| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In CodeMeter Runtime before versions 8.41a and 9.10, the logger does not sanitize input strings in certain cases, allowing an attacker to inject printf-style format
specifiers. This can be used to reliably crash CodeMeter and disclose sensitive information such as process memory
and stack canaries. The attack works locally, for example by using cmu --set-proxy to set the proxy value, and
remotely when combined with CVE-2026-81573 by setting General.ProxyServer and then triggering this
vulnerability. |
| Incorrect provision of specified functionality in Proxy in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed an adjacent attacker to potentially obtain sensitive information via crafted network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Subscriber SQL Injection in ACPT (Pro) - Custom Post Types Plugin for WordPress <= 2.0.63 versions. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in danielpopamd linkedin-ads-mcp 1.0.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function fs.readFileSync of the file src/tools/campaign-management.ts of the component Media Upload. Such manipulation of the argument filePath leads to path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| If configured as a server, CodeMeter Runtime before versions 8.41a and 9.10 accepts requests with opcode 0x5e, which contain the data length and
the data itself. Missing bounds checking on the data length value can lead to out of bounds reads, causing a
segmentation fault that ultimately crashes the CodeMeter Runtime. |
| Information leak in XR in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| A denial-of-service security issue exists in 1734 POINT I/O™ module. The security issue stems from improper handling of crafted CIP messages, which can cause the module to enter a faulted state. A restart is required to recover. |
| Dool in versions up to 1.3.8 is vulnerable to symlink following when the "--devel" flag is used, as the application opens a log file without the "O_NOFOLLOW" flag. A local attacker can exploit this by creating a symlink at the expected log file path pointing to a sensitive file, causing dool to truncate and overwrite the target file with log data, which is especially impactful if dool is run with elevated privileges.
The issue was addressed by pull request #116 |
| Dool in versions up to 1.3.8 is vulnerable to a CSV injection vulnerability when exporting data to a CSV file, as it fails to sanitize cell content beginning with special formula characters like =, +, -, or @. A local attacker can exploit this by running a process with a crafted name starting with =, which injects malicious formulas into the CSV output that execute when a victim opens the file in a spreadsheet application.
The issue was addressed by pull request #117 |
| shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal newline as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways: (1) direct construction of `{ op: '...\n...' }` from external input, and (2) via `parse(cmd, envFn)` when `envFn` returns object tokens whose `.op` is attacker-influenced. Both are documented API surface. Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation: `.op` must match the parser's control-operator allowlist; `{ op: 'glob', pattern }` validates `pattern` and forbids line terminators; `{ comment }` validates `comment` and forbids line terminators; any other object shape throws `TypeError`. |
| A remote attacker with user privileges may use a malicious or compromised NASL vulnerability test (VT) on the affected products to trigger a stack buffer overflow and gain full access on the compromised system. |
| Subscriber Broken Access Control in Ditty <= 3.1.67 versions. |
| Editor Broken Access Control in FluentPlayer Pro <= 1.3.2 versions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: avoid combining some incoming suboptions
Some MPTCP suboptions are mutually exclusive according to the RFC8684,
but also because in different places, the code doesn't expect some
combinations to be present. That's specially true for suboptions that
would be present twice, but with different attributes.
The new restrictions are the same as the ones applied on the output
side, with mptcp_write_options. The same rules can be reused with a
small fix: an MP_FASTCLOSE can be used with a DSS when the sender picks
this option [1], which is not the case on Linux. Here are the rules:
Which options can be used together?
X: mutually exclusive
O: often used together
C: can be used together in some cases
P: could be used together but we prefer not to (optimisations)
| Opt: | MPC | MPJ | DSS | ADD | RM | PRIO | FAIL | FC |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| MPC |------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| MPJ | X |------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| DSS | X | X |------|------|------|------|------|------|
| ADD | X | X | P |------|------|------|------|------|
| RM | C | C | C | P |------|------|------|------|
| PRIO | X | C | C | C | C |------|------|------|
| FAIL | X | X | C | X | X | X |------|------|
| FC | X | X | P | X | X | X | X |------|
| RST | X | X | X | X | X | X | O | O |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
The only difference is with the 'P': another stack could send and
ADD_ADDR with other suboptions (DSS, RM_ADDR), and this should be
allowed.
A few points of attention:
- In theory, an MP_CAPABLE could be used with a RM_ADDR, but there is
no reason to add it with a SYN. Note that even with a 4th ACK, it
doesn't seem to be useful, except when IDs are known in advance via
another channel. Better not to break that.
- Now, combining both an MP_CAPABLE and an MP_JOIN will no longer
result to a reject of the two options, but only the second suboption
is ignored. That seems OK to do that for this unexpected error. At
least now all inconsistent combinations are handled the same way.
This could change later in next. This also means the explicit checks
for having both MPC + MPJ in subflow.c will now be unreachable.
That's fine, they will be removed in a follow-up patch.
- In case of conflicting combinations, the extra suboption(s) is/are
ignored: having such combinations either means the remote peer is
buggy, or is evil. The simplest action is then taken in this case:
stop processing the current suboption.
- In mp_opt->suboptions, there is also a bit reserved to the checksum,
which can be used in an MP_CAPABLE and a DSS. Each time a DSS option
can be used in parallel with another option, the checksum can be set,
so the verification is combined into a new OPTIONS_MPTCP_DSS macro.
- An MP_CAPABLE ACK can carry a Data-Level Length, and an optional
Checksum: they are the same as the ones found in a DSS, because a DSS
cannot be used in parallel to an MP_CAPABLE. Similarly, even if there
is room, a DSS cannot be used with an MP_JOIN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: codecs: lpass-tx-macro: Fix enum kcontrol accesses
The "DEC0 MODE" to "DEC7 MODE" controls are enumerated, but
tx_macro_dec_mode_get() and tx_macro_dec_mode_put() access their
value through ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] (a long) instead of
ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] (an unsigned int).
This same pattern was fixed in the sibling drivers by
commit bcfe5f76cc40 ("ASoC: codecs: rx-macro: fix accessing array
out of bounds for enum type") and
commit 0ea5eff7c606 ("ASoC: codecs: va-macro: fix accessing array
out of bounds for enum type"), but tx-macro was missed.
On 64-bit kernels built with CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG, the elem value
sanity check catches the 4 bytes written past the enumerated item
and every read of these controls fails with -EINVAL:
snd-sm8250 sound: control 2:0:0:DEC0 MODE:0: access overflow |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Continue the pipeline trigger in case of IPC timeout
Ignore IPC errors for pipeline state change if the firmware state is
crashed or the IPC has timed out.
If the firmware has crashed the kernel still needs to go through the state
changes to reset its internal to be able to correctly work the next time
the DSP is booted up.
The case with IPC timeout is a bit more problematic, but it has been
rootcaused to be the result of system scheduling blockage and the firmware
did actually received and handled the message, but the reply handling got
blocked by issues outside of the SOF stack.
So far the best way to handle this is to continue with setting the state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: byd - synchronize timer deletion before freeing private data
byd_disconnect() uses timer_delete() before freeing the driver's private
data. This does not wait for a running byd_clear_touch() callback, which
dereferences the private data and its psmouse pointer. A callback racing
with disconnect can therefore access the private data after it has been
freed. The timer can also still be re-armed by byd_process_byte() while
the disconnect is in progress.
Use timer_shutdown_sync() before freeing the private data: it waits for
a running callback and turns any later re-arm attempt into a no-op. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: ml-ioh: use raw_spinlock_t for the register lock
ioh_irq_type() is registered as the irq_chip .irq_set_type callback and
takes chip->spinlock with spin_lock_irqsave(). This callback is reached
from __setup_irq() -> __irq_set_trigger() -> chip->irq_set_type() while
the caller holds desc->lock, a raw_spinlock_t, with hardirqs disabled.
That context is not sleepable, but on PREEMPT_RT a regular spinlock_t is
an rtmutex-backed sleeping lock, so acquiring it there is invalid.
ioh_irq_enable() and ioh_irq_disable() take the same lock from the
.irq_enable/.irq_disable callbacks, which are likewise invoked with
desc->lock held.
Convert the register lock to raw_spinlock_t. The same lock also
serializes the GPIO direction/value callbacks and the suspend/resume
register save/restore, and those critical sections only perform short
sequences of MMIO register accesses (ioread32()/iowrite32()); the
.irq_set_type callback additionally emits a dev_warn() on an unsupported
type. None of these are sleepable operations, so keeping this register
lock non-sleeping is appropriate for the irqchip callbacks and does not
change the GPIO-side locking contract.
This is the same fix as commit a02b8950d619 ("gpio: pch: use
raw_spinlock_t for the register lock"); this driver shares the same
structure as gpio-pch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check
ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the
buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid:
ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or
compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with
struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end,
leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.
The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has
no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past
the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed
directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.
The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants
(ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32)
after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the
only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.
Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end,
*num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client
that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges
beyond OSD session establishment.
[ idryomov: trim changelog ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Cancel existing workqueues
The initialization of the io_work and crw_work workqueues begs the
question of whether they should be un-initialized. Add the corresponding
cleanup tags in _release_dev to ensure work isn't dispatched after
the private struct is free'd. |
