| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 3.20.4 until 4.0.9, ReadWriteLock and AsyncReadWriteLock versions from 3.20.4 resolve the lock path and pass it to SQLite without rejecting a final symbolic link, allowing another local user who can create names in the lock directory to redirect database creation and locking or split mutual exclusion between targets. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.9. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 3.20.4 until 4.2.1, ReadWriteLock let SQLite reopen the database and side files by name; on POSIX systems an attacker with rename access in a non-sticky parent can swap those names to cause overwrite or unlink operations, while a writable adjacent hot journal is additionally required for attacker-chosen content overwrites. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 3.30.0 until 4.2.1, StrictSoftFileLock versions from 3.30.0 and SoftReadWriteLock versions from 4.0.0 can adopt a protocol directory created first by another local user in a shared parent directory, allowing that user to alter protocol state and admit concurrent holders. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 4.1.0 until 4.2.1, SoftReadWriteLock and AsyncSoftReadWriteLock cache a successful check of the <path>.rw lock tree and resolve its names again during later record operations, allowing another local user who can replace that tree after the first acquisition to redirect lock-record writes into directories writable by the lock user. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 3.22.0 until 4.2.1, SoftFileLock can break a stale marker after an attacker frees its own marker following the stale read, an honest contender creates a live successor on the reused inode, and the successor's modification time is not newer than the saved observation, causing the live marker to be removed and two holders to be admitted. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 4.1.0 until 4.2.1, SoftFileLock can restore a stale marker by name after moving it aside, allowing another local user with rename access in a non-sticky lock directory to swap in a symbolic link and, on a runtime that follows the link and a same-filesystem target, make the lock user hard-link one of its files into the lock directory. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. Prior to 4.2.1, UnixFileLock can truncate a regular file renamed onto the lock path when another local user has actual rename permission, or hard-linked there under a permissive hard-link policy; when an explicit mode is requested, affected versions from 3.10.2 can also change that file's mode. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 3.22.0 until 4.2.1, SoftFileLock can trust a forged process identifier in a marker that an attacker can modify but cannot remove, allowing an authorized contender such as another process of the holder's account or root to act as a confused deputy, remove the live marker, and admit another holder. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 3.32.6 until 4.2.1, SoftFileLock can follow a swapped symbolic link during the conditional os.access writability check for a node without its owner-write bit, allowing another local user on a platform and directory configuration that follows the link to infer whether a chosen path exists and is writable from the observable acquisition result. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 4.1.0 until 4.2.1, SoftFileLock versions from 4.1.0 can reuse a stale observation when an attacker pre-dates and removes its own marker, at least two lock-user processes are waiting, coarse or matching modification times preserve the observation, and an honest contender creates a fresh marker on the reused inode, causing that live marker to be removed as stale. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 9.2.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow performs quadratic copying when saving a GIF with a long comment. _get_global_header() repeatedly copies portions of comment data while assembling the global header, including comments retained from an untrusted input image. An attacker can supply an image with a large GIF comment to an application that saves it as GIF. This can consume excessive CPU and delay or deny service. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. |
| Dell Container Storage Modules, versions prior to 1.18.0, contain(s) an Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information disclosure. |
| Dell Container Storage Modules, versions prior to 1.18.0, contain(s) an Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information disclosure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64/boot: Disable trapping of PMZR_EL0 writes to EL2
__init_el2_fgt2() writes one mask to both HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2.
PMZR_EL0 is write-only, so its trap bit, nPMZR_EL0, exists only in
HDFGWTR2_EL2 and is therefore never set: a PMZR_EL0 write from the host
traps to EL2, where the nVHE hypervisor has no handler and BUG()s. The
kernel never writes PMZR_EL0, but kernel.perf_user_access=1 has the PMU
driver set PMUSERENR_EL0.UEN for a task with a user-read event, so a
write from EL0 reaches the trap and takes the host down without a panic
message.
Accumulate the HDFGWTR2_EL2 bits separately, as __init_el2_fgt() already
does for HDFGWTR_EL2, and set nPMZR_EL0 with the other FEAT_PMUv3p9
bits. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()
prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() computes in 32-bit int arithmetic:
mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024);
If I'm reading the validation right, tp_block_size is user
controlled and packet_set_ring() only rejects values that are <= 0
as int or not page aligned, so a 256MiB block goes right through
(and alloc_one_pg_vec_page() even has a vzalloc fallback for it).
0x10000000 * 8 wraps to INT_MIN, and on a NIC reporting 1 Gbps
(div == 1) the function ends up returning -2047.
The condition is actually (8 * size) mod 2^32 >= 2^31 && div == 1,
so the trigger set is [256,512), [768,1024), [1280,1536) and
[1792,2048) MiB. Other sizes wrap to non-negative values and faster
links divide the unsigned value back below 2^31, which is why this
doesn't blow up for everyone.
What makes it fatal is what happens next in init_prb_bdqc():
p1->interval_ktime = ms_to_ktime(prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(...));
hrtimer_start(&p1->retire_blk_timer, p1->interval_ktime,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
A negative relative timeout expires immediately. The callback
unconditionally returns HRTIMER_RESTART, and hrtimer_forward() turns
the negative interval into hrtimer_resolution:
if (interval < hrtimer_resolution)
interval = hrtimer_resolution;
So the SOFT timer re-fires at the maximum rate forever, holding
sk_receive_queue.lock each pass. One CPU spins in softirq until the
socket is closed. Repeat with more rings and the machine is gone.
The overflow itself is ancient - it was introduced together with
TPACKET_V3 in f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer
implementation."). Its effect prior to f7460d2989fa ("net:
af_packet: Use hrtimer to do the retire operation", v6.18) was not
as clear-cut, though: the return value was stored into an unsigned
short retire_blk_tov, so a negative result was truncated, and a
0-jiffy delay loop could be programmed as well. Neither is nearly
as detrimental as the immediate maximum-rate spin the hrtimer
conversion turned it into.
(Unrelated to CVE-2019-20812 - that one was the ethtool failure path
returning 0, which now returns DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV.)
Reproducer, needs CAP_NET_RAW (a --network host container has it by
default) and a 1 Gbps NIC (QEMU e1000 works):
int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL));
bind(fd, ...);
int v = TPACKET_V3;
setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &v, sizeof(v));
struct tpacket_req3 req = {
.tp_block_size = 0x10000000,
.tp_block_nr = 1,
.tp_frame_size = 2048,
.tp_frame_nr = 0x10000000 / 2048,
.tp_retire_blk_tov = 0,
};
setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req));
Compute in 64 bits instead. The operands are already bounded by the
existing validation, so nothing else changes. If you'd prefer a
different fix, just say so and I'll respin. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: prevent collapsing skbs across boundary in rtx queue
tcp_write_collapse_fence() sets TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor = 1 on
tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) to prevent skbs queued after a switch to
device encryption from being collapsed into earlier skbs.
The fence is a no-op if all earlier data has already been transmitted
when the switch happens: sk->sk_write_queue is empty. The not yet
acknowledged earlier skbs wait in sk->tcp_rtx_queue with eor 0.
On a subsequent retransmit or SACK shift, tcp_retrans_try_collapse() or
tcp_shift_skb_data() can then merge an skb queued after the switch into
one queued before it.
Both users of the fence are affected:
- psp: devices only encrypt skbs with skb->decrypted set. The merged skb
keeps decrypted = 0 from the earlier skb, so merged data sent after
psp_sock_assoc_set_tx() is retransmitted in cleartext.
- tls device offload: the merged skb straddles the start marker set in
tls_set_device_offload(). The software fallback (fill_sg_in() returns
-EINVAL) and the mlx5, nfp and funeth drivers cannot handle such an
skb and drop it. Every retransmit rebuilds the same skb, so the
connection stalls.
Fix this in two places, for defense in depth:
1. Fall back to tcp_rtx_queue_tail(sk) in tcp_write_collapse_fence()
when tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) is NULL.
2. Check !skb_cmp_decrypted(to, from) in tcp_skb_can_collapse(), as
tcp_skb_can_collapse_rx() does on receive. skb_shift(), which both
collapse paths call, already has a DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE() for this
condition. |
| A permissions issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.7 and iPadOS 26.7, iOS 27 and iPadOS 27, macOS Golden Gate 27, visionOS 27. A local attacker may be able to overwrite restricted files. |
| A permissions issue was addressed with additional sandbox restrictions. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27. An app may be able to access information about a user's contacts. |
| This issue was addressed by enforcing library validation on the affected binaries. This issue is fixed in Xcode 27. A malicious app may be able to break out of its sandbox. |
