| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost: fix vhost_get_avail_idx for a non empty ring
vhost_get_avail_idx is supposed to report whether it has updated
vq->avail_idx. Instead, it returns whether all entries have been
consumed, which is usually the same. But not always - in
drivers/vhost/net.c and when mergeable buffers have been enabled, the
driver checks whether the combined entries are big enough to store an
incoming packet. If not, the driver re-enables notifications with
available entries still in the ring. The incorrect return value from
vhost_get_avail_idx propagates through vhost_enable_notify and causes
the host to livelock if the guest is not making progress, as vhost will
immediately disable notifications and retry using the available entries.
This goes back to commit d3bb267bbdcb ("vhost: cache avail index in
vhost_enable_notify()") which changed vhost_enable_notify() to compare
the freshly read avail index against vq->last_avail_idx instead of the
previously cached vq->avail_idx. Commit 7ad472397667 ("vhost: move
smp_rmb() into vhost_get_avail_idx()") then carried over the same
comparison when refactoring vhost_enable_notify() to call the unified
vhost_get_avail_idx().
The obvious fix is to make vhost_get_avail_idx do what the comment
says it does and report whether new entries have been added. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix fast commit wait/wake bit mapping on 64-bit
On 64-bit, ext4 dynamic inode states live in the upper half of i_flags,
and ext4_test_inode_state() applies the corresponding +32 offset.
The fast-commit wait and wake paths open-coded the wait key with the raw
EXT4_STATE_* value. Add small helpers for the state wait word and bit,
and use them for the FC_COMMITTING and FC_FLUSHING_DATA waits so the wait
key follows the same mapping as the state helpers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvdimm/btt: Handle preemption in BTT lane acquisition
BTT lanes serialize access to per-lane metadata and workspace state
during BTT I/O. The btt-check unit test reports data mismatches during
BTT writes due to a race in lane acquisition that can lead to silent
data corruption.
The existing lane model uses a spinlock together with a per-CPU
recursion count. That recursion model stopped being valid after BTT
lanes became preemptible: another task can run on the same CPU,
observe a non-zero recursion count, bypass locking, and use the same
lane concurrently.
BTT lanes are also held across arena_write_bytes() calls. That path
reaches nsio_rw_bytes(), which flushes writes with nvdimm_flush().
Some provider flush callbacks can sleep, making a spinlock the wrong
primitive for the lane lifetime.
Replace the spinlock-based recursion model with a dynamically
allocated per-lane mutex array and take the lane lock
unconditionally.
Add might_sleep() to catch any future atomic-context caller.
Found with the ndctl unit test btt-check.sh. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hns: Fix log flood after cmd_mbox failure
hns_roce_cmd_mbox() is the command interface between driver and
hardware. When hardware is abnormal, the unlimited error printings
after hns_roce_cmd_mbox() failure will cause log flood and even
system crash.
Replace ibdev_err() and ibdev_warn() with their ratelimited versions
in the error handling path after hns_roce_cmd_mbox() (and its wrappers
hns_roce_create_hw_ctx/hns_roce_destroy_hw_ctx) fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: limit target bio polling to one shot
dm_poll_bio() is the ->poll_bio() callback for a stacked dm device.
The caller only knows about the dm queue, so it may decide to do a
spinning poll if it thinks a single queue is being polled. Passing those
flags unchanged to the mapped clone lets blk_mq_poll() spin on a target
queue from inside dm_poll_bio().
With io_uring IOPOLL on a dm-stripe target this can keep a task in
dm_poll_bio() -> bio_poll() -> blk_mq_poll()
long enough to trigger an RCU CPU stall, before io_uring gets back to
io_iopoll_check() and its need_resched() check.
Keep dm's ->poll_bio() bounded by forcing one-shot polling for target
bios. The caller can invoke dm_poll_bio() again if it wants to keep
polling, and it also gets a chance to reap completions or reschedule
between passes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/syncobj: Fix memory leak in drm_syncobj_find_fence()
Commit 18226ba52159 ("drm/syncobj: reject invalid flags in
drm_syncobj_find_fence") forgot to take into account the fact that
drm_syncobj_find() takes a reference to syncobj and returns early
without dropping the reference, leading to memory leaks.
Reported by: Sam Spencer <[email protected]> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
evm: terminate and bound the evm_xattrs read buffer
evm_read_xattrs() allocates size + 1 bytes, fills them from the list of
enabled xattrs, and then passes strlen(temp) to
simple_read_from_buffer(). When no configured xattrs are enabled, the
fill loop stores nothing and temp[0] remains uninitialized, so strlen()
reads beyond initialized memory.
Explicitly terminate the buffer after allocation, use snprintf() for
each formatted line, and pass the accumulated length, without risk of
truncation, to simple_read_from_buffer(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
OPP: Fix race between OPP addition and lookup
A race exists between dev_pm_opp_add_dynamic() and
dev_pm_opp_find_freq_exact():
CPU0 (add) CPU1 (lookup)
------------------------------- ------------------------------
_opp_add()
mutex_lock()
list_add(&new_opp->node, head)
mutex_unlock() _opp_table_find_key()
mutex_lock()
dev_pm_opp_get(opp)
kref_get()
mutex_unlock()
kref_init(&new_opp->kref)
dev_pm_opp_put()
kref_put_mutex()
The newly added OPP is inserted into the list before its kref is
initialized. A concurrent lookup can find this OPP and increment its
reference count while it is still uninitialized, leading to refcount
corruption and a potential premature free.
Fix this by initializing ->kref and ->opp_table before making the OPP
visible via list_add(). This ensures any concurrent lookup observes a
fully initialized object.
[ Viresh: Updated commit log ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: atcspi200: fix use-after-free when driver unbind
DMA resource is initialized after SPI controller registration. So
when driver unbind, this can trigger a use-after-free when DMA is
torn down while the controller is still alive and triggers DMA transfers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/radeon: fix memory leak in radeon_ring_restore() on lock failure
radeon_ring_restore() takes ownership of the data buffer allocated by
radeon_ring_backup(). The caller (radeon_gpu_reset()) only frees it in
the non-restore branch; in the restore branch it relies on
radeon_ring_restore() to free it.
If radeon_ring_lock() fails, the function returned early without calling
kvfree(data), leaking the ring backup buffer on every GPU reset that
fails at the lock stage. During repeated GPU resets this causes
cumulative kernel memory exhaustion.
Free data before returning the error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/radeon: fix integer overflow in radeon_align_pitch()
radeon_align_pitch() has the same kind of overflow issue as the old
amdgpu helper: both the alignment round-up add and the final
'aligned * cpp' calculation can overflow signed int.
If that wraps, radeon_mode_dumb_create() can end up returning an
invalid pitch or creating a zero-sized dumb buffer.
Fix this by using check_add_overflow() for the alignment round-up and
check_mul_overflow() for the final pitch calculation, returning 0 on
overflow. Also reject zero pitch and size in
radeon_mode_dumb_create().
Found via AST-based call-graph analysis using sqry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: Adjust size for copy_to_user()
The amount of data returned to user space should be limited by the buffer
size provided by the application. If the buffer is smaller than the data
size, return only the portion that fits instead of failing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: dw_dp: Switch to drmm_kzalloc()
Driver makes use of drmm_encoder_init() to initialize the encoder and
automatically handle the cleanup by registering drm_encoder_cleanup()
with drmm_add_action().
However, the internal structure containing the encoder part gets
allocated with devm_kzalloc(), which happens while component_bind_all()
is being called from Rockchip DRM driver. The component framework
further ensures it is deallocated as part of releasing all the resources
claimed during bind, which is triggered from component_unbind_all().
When the reference to the DRM device gets eventually dropped via
drm_dev_put() in rockchip_drm_unbind(), drmm_encoder_alloc_release()
attempts to access the now released encoder structure, leading to
use-after-free.
Ensure driver's internal structure is still reachable on encoder cleanup
by switching from a device-managed allocation to a drm-managed one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbcon: fix NULL pointer dereference for a console without vc_data
fbcon_new_modelist() runs when a framebuffer's modelist changes. For each
console mapped to it with fb_display[i].mode set, it reads vc_cons[i].d and
passes the vc_num to fbcon_set_disp(). This assumes a console with a mode
set has a vc_data, but it can be NULL. fbcon_set_disp() sets
fb_display[i].mode before it checks vc_data, and fbcon_deinit() leaves the
mode set after the vc_data is freed. fbcon_new_modelist() then dereferences
the NULL vc_data.
Keep fb_display[i].mode set only while the console has a vc_data. Check
vc_data before setting the mode in fbcon_set_disp(), and clear the mode in
fbcon_deinit(). The existing mode check in fbcon_new_modelist() then skips
such consoles. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: peak_usb: add bounds check for USB channel index
The channel control index ctrl_idx is derived from rx->len which comes
directly from a device USB payload. The mask 0x0f allows values 0-15, but
the array size of usb_if->dev[] is only 2. Values 2-15 cause heap
out-of-bounds read, eventually causing kernel panic in the IRQ context.
Add bounds checking for ctrl_idx before the array access in both
pcan_usb_pro_handle_canmsg() and pcan_usb_pro_handle_error(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: timer: Clear SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD once the close completes
snd_timer_close_locked() marks an instance with SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD
and returns early when the flag is already set, but the flag is never
cleared again. A completed close ends in remove_slave_links(), which
leaves timeri->timer NULL, so a second close is already harmless through
the timer == NULL path; the early return can only be reached by an
instance that was opened again in between. For such an instance the
close unlinks nothing, so snd_timer_instance_free() frees an object that
is still on timer->open_list_head, still on snd_timer_master_list if it
was opened with a slave key, still owns any adopted slaves, and still
holds its timer and module references.
snd_seq_timer_open() reopens an instance exactly like that: it retries
its fallback open on the same object after a failure that has already
run snd_timer_close_locked() internally. An unprivileged user with
access to /dev/snd/timer and /dev/snd/seq can force that failure, since
snd_timer_check_master() returns -EBUSY when a pending slave matches the
new master's (slave_class, slave_id) key and the target timer has
reached max_instances, and SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT with dev_class =
SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_SLAVE keeps the caller-supplied dev_sclass, so a
sequencer queue's key can be forged. The freed instance is afterwards
dereferenced by any further snd_timer_open() on that timer, by
snd_timer_check_slave(), and by /proc/asound/timers, which faults on the
stale ti->owner pointer.
The flag only has to be visible while the close is in progress, which is
all its other users need. Clear it in remove_slave_links(), under the
same timer->lock that sets it, once the instance is off every list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Cancel delayed I/O APIC EOI handling before destroying vCPUs
Cancel (and flush) the I/O APIC's delayed EOI handling work during the
"pre VM destroy" phase, before vCPUs are destroyed, as processing the EOI
broadcast will inject another IRQ if the line is asserted, i.e. will try
to deliver an IRQ to the target vCPU(s). Canceling the work after vCPUs
are destroyed leads to UAF if the delayed work is processed after vCPUs are
destroyed.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast+0x9bf/0xa20 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1250
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880499abea0 by task kworker/1:2/1218
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1218 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc7 #5 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x139/0x4ad mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:595
__kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast+0x9bf/0xa20 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1250
__kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic+0xd8/0xbf0 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1345
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h:129
ioapic_service+0x308/0x590 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:492
kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work+0x13c/0x190 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:532
process_one_work+0xa59/0x19a0 kernel/workqueue.c:3314
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3397
worker_thread+0x5eb/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3478
kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x72b/0xd30 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Note, the VM is unreachable once kvm_destroy_vm() starts, and scheduling
new work via kvm_ioapic_send_eoi() can only be done via KVM_RUN, i.e.
requires a live vCPU.
Alternatively, KVM could simply destroy the I/O APIC during the "pre" phase
of VM destruction, but that gets more than a bit sketchy as KVM expects the
I/O APIC to exist if ioapic_in_kernel() is true, and nested virtualization
in particular has a bad habit of touching VM-scope state during vCPU
destruction. E.g. attempting to free the PIC during the pre phase would
lead to a NULL pointer dereference in kvm_cpu_has_extint(), and it's not
hard to imagine the I/O APIC having a similar flaw. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free in __close_file_table_ids()
A ksmbd_file can remain alive after logical close while another session
holds a temporary reference obtained through ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode().
ksmbd_close_fd() currently marks the file closed and drops the idr-owned
reference, but leaves the pointer published in the closing session's idr
until the final reference is dropped.
If the foreign holder performs the final ksmbd_fd_put(), __put_fd_final()
supplies the foreign session's file table to __ksmbd_close_fd(). The object
is then freed without being removed from its owner's idr, and the owner
session later dereferences the stale pointer during file-table teardown.
Remove the volatile id from the owner's idr while ksmbd_close_fd() still
holds that table's lock, and clear volatile_id before dropping
the idr-owned reference. A later foreign final put then only performs
physical destruction and cannot remove the object from the wrong table. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qede: sync udp_tunnel ports outside qede_lock in the recovery path
A TX timeout on a qede NIC that has VXLAN/GENEVE tunnel ports
configured wedges the rtnetlink control plane of the whole machine:
NETDEV WATCHDOG: ens6f1 (qede): transmit queue 2 timed out 10226 ms
[qede_tx_timeout:586(ens6f1)]TX timeout on queue 2!
[qede_recovery_handler:2665(ens6f0)]Starting a recovery process
The recovery path deadlocks on the driver's own mutex:
qede_sp_task
rtnl_lock()
mutex_lock(&edev->qede_lock) <- taken
qede_recovery_handler
qede_load
udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf
__udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync
info->sync_table == qede_udp_tunnel_sync
mutex_lock(&edev->qede_lock) <- same task: deadlock
The mutex is not recursive, so the kworker blocks on itself with
rtnl_lock held, and neither lock is ever released. Every task that
calls rtnl_lock() afterwards (ip, ovs-vswitchd, lldpad, IPv6
addrconf, sshd) blocks forever while the node still answers ping.
In a vmcore from an affected production node rtnl_mutex.owner
decodes to the very kworker blocked at the innermost mutex_lock()
above.
Re-sync the tunnel ports from qede_sp_task() after the internal lock
is dropped, still under rtnl_lock as the udp_tunnel API requires.
This mirrors qede_open(), which calls udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf()
under rtnl without the internal lock.
qede_recovery_handler() now returns whether it has successfully
reloaded an open device, and the caller re-syncs the ports only in
that case. This keeps the old gating exactly: a device that was down
or a failed recovery returns false, as those paths never reached the
udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf() call before either.
This was the only user of the qede_lock()/qede_unlock() helpers, so
remove them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mpls: initialize rtm_tos in mpls_getroute()
mpls_getroute() builds the RTM_NEWROUTE reply to an RTM_GETROUTE
request by filling a struct rtmsg allocated from an skb whose data
area is not zeroed (alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, ...)). It sets every
field of the header except rtm_tos:
r = nlmsg_data(nlh);
r->rtm_family = AF_MPLS;
r->rtm_dst_len = 20;
r->rtm_src_len = 0;
r->rtm_table = RT_TABLE_MAIN;
r->rtm_type = RTN_UNICAST;
r->rtm_scope = RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;
r->rtm_protocol = rt->rt_protocol;
r->rtm_flags = 0;
struct rtmsg has no padding, so the one uninitialised byte rtm_tos
(offset 3) is copied straight to user space on recvmsg(), leaking a
byte of uninitialised heap memory. This is in contrast to
mpls_dump_route(), which fills the very same header and does set
rtm_tos = 0.
Initialize rtm_tos to 0, matching mpls_dump_route().
Reproduced with KMSAN by adding an MPLS route and issuing a
non-RTM_F_FIB_MATCH RTM_GETROUTE for its label:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x36c/0x33f0
_copy_to_iter+0x36c/0x33f0
__skb_datagram_iter+0x196/0x12c0
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5b/0x210
netlink_recvmsg+0x37b/0xef0
...
Uninit was created at:
__alloc_skb+0x8ca/0x10e0
mpls_getroute+0x1280/0x3a40
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1138/0x15a0
...
Byte 19 of 64 is uninitialized
(byte 19 = nlmsghdr(16) + rtmsg offset 3 = rtm_tos) |
