| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: deal with large GSO size
After the blamed commit below, the TCP sockets (and the MPTCP subflows)
can build egress packets larger than 64K. That exceeds the maximum DSS
data size, the length being misrepresent on the wire and the stream being
corrupted, as later observed on the receiver:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9696 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:705 __mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x2604/0x26e0
CPU: 0 PID: 9696 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc5-gcd8bdf563d46 #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
netlink: 8 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `syz-executor.4'.
RIP: 0010:__mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x2604/0x26e0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:705
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006e80 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffffff83e9f674 RBX: ffff88802f45d870 RCX: ffff888102ad0000
netlink: 8 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `syz-executor.4'.
RDX: 0000000080000303 RSI: 0000000000013908 RDI: 0000000000003908
RBP: ffffc90000007110 R08: ffffffff83e9e078 R09: 1ffff1100e548c8a
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100e548c8b R12: 0000000000013908
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000003908 R15: 000000000031cf29
FS: 00007f239c47e700(0000) GS:ffff88811b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f239c45cd78 CR3: 000000006a66c006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
mptcp_data_ready+0x263/0xac0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:819
subflow_data_ready+0x268/0x6d0 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1409
tcp_data_queue+0x21a1/0x7a60 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5151
tcp_rcv_established+0x950/0x1d90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6098
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x554/0x12f0 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1483
tcp_v6_rcv+0x2e26/0x3810 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1749
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd6b/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
ip6_input+0x1c5/0x470 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483
ipv6_rcv+0xef/0x2c0 include/linux/netfilter.h:304
__netif_receive_skb+0x1ea/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:5532
process_backlog+0x353/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5974
__napi_poll+0xc6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:6536
net_rx_action+0x6a0/0xfd0 net/core/dev.c:6603
__do_softirq+0x184/0x524 kernel/softirq.c:553
do_softirq+0xdd/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:454
Address the issue explicitly bounding the maximum GSO size to what MPTCP
actually allows. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: config: fix iteration issue in 'usb_get_bos_descriptor()'
The BOS descriptor defines a root descriptor and is the base descriptor for
accessing a family of related descriptors.
Function 'usb_get_bos_descriptor()' encounters an iteration issue when
skipping the 'USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY' descriptor type. This results in
the same descriptor being read repeatedly.
To address this issue, a 'goto' statement is introduced to ensure that the
pointer and the amount read is updated correctly. This ensures that the
function iterates to the next descriptor instead of reading the same
descriptor repeatedly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: stop the device in bond_setup_by_slave()
Commit 9eed321cde22 ("net: lapbether: only support ethernet devices")
has been able to keep syzbot away from net/lapb, until today.
In the following splat [1], the issue is that a lapbether device has
been created on a bonding device without members. Then adding a non
ARPHRD_ETHER member forced the bonding master to change its type.
The fix is to make sure we call dev_close() in bond_setup_by_slave()
so that the potential linked lapbether devices (or any other devices
having assumptions on the physical device) are removed.
A similar bug has been addressed in commit 40baec225765
("bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure")
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800089508810 len:44 put:40 head:ffff0000c78e7c00 data:ffff0000c78e7bea tail:0x16 end:0x140 dev:bond0
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:192 !
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 6007 Comm: syz-executor383 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-syzkaller-gbf6547d8715b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/04/2023
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:188 [inline]
pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:202
lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:188 [inline]
lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:202
sp : ffff800096a06aa0
x29: ffff800096a06ab0 x28: ffff800096a06ba0 x27: dfff800000000000
x26: ffff0000ce9b9b50 x25: 0000000000000016 x24: ffff0000c78e7bea
x23: ffff0000c78e7c00 x22: 000000000000002c x21: 0000000000000140
x20: 0000000000000028 x19: ffff800089508810 x18: ffff800096a06100
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80008a629a3c x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1fffe00036837a32 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000201 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : cb50b496c519aa00
x8 : cb50b496c519aa00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff800096a063b8 x4 : ffff80008e280f80 x3 : ffff8000805ad11c
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000201 x0 : 0000000000000086
Call trace:
skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:188 [inline]
skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:202
skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2446
ip6gre_header+0xbc/0x738 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1384
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3136 [inline]
lapbeth_data_transmit+0x1c4/0x298 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:257
lapb_data_transmit+0x8c/0xb0 net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:447
lapb_transmit_buffer+0x178/0x204 net/lapb/lapb_out.c:149
lapb_send_control+0x220/0x320 net/lapb/lapb_subr.c:251
__lapb_disconnect_request+0x9c/0x17c net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:326
lapb_device_event+0x288/0x4e0 net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:492
notifier_call_chain+0x1a4/0x510 kernel/notifier.c:93
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x3c/0x50 kernel/notifier.c:461
call_netdevice_notifiers_info net/core/dev.c:1970 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2008 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2022 [inline]
__dev_close_many+0x1b8/0x3c4 net/core/dev.c:1508
dev_close_many+0x1e0/0x470 net/core/dev.c:1559
dev_close+0x174/0x250 net/core/dev.c:1585
lapbeth_device_event+0x2e4/0x958 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:466
notifier_call_chain+0x1a4/0x510 kernel/notifier.c:93
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x3c/0x50 kernel/notifier.c:461
call_netdevice_notifiers_info net/core/dev.c:1970 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2008 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2022 [inline]
__dev_close_many+0x1b8/0x3c4 net/core/dev.c:1508
dev_close_many+0x1e0/0x470 net/core/dev.c:1559
dev_close+0x174/0x250 net/core/dev.c:1585
bond_enslave+0x2298/0x30cc drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2332
bond_do_ioctl+0x268/0xc64 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4539
dev_ifsioc+0x754/0x9ac
dev_ioctl+0x4d8/0xd34 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:786
sock_do_ioctl+0x1d4/0x2d0 net/socket.c:1217
sock_ioctl+0x4e8/0x834 net/socket.c:1322
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix racy may inline data check in dio write
syzbot reports that the following warning from ext4_iomap_begin()
triggers as of the commit referenced below:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ext4_has_inline_data(inode)))
return -ERANGE;
This occurs during a dio write, which is never expected to encounter
an inode with inline data. To enforce this behavior,
ext4_dio_write_iter() checks the current inline state of the inode
and clears the MAY_INLINE_DATA state flag to either fall back to
buffered writes, or enforce that any other writers in progress on
the inode are not allowed to create inline data.
The problem is that the check for existing inline data and the state
flag can span a lock cycle. For example, if the ilock is originally
locked shared and subsequently upgraded to exclusive, another writer
may have reacquired the lock and created inline data before the dio
write task acquires the lock and proceeds.
The commit referenced below loosens the lock requirements to allow
some forms of unaligned dio writes to occur under shared lock, but
AFAICT the inline data check was technically already racy for any
dio write that would have involved a lock cycle. Regardless, lift
clearing of the state bit to the same lock critical section that
checks for preexisting inline data on the inode to close the race. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: scarlett2: Add missing error check to scarlett2_usb_set_config()
scarlett2_usb_set_config() calls scarlett2_usb_get() but was not
checking the result. Return the error if it fails rather than
continuing with an invalid value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: sof_sdw_rt_sdca_jack_common: ctx->headset_codec_dev = NULL
sof_sdw_rt_sdca_jack_exit() are used by different codecs, and some of
them use the same dai name.
For example, rt712 and rt713 both use "rt712-sdca-aif1" and
sof_sdw_rt_sdca_jack_exit().
As a result, sof_sdw_rt_sdca_jack_exit() will be called twice by
mc_dailink_exit_loop(). Set ctx->headset_codec_dev = NULL; after
put_device(ctx->headset_codec_dev); to avoid ctx->headset_codec_dev
being put twice. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rkisp1: Fix IRQ handling due to shared interrupts
The driver requests the interrupts as IRQF_SHARED, so the interrupt
handlers can be called at any time. If such a call happens while the ISP
is powered down, the SoC will hang as the driver tries to access the
ISP registers.
This can be reproduced even without the platform sharing the IRQ line:
Enable CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ and unload the driver, and the board will
hang.
Fix this by adding a new field, 'irqs_enabled', which is used to bail
out from the interrupt handler when the ISP is not operational. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix hang/underflow when transitioning to ODM4:1
[Why]
Under some circumstances, disabling an OPTC and attempting to reclaim
its OPP(s) for a different OPTC could cause a hang/underflow due to OPPs
not being properly disconnected from the disabled OPTC.
[How]
Ensure that all OPPs are unassigned from an OPTC when it gets disabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Check if the code to patch lies in the exit section
Otherwise we fall through to vmalloc_to_page() which panics since the
address does not lie in the vmalloc region. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: scarlett2: Add missing error checks to *_ctl_get()
The *_ctl_get() functions which call scarlett2_update_*() were not
checking the return value. Fix to check the return value and pass to
the caller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efivarfs: Free s_fs_info on unmount
Now that we allocate a s_fs_info struct on fs context creation, we
should ensure that we free it again when the superblock goes away. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: scarlett2: Add missing mutex lock around get meter levels
As scarlett2_meter_ctl_get() uses meter_level_map[], the data_mutex
should be locked while accessing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Flush current cpu icache before other cpus
On SiFive Unmatched, I recently fell onto the following BUG when booting:
[ 0.000000] ftrace: allocating 36610 entries in 144 pages
[ 0.000000] Oops - illegal instruction [#1]
[ 0.000000] Modules linked in:
[ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.13.1+ #5
[ 0.000000] Hardware name: SiFive HiFive Unmatched A00 (DT)
[ 0.000000] epc : riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask+0x6/0xae
[ 0.000000] ra : __sbi_rfence_v02+0xc8/0x10a
[ 0.000000] epc : ffffffff80007240 ra : ffffffff80009964 sp : ffffffff81803e10
[ 0.000000] gp : ffffffff81a1ea70 tp : ffffffff8180f500 t0 : ffffffe07fe30000
[ 0.000000] t1 : 0000000000000004 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffffff81803e60
[ 0.000000] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : ffffffff81a22238 a1 : ffffffff81803e10
[ 0.000000] a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffffff8000989c a7 : 0000000052464e43
[ 0.000000] s2 : ffffffff81a220c8 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000200000100 s7 : 0000000000000001
[ 0.000000] s8 : ffffffe07fe04040 s9 : ffffffff81a22c80 s10: 0000000000001000
[ 0.000000] s11: 0000000000000004 t3 : 0000000000000001 t4 : 0000000000000008
[ 0.000000] t5 : ffffffcf04000808 t6 : ffffffe3ffddf188
[ 0.000000] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000002
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007240>] riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask+0x6/0xae
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80009474>] sbi_remote_fence_i+0x1e/0x26
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8000b8f4>] flush_icache_all+0x12/0x1a
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8000666c>] patch_text_nosync+0x26/0x32
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8000884e>] ftrace_init_nop+0x52/0x8c
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff800f051e>] ftrace_process_locs.isra.0+0x29c/0x360
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a0e3c6>] ftrace_init+0x80/0x130
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a00f8c>] start_kernel+0x5c4/0x8f6
[ 0.000000] ---[ end trace f67eb9af4d8d492b ]---
[ 0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task!
[ 0.000000] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! ]---
While ftrace is looping over a list of addresses to patch, it always failed
when patching the same function: riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask. Looking at the
backtrace, the illegal instruction is encountered in this same function.
However, patch_text_nosync, after patching the instructions, calls
flush_icache_range. But looking at what happens in this function:
flush_icache_range -> flush_icache_all
-> sbi_remote_fence_i
-> __sbi_rfence_v02
-> riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask
The icache and dcache of the current cpu are never synchronized between the
patching of riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask and calling this same function.
So fix this by flushing the current cpu's icache before asking for the other
cpus to do the same. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/64s: fix program check interrupt emergency stack path
Emergency stack path was jumping into a 3: label inside the
__GEN_COMMON_BODY macro for the normal path after it had finished,
rather than jumping over it. By a small miracle this is the correct
place to build up a new interrupt frame with the existing stack
pointer, so things basically worked okay with an added weird looking
700 trap frame on top (which had the wrong ->nip so it didn't decode
bug messages either).
Fix this by avoiding using numeric labels when jumping over non-trivial
macros.
Before:
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 88 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2-00034-ge057cdade6e5 #2637
NIP: 7265677368657265 LR: c00000000006c0c8 CTR: c0000000000097f0
REGS: c0000000fffb3a50 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted
MSR: 9000000000021031 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,LE> CR: 00000700 XER: 20040000
CFAR: c0000000000098b0 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c00000000006c964 c0000000fffb3cf0 c000000001513800 0000000000000000
GPR04: 0000000048ab0778 0000000042000000 0000000000000000 0000000000001299
GPR08: 000001e447c718ec 0000000022424282 0000000000002710 c00000000006bee8
GPR12: 9000000000009033 c0000000016b0000 00000000000000b0 0000000000000001
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000ff8
GPR20: 0000000000001fff 0000000000000007 0000000000000080 00007fff89d90158
GPR24: 0000000002000000 0000000002000000 0000000000000255 0000000000000300
GPR28: c000000001270000 0000000042000000 0000000048ab0778 c000000080647e80
NIP [7265677368657265] 0x7265677368657265
LR [c00000000006c0c8] ___do_page_fault+0x3f8/0xb10
Call Trace:
[c0000000fffb3cf0] [c00000000000bdac] soft_nmi_common+0x13c/0x1d0 (unreliable)
--- interrupt: 700 at decrementer_common_virt+0xb8/0x230
NIP: c0000000000098b8 LR: c00000000006c0c8 CTR: c0000000000097f0
REGS: c0000000fffb3d60 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted
MSR: 9000000000021031 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,LE> CR: 22424282 XER: 20040000
CFAR: c0000000000098b0 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c00000000006c964 0000000000002400 c000000001513800 0000000000000000
GPR04: 0000000048ab0778 0000000042000000 0000000000000000 0000000000001299
GPR08: 000001e447c718ec 0000000022424282 0000000000002710 c00000000006bee8
GPR12: 9000000000009033 c0000000016b0000 00000000000000b0 0000000000000001
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000ff8
GPR20: 0000000000001fff 0000000000000007 0000000000000080 00007fff89d90158
GPR24: 0000000002000000 0000000002000000 0000000000000255 0000000000000300
GPR28: c000000001270000 0000000042000000 0000000048ab0778 c000000080647e80
NIP [c0000000000098b8] decrementer_common_virt+0xb8/0x230
LR [c00000000006c0c8] ___do_page_fault+0x3f8/0xb10
--- interrupt: 700
Instruction dump:
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
---[ end trace 6d28218e0cc3c949 ]---
After:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:491!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 88 Comm: login Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2-00034-ge057cdade6e5-dirty #2638
NIP: c0000000000098b8 LR: c00000000006bf04 CTR: c0000000000097f0
REGS: c0000000fffb3d60 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted
MSR: 9000000000021031 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,LE> CR: 24482227 XER: 00040000
CFAR: c0000000000098b0 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c00000000006bf04 0000000000002400 c000000001513800 c000000001271868
GPR04: 00000000100f0d29 0000000042000000 0000000000000007 0000000000000009
GPR08: 00000000100f0d29 0000000024482227 0000000000002710 c000000000181b3c
GPR12: 9000000000009033 c0000000016b0000 00000000100f0d29 c000000005b22f00
GPR16: 00000000ffff0000 0000000000000001 0000000000000009 00000000100eed90
GPR20: 00000000100eed90 00000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/64s: Fix unrecoverable MCE calling async handler from NMI
The machine check handler is not considered NMI on 64s. The early
handler is the true NMI handler, and then it schedules the
machine_check_exception handler to run when interrupts are enabled.
This works fine except the case of an unrecoverable MCE, where the true
NMI is taken when MSR[RI] is clear, it can not recover, so it calls
machine_check_exception directly so something might be done about it.
Calling an async handler from NMI context can result in irq state and
other things getting corrupted. This can also trigger the BUG at
arch/powerpc/include/asm/interrupt.h:168
BUG_ON(!arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs) && !(regs->msr & MSR_EE));
Fix this by making an _async version of the handler which is called
in the normal case, and a NMI version that is called for unrecoverable
interrupts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/entry: Clear X86_FEATURE_SMAP when CONFIG_X86_SMAP=n
Commit
3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks")
added a warning if AC is set when in the kernel.
Commit
662a0221893a3d ("x86/entry: Fix AC assertion")
changed the warning to only fire if the CPU supports SMAP.
However, the warning can still trigger on a machine that supports SMAP
but where it's disabled in the kernel config and when running the
syscall_nt selftest, for example:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 49 at irqentry_enter_from_user_mode
CPU: 0 PID: 49 Comm: init Tainted: G T 5.15.0-rc4+ #98 e6202628ee053b4f310759978284bd8bb0ce6905
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:irqentry_enter_from_user_mode
...
Call Trace:
? irqentry_enter
? exc_general_protection
? asm_exc_general_protection
? asm_exc_general_protectio
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SMAP) could be added to the warning condition, but
even this would not be enough in case SMAP is disabled at boot time with
the "nosmap" parameter.
To be consistent with "nosmap" behaviour, clear X86_FEATURE_SMAP when
!CONFIG_X86_SMAP.
Found using entry-fuzz + satrandconfig.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/edid: In connector_bad_edid() cap num_of_ext by num_blocks read
In commit e11f5bd8228f ("drm: Add support for DP 1.4 Compliance edid
corruption test") the function connector_bad_edid() started assuming
that the memory for the EDID passed to it was big enough to hold
`edid[0x7e] + 1` blocks of data (1 extra for the base block). It
completely ignored the fact that the function was passed `num_blocks`
which indicated how much memory had been allocated for the EDID.
Let's fix this by adding a bounds check.
This is important for handling the case where there's an error in the
first block of the EDID. In that case we will call
connector_bad_edid() without having re-allocated memory based on
`edid[0x7e]`. |
| Side-channel information leakage in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 140.0.7339.207 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type
On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input
value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get
lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical
address to provide a virtual address for.
One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where
the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit
bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into
pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses
above the 1TB range due to the above.
Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that
might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function,
instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the
expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation.
While it might be argued that the issue is on the caller side, other
archs/macros have taken similar approaches to deal with instances like
this, such as ARM explicitly casting the input to phys_addr_t:
e48866647b48 ("ARM: 8396/1: use phys_addr_t in pfn_to_kaddr()")
A C inline function is even better though.
[ mingo: Refined the changelog some more & added __always_inline. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Add oversize check before call kvcalloc()
Commit 7661809d493b ("mm: don't allow oversized kvmalloc() calls") add the
oversize check. When the allocation is larger than what kmalloc() supports,
the following warning triggered:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8408 at mm/util.c:597 kvmalloc_node+0x108/0x110 mm/util.c:597
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 8408 Comm: syz-executor221 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:kvmalloc_node+0x108/0x110 mm/util.c:597
Call Trace:
kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:806 [inline]
kvmalloc_array include/linux/mm.h:824 [inline]
kvcalloc include/linux/mm.h:829 [inline]
check_btf_line kernel/bpf/verifier.c:9925 [inline]
check_btf_info kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10049 [inline]
bpf_check+0xd634/0x150d0 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13759
bpf_prog_load kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2301 [inline]
__sys_bpf+0x11181/0x126e0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4587
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x78/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae |
