| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: only count successfully cleared runs when freeing clusters
ntfs_cluster_free_from_rl_nolock() adds a run's length to nr_freed
whenever the error bookkeeping condition is false, which includes
cases where ntfs_bitmap_clear_run() actually failed - e.g. a second
run failing with the same errno as an earlier one, or any failure
after a non-ENOMEM error was already recorded. Since a failed
ntfs_bitmap_clear_run() rolls back its partial modifications, no
bits were cleared for that run, yet its length still inflates
vol->free_clusters, corrupting statfs output and the allocator's
free space gate.
Only count runs whose bitmap clear succeeded. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/cirrus-qemu: Validate BAR0 size during probe
The `cirrus-qemu` driver relies on `CIRRUS_VRAM_SIZE` (4 MB) to validate
framebuffer sizes. However, during PCI probe, the driver mapped BAR0
without verifying that its size matches `CIRRUS_VRAM_SIZE`.
If a PCI device with a BAR0 smaller than 4 MB is bound to the driver, the
mapped VRAM will be smaller than expected. Because validation checks assume
4 MB VRAM, framebuffers larger than the mapped memory can be created.
When the display plane is updated (e.g. during release),
`cirrus_primary_plane_helper_atomic_update()` copies the framebuffer to
VRAM using `drm_fb_memcpy()`. Writing past the end of the mapped I/O memory
causes a supervisor write page fault:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc9000389c000
...
RIP: 0010:memcpy_toio+0x7c/0xe0 arch/x86/lib/iomem.c:110
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
iosys_map_memcpy_to include/linux/iosys-map.h:285 [inline]
drm_fb_memcpy+0x325/0x5d0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_format_helper.c:442
cirrus_primary_plane_helper_atomic_update+0x98a/0xb00
drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/cirrus-qemu.c:358
drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes+0x626/0xea0
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:3038
drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x60/0x510
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:1989
commit_tail+0x2b1/0x3c0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:2074
drm_atomic_helper_commit+0xa77/0xb10
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:2312
Fix this by validating in `cirrus_pci_probe()` that the PCI BAR0 resource
is not less than `CIRRUS_VRAM_SIZE`, returning `-ENODEV` if it is less. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
printk: Don't WARN on kthread_run failure.
Since __kthread_create_on_node() returns -EINTR upon SIGKILL,
we should not use WARN_ON() in order to catch kthread_run() failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-rdma: fix queue leak when connect backlog is exceeded
When pending disconnecting queues exceed the backlog limit, the
connect path only drops the device reference and leaks the newly
allocated queue and its IB resources. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: fix racy access to FDP placement id array
nvme_query_fdp_info() is called per-path and therefore prone to races.
It populates head->nr_plids/head->plids for fdp registration.
But nothing protects that pair from concurrent access - two paths scanning
the same namespace can race to populate it.
Avoid the race by moving this initialization work to nvme_alloc_ns_head()
which is called once per shared namespace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
EDAC/device_sysfs: Use kstrtouint() for poll_msec to prevent truncation
The poll_msec sysfs store file uses simple_strtoul() which accepts an unsigned
long, but the target field (poll_msec) is unsigned int. On 64-bit systems,
a value > UINT_MAX is silently truncated when stored.
Fix the mismatch by using kstrtouint() instead. This rejects values larger
than UINT_MAX at parse time, making truncation impossible. Also add a check
for value < 1 to reject the 0-delay case, which would cause the poll work to
spin without delay and consume 100% CPU. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/server: fix tree connection leak in smb2_tree_connect()
See the procedure below:
smb2_tree_connect
ksmbd_tree_conn_connect
xa_store(&sess->tree_conns, tree_conn->id, tree_conn)
ksmbd_counter_inc(KSMBD_COUNTER_TREE_CONNS)
ksmbd_share_tree_conn_inc(sc)
ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp // fail
status.ret = KSMBD_TREE_CONN_STATUS_NOMEM
// do not disconnect tree_conn
Disconnect the new tree connection if ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp() fails. |
| Any host on the LAN can send two mDNS records and make the responder write past the end of its
transmit packet.
The string table stores each name in a slot rounded up to a multiple of four:
```c
/* addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:11436, 11443, 11447 */
memory_len = ((memory_len & 0xFFFFFFFC) + 8) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
...
len = *((USHORT*)(p - 2)); /* slot size, not string length */
if ((len == memory_len) && ... _nx_mdns_name_match(start, memory_ptr, memory_size) ...)
```
The lookup that decides whether an incoming name is already stored compares the rounded slot size,
so names of 12, 13, 14 and 15 characters share one bucket. A second name in the bucket is answered
with the pointer to the first, and the record then carries a string up to three bytes longer than
the length the caller accounted for. `_nx_mdns_packet_rr_add` (nxd_mdns.c:8911) sizes its only
bound check from that stale length, and `_nx_mdns_name_string_encode` writes the real string.
Two PTR records are enough, both ordinary mDNS responses to a `_http._tcp` query, with owner names
whose lengths fall in the same bucket:
```
==87491==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
WRITE of size 1 at 0x611000000124 thread T5
#0 _nx_mdns_name_string_encode addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:13096
#1 _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:8911
0x611000000124 is 0 bytes to the right of 228-byte region
```
The overflow is one to three bytes of attacker-influenced name data past `nx_packet_data_end`. In a
normal pool that lands in the next packet in the same pool rather than in a redzone, so the visible
effect is a corrupted neighbouring packet or a corrupted pool free list rather than a clean crash.
Compare the slot size against the stored string length before declaring a match, or keep the
string length in the slot header and return it to the caller so the encoder and the bound check
agree. |
| Improper link resolution (CWE-59 / CWE-22) in the allowedLocalRoots path validation in Google MCP Toolbox for Databases versions 1.2.0 through 1.9.0 allows a remote authenticated attacker with tool execution permissions to bypass directory boundary restrictions via symbolic links. Because path validation checks directories lexically without resolving symbolic links first, an attacker can access or overwrite arbitrary local files located outside the permitted root directories. |
| Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to 20.3.28, 21.2.20, and 22.1.1, Angular's @angular/common HttpTransferCache can cache an authenticated response when Server-Side Rendering (SSR) and hydration use a hierarchical HttpClient configured with withRequestsMadeViaParent. The child TransferCache evaluates an initially anonymous request before delegation, then a parent withInterceptors chain adds an Authorization header, cookie, or API token; although the parent cache skips the authenticated request, the child still stores the private response in TransferState serialized as JSON in the ng-state script. Exploitation requires provideClientHydration, child provideHttpClient delegation through withRequestsMadeViaParent, parent-level credential injection, and an SSR HTML response shared across users by a CDN, reverse proxy, or application cache. A later unauthenticated or unauthorized visitor can receive the cached HTML containing the earlier authenticated user's sensitive response data. Applications can mitigate by attaching credentials at the child, filtering sensitive endpoints with withHttpTransferCacheOptions, disabling transfer caching for sensitive routes, or marking personalized HTML private or no-store. This issue is fixed in versions 20.3.28, 21.2.20, and 22.1.1. |
| MongoDB Schema Manager and MongoDB Atlas SQL ODBC Driver do not validate the scheme of the authorization and token endpoints returned by an OIDC issuer's discovery document. A user induced to connect to an uncontrolled MongoDB deployment using MONGODB-OIDC authentication may have an uncontrolled URI dispatched to their operating system's default protocol handler, potentially exposing credentials or, under certain conditions, resulting in code execution in the user's context. |
| IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to improper validation of paths during archive extraction. |
| IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to command injection in the certificate export CLI functionality, allowing a privileged authenticated CLI user to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. |
| IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to path traversal and arbitrary file deletion in the Datasource REST component. An authenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to delete files and potentially cause denial of service or impact system integrity. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix readahead synchronisation issues by loading all folios upfront
There are some synchronisation issues that derive from the app thread
adding more folios to the rolling buffer whilst the collector thread is
looking at them or trying to clear them, such as determining the setting of
front_folio_order when the next folio hasn't been added yet,
The reason for the rolling buffer approach is that loading the buffer
upfront and then dropping all the refs just acquired is quite a slow
operation, and loading progressively allows some of the cost to be deferred
until after at least some of the I/O is started.
Instead, a better way is to load all the folios into the rolling buffer
upfront - and then drop the refs later, once the I/O is in progress. (Even
better would be for the refs not to be there at all.)
Fix this by changing the rolling buffer loader to load all the folios
selected by the VM for readahead upfront into the folio queue. The folio
queue is allocated a batch worth at a time as we don't know how many folios
are involved (the readahead_control struct, alas, has a page count, not a
folio count).
The folio refs acquired from readahead are then dropped in bulk once the
first subrequest is dispatched as it's quite a slow operation. The
collector waits for NETFS_RREQ_NEED_PUT_RA_REFS to be cleared so that it
doesn't unlock folios before the xarray has been scanned for them.
This simplifies the buffer handling later and isn't noticeably slower as
the xarray doesn't need to be modified and the folios are all already
pre-locked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix soft lockup from unpadded ASCONF-ACK parameter iteration
sctp_verify_asconf() walks ASCONF-ACK parameters with
sctp_walk_params(), which advances by SCTP_PAD4(length), while the
consumer sctp_get_asconf_response() iterates the same parameters
advancing by the raw length, without padding. A single odd-length
parameter desynchronises the two walks and makes the consumer
interpret attacker-controlled bytes at a misaligned offset.
When those bytes yield a length of zero, the while loop over
asconf_ack_len makes no progress, spinning forever in softirq
context, and the watchdog reports a soft lockup. All reads stay
within the received skb, so the lockup is a pure remote denial of
service. A remote peer can trigger it with a crafted ASCONF-ACK on
an ADD-IP enabled association with an outstanding ASCONF (RFC 5061
section 4.1.2 requires the chunk to be authenticated, but the
predefined empty key id 0 allows the peer to compute the same
association HMAC from publicly exchanged parameters, so the gate
does not help).
The SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE case of sctp_verify_asconf() also performs
no length check, letting a parameter without a complete error
header reach the consumer, which reads errhdr.cause past the end of
the parameter, an out-of-bounds read.
Reject SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE parameters shorter than
sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr) at the
verifier, and advance the consumer iterator with the same padding
rule as the verifier to keep the two walks in lockstep. The verifier
change guarantees a complete error header in every ERR_CAUSE
parameter the consumer can see, so the consumer's asconf_ack_len
check is dropped and it returns err_param->cause directly. The
consumer padding fix is still required because odd lengths remain
valid for SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE per RFC 5061.
The issue was found by ZeroHive, a vulnerability hunting agent at
Tencent Yunding Lab. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: invalidate fscache for fallocate range operations
smb3_zero_range(), smb3_punch_hole(), smb3_insert_range(), and
smb3_collapse_range() modify file contents through server-side range
operations. These operations discard the affected page cache, but leave
the FS-Cache cookie valid, so a later read may return data cached before
the range operation.
Fix this by invalidating FS-Cache after outstanding I/O has completed
and before modifying the file on the server.
Run the following as root on a CIFS mount with fsc enabled and an active
CacheFiles backend:
bash -c '
MNT=/mnt/cifs
FILE="$MNT/repro"
# Generate four 1 MiB random blocks: [A][B][C][D].
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/tmp/src bs=1M count=4 status=none
# Expected contents after zeroing B: [A][zero][C][D].
cp /tmp/src /tmp/expected
dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/expected bs=1M seek=1 count=1 \
conv=notrunc status=none
cp /tmp/src "$FILE"
# Populate FS-Cache, then discard the page cache.
sync
echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
cat "$FILE" > /dev/null
sync
echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
fallocate --zero-range -o 1M -l 1M "$FILE"
if cmp -s /tmp/expected "$FILE"; then
echo "readback: OK"
else
echo "readback: STALE DATA"
fi
'
Before this change, the readback differs from /tmp/expected:
readback: STALE DATA
After this change, it matches:
readback: OK |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: fix stale page cache in insert/collapse range
smb3_insert_range() and smb3_collapse_range() use
truncate_pagecache_range() to invalidate the affected page cache.
However, if off or old_eof is not page-aligned, the boundary pages are
only partially zeroed and remain uptodate. As a result, the client may
return stale data after a successful insert/collapse range operation.
For example, with 4K pages:
page 0 page 1 page 2
0------4K 4K------8K 8K------12K
^ ^
off=2K old_eof=10K
Page 1 is removed from the page cache, while the boundary pages are
only partially zeroed. After COPYCHUNK moves the data on the server,
these cached pages may still return stale data.
This can be reproduced on a CIFS mount:
bash -c '
FILE=/mnt/scratch/repro
# Use a 6 KiB file so EOF is not page-aligned.
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/tmp/src bs=1K count=6 status=none
# Expected: a 4 KiB hole followed by the original data.
rm -f /tmp/expected
truncate -s 4K /tmp/expected
cat /tmp/src >> /tmp/expected
cp /tmp/src "$FILE"
# Prime the page cache before moving data on the server.
cat "$FILE" > /dev/null
fallocate --insert-range -o 0 -l 4K "$FILE"
if cmp -s /tmp/expected "$FILE"; then
echo "readback: OK"
else
echo "readback: STALE DATA"
fi
'
Fix this by writing back dirty data and discarding the page cache from
the start of the page containing off to EOF before moving data on the
server. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: validate new EOF for zero range
When FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE is used without FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE,
smb3_zero_range() may extend EOF without checking RLIMIT_FSIZE, allowing
the file to grow beyond the caller's file-size limit.
Fix this by calling inode_newsize_ok() before sending the zero-range
request when the operation would extend EOF.
Reproducer, using a file on a CIFS mount:
bash -c '
FILE=/mnt/cifs/repro
trap "" SIGXFSZ
ulimit -f 3072
truncate -s 2M "$FILE"
fallocate --zero-range -o 0 -l 4M "$FILE"
echo "fallocate rc=$?"
stat -c "file size=%s" "$FILE"
'
Before this change, the operation succeeds despite the 3 MiB limit:
fallocate rc=0
file size=4194304
After this change, fallocate fails and leaves the file at 2 MiB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: validate new EOF for insert range
smb3_insert_range() does not check if the new file size
(i_size + len) is valid. This allows FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE to bypass
RLIMIT_FSIZE, exceed s_maxbytes, or produce a size outside the loff_t
range.
Use check_add_overflow() to calculate the new EOF. Validate it with
inode_newsize_ok() before modifying the file.
Reproducer, using a file on a CIFS mount:
bash -c '
FILE=/mnt/cifs/repro
trap "" SIGXFSZ
ulimit -f 3072 # RLIMIT_FSIZE = 3 MiB
# A regular write is stopped at 3 MiB.
dd if=/dev/zero of="$FILE" bs=1M count=4 status=none
stat -c "size after write: %s" "$FILE"
# Insert 2 MiB into a 2 MiB file.
truncate -s 2M "$FILE"
fallocate -i -o 0 -l 2M "$FILE"
stat -c "size after insert: %s" "$FILE"
'
Before this change, the regular write stops at the 3 MiB limit, but
insert range grows the file to 4 MiB:
dd: error writing '/mnt/cifs/repro': File too large
size after write: 3145728
size after insert: 4194304
After this change, insert range also fails at the limit and leaves the
2 MiB file unchanged:
dd: error writing '/mnt/cifs/repro': File too large
size after write: 3145728
fallocate: fallocate failed: File too large
size after insert: 2097152 |
