| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A security flaw has been discovered in SourceCodester Simple Doctors Appointment System 1.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /admin/ajax.php?action=delete_appointment. The manipulation of the argument ID results in sql injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. |
| Nefteprodukttekhnika BUK TS-G Gas Station Automation System 2.9.1 on Linux contains a SQL Injection vulnerability (CWE-89) in the system configuration module. A remote attacker can send specially crafted HTTP POST requests to the /php/request.php endpoint via the sql parameter in application/x-www-form-urlencoded data (e.g., action=do&sql=<query_here>&reload_driver=0) to execute arbitrary SQL commands and potentially achieve remote code execution. |
| Subrion CMS's admin grid sorting helper, _gridGetSorting in includes/classes/ia.base.controller.admin.php, whitelists the (ASC/DESC) request parameter via in_array, but falls back to the raw, attacker-supplied GET parameter whenever the requested key is not present in the per-controller whitelist array: , which is then placed into %s with only backtick-quoting and no escaping. |
| Koha's guided report builder (reports/guided_reports.pl) reads the CGI parameter and, for each value, a dynamically-named parameter, and concatenates both directly into an SQL ORDER BY clause with no allowlist or validation. Since ORDER BY columns cannot be bound via prepared-statement placeholders, this requires an explicit allowlist, which does not exist. |
| ChirpStack's SQLite-backend device tag filtering (chirpstack/src/storage/device.rs, in both get_count and list) interpolates the user-supplied tag KEY directly into a raw SQL fragment via Rust's format! macro , while only the tag VALUE is safely parameter-bound via Diesel's .bind. |
| Magistrala (formerly Mainflux)'s message-readers API reads a value from the HTTP query string (readers/api/http/transport.go) with no validation and interpolates it directly into raw SQL queries via fmt.Sprintf in both the PostgreSQL reader (readers/postgres/messages.go: ) and the TimescaleDB reader (readers/timescale/messages.go, same pattern), enabling SQL injection by any authenticated user able to query channel messages. |
| Inventory-Management-System-PHP's login.php constructs its authentication query via direct string concatenation of raw POST parameters: = "select * from user where email = '' and password = ''", with no escaping or parameterization, allowing authentication bypass via a payload such as email=' OR 1=1 LIMIT 1-- -. |
| Mautic's getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction (LeadBundle/Controller/AjaxController.php) reads a field parameter from the request, sanitizes it only with InputHelper::clean (which HTML-entity-encodes quotes and angle brackets but does not restrict other characters), and passes it into LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue where it is concatenated directly as a raw SQL column identifier ( = 'l.'.) rather than being validated against a whitelist of real column names or passed as a bound parameter. |
| Miantang/IoT-PHP's index.php implements a POST /userlogin route that reads the password directly from ['pwd'] with no sanitization and concatenates it into a raw SQL string: mysql_query("select * from userlists where username='' and password='' limit 1"). An unauthenticated attacker can submit a payload such as pwd=' OR '1'='1 to bypass authentication and, via UNION-based injection, extract arbitrary data from the database. |
| IOTSmartHome's gui/login.php checkCookie function builds an authentication query as SELECT * FROM users WHERE ID='<decoded lastLogin cookie>' after base64-decoding the client-supplied lastLogin cookie via safe_decode, which performs URL-safe base64 decoding with no sanitization of the decoded value before it is concatenated into the SQL string. |
| The Stock-Inventory-Management-System application's login.php assigns raw username/password values to and builds its authentication query by directly concatenating those session values into a SQL statement with no parameterization or escaping. The same script additionally contains hardcoded administrative credentials (admin/neola) in a post-login conditional check, providing a second, independent full-authentication-bypass path. |
| Koha's reports/issues_stats.pl (the circulation statistics report) builds its calculation query in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the SQL string. The PeriodTypeSel, PeriodDaySel, and PeriodMonthSel parameters are interpolated raw into single-quoted equality and function-comparison fragments, and the Filter slots plus the Line and Column identifiers are likewise interpolated with no whitelist and no placeholder binding. |
| Koha's reports/bor_issues_top.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions. |
| Koha's reports/issues_avg_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. The Line and Column parameters are not validated against any whitelist and land verbatim in identifier positions (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY), and each Filter slot is concatenated raw into single-quoted LIKE, BETWEEN, and comparison fragments with no bound parameters. |
| Koha's reports/catalogue_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by interpolating the user-controlled Line and Column request parameters directly into identifier positions of the query (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY) with no whitelist validation. |
| Koha's reports/acquisitions_stats.pl builds its per-cell statistics query in sub calculate by interpolating the user-controlled Filter request parameters directly into WHERE fragments covering aqbasket.closedate, aqorders.datereceived, aqbooksellers.name, items.homebranch, items.ccode, biblioitems.itemtype, aqbudgets.budget_code, aqorders.sort1, and aqorders.sort2. |
| SQL Injection in reports/catalogue_out.pl in Koha Community Koha through 22.11.37, 23.x, 24.x before 24.11.16, 25.05.x before 25.05.11, 25.11.x before 25.11.05, 26.05.x before 26.05.01, and 26.11.x before 26.11.00 allows an authenticated staff user with the Reports module flag to read arbitrary data from the Koha application database via the Filter URL parameter when the Criteria parameter matches /branchcode/. |
| Nur-Alam39 bus-ticket (no released versions; latest commit 459cabdbeb99c00225b26e46e3c2c30ae1de7bad) contains an unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in bus_info.php. The busid parameter received via HTTP POST is concatenated directly into a MySQL query (select * from bus_info where id=) without sanitization, escaping, or parameterization, and in a numeric (unquoted) context. |
| claudiopizzillo PIAF-HMS (PBX-In-A-Flash Hotel Management System; no released versions, latest commit 389d2633441b65ced1c104212cd62be2bfca21e5) contains multiple unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerabilities. The application has no authentication mechanism and passes user-supplied HTTP parameters directly into deprecated mysql_query calls via string concatenation, without sanitization, escaping, or parameterization. |
| An authenticated SQL Injection vulnerability (CWE-89) exists in the Koha staff interface in the /cgi-bin/koha/suggestion/suggestion.pl endpoint due to improper validation of the displayby parameter used by the GetDistinctValues functionality. Successful exploitation may lead to full compromise of the backend database, including disclosure or modification of stored data. |
