catch, already exists but is not used at this call site. lookup_component/1 calls rabbit_data_coercion:to_atom(Component) on the :component segment of the request URL, converting an attacker-supplied string into a new atom. Because the Erlang atom table is bounded and atoms are never garbage collected, an authorized policymaker issuing roughly one million requests with distinct component values can exhaust the atom table and crash the node, resulting in a denial of service. Preconditions include Exploitation requires policymaker privileges and roughly one million requests.. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.17, 4.0.22, 4.1.13, and 4.2.6, match_origin/1 returned the bare reflected Origin and allowed credentials even when the wildcard "" was configured, so the response echoed the attacker's origin together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. The affected code is rabbit_mgmt_cors.erl. When the management plugin is configured with a wildcard CORS origin (cors_allow_origins = ""), the handler reflects the request Origin back in Access-Control-Allow-Origin and also sends Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. A malicious web page that a signed-in administrator visits can then use that administrator's cached HTTP Basic credentials to issue authenticated, state-changing requests to the management API. Preconditions include The management plugin is configured with the wildcard cors_allow_origins = "*", which is an explicit operator misconfiguration A target administrator has a cached HTTP Basic-auth session in the browser. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.17, 4.0.22, 4.1.13, and 4.2.6. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.1.13, 4.2.7, and 4.3.0, is_authorized/2 uses is_authorized_monitor for all methods. DELETE resets rabbit_core_metrics:reset_auth_attempt_metrics(). Impact is cosmetic (counters only, no log erasure), but inconsistent with rabbit_mgmt_wm_reset.erl which requires admin for the analogous operation. A monitoring-tagged user can reset the per-node authentication-attempt counters via DELETE /api/auth/attempts/:node, erasing evidence of brute-force activity. The sibling endpoint wm_reset requires administrator. Preconditions include Management plugin enabled monitoring tag. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.13, 4.2.7, and 4.3.0. |
