| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| `_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length > 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes.
Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls.
**Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one.
**Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow — `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case.
**One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte.
During a runaway walk, stray bytes parsing as a link-layer address option are copied into the neighbor cache (`nx_icmpv6_process_ns.c:280, :293`) and subsequently used as the destination MAC for frames to that neighbour, placing off-packet memory on the link. Confirmed by inspection, not reproduced. |
| hey,
`_nx_snmp_utility_object_id_get` in the NetX Duo SNMP addon does not validate the claimed OID data length against the actual buffer size when the OID uses BER multibyte length encoding, so a remote attacker can send a crafted SNMP packet with a multibyte OID length larger than the available buffer, causing the parser to read past the packet buffer boundary into adjacent heap memory. the OOB bytes are decoded as OID component values and written into the agents internal OID string buffer, corrupting agent state. on systems with memory protection the OOB read poses the risk of crashing the SNMP agent thread, causing denial of service. on bare metal embedded systems without memory protection the read silently succeeds and corrupts the agents internal state with heap data. |
| A TFTP server that answers with a short ERROR packet makes the client read up to 64 bytes past the
received datagram.
Each receive path checks only that the datagram is at least four bytes long (nxd_tftp_client.c:1229,
1521, 1984). When the opcode is NX_TFTP_CODE_ERROR the message string is copied with a loop whose
only limits are the destination buffer and a NUL byte:
```c
/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769 */
for (i = 0; (i < (sizeof(tftp_client_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_error_string) - 1)) && (*buffer_ptr); i++)
```
Nothing compares `buffer_ptr` against `nx_packet_append_ptr`. An ERROR packet that carries no
terminating NUL, which a server controls completely, walks the loop off the end of the packet until
it happens to meet a zero byte or fills the 64 byte destination.
```
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ of size 1 at 0x60d0000000c8 thread T4
#0 _nxd_tftp_client_file_read addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769
0x60d0000000c8 is 0 bytes to the right of 136-byte region
```
The open path has the same loop at :1327 and reports the same way. What is read lands in
`nx_tftp_client_error_string`, which the application is expected to display or log, so adjacent
packet pool memory ends up in whatever the device does with the error text.
Add `(buffer_ptr < packet_ptr -> nx_packet_append_ptr)` to the loop condition in all three paths. |
| Out-of-bounds Read from Unvalidated MSRP Attribute List Length |
| Unbounded PPP IPCP Option Parsing Causes a Worker Stall and Out-of-bounds Read |
| XS::Parse::Infix versions from 0.40 through 0.49 for Perl treat a number as an array reference.
The wrapper function XS::Parse::Infix generates for a list-associative infix operator checks whether arguments are array references, but it tests using SvRV() rather than SvROK(). SvRV() reads a union slot that only holds a referent once SvROK(sv) is true, so the guard never validates that it is a reference. For an IV or NV that slot holds the number itself, SvRV() returns the caller's value and SvTYPE() dereferences it at offset 12. This will generally result in a segmentation fault.
An application that hands the wrapper a list built from decoded input (for example, from JSON) lets whoever supplies a number in that list choose the address that the interpreter dereferences.
An ordinary string's byte 12 is rarely SVt_PVAV so the guard croaks by luck, but an attacker-crafted string carrying 0x0b there passes, and the buffer is then used as an AV head, with AvARRAY taken from bytes 16-23 and its entries pushed onto the Perl stack as live SVs.
A simple proof-of-concept uses the zip operator:
use Syntax::Operator::Zip 'zip';
my @args = ([1], 2);
zip(@args); |
| NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. |
| NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Linux contains a vulnerability in the firmware where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. |
| NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. |
| Algorithm::AhoCorasick::XS versions through 0.04 for Perl read the haystack string length before the scalar is stringified.
The matches, first_match and match_details methods use the T_STD_STRING typemap to translate Perl scalars (SVs) into strings via the std::string constructor, using the SvPV macro to stringify the haystack input, and the SvCUR macro to determine the length of the SV.
When the input SVs are references, integers (IVs) or floats (NVs), the SvCUR macro will return an invalid length if it is run before the input is stringified, leading to an out-of-bounds read which can abort the process.
Note that the evaluation order of arguments to std::string is unspecified. Depending on the compiler, SvCUR may be run first and lead to an abort that cannot be caught within Perl.
This can be triggered when the haystack is a numeric value, for example,
my $ac = Algorithm::AhoCorasick::XS->new( [ "11", "22" ] );
$ac->matches( 211 );
This can occur when the haystack is the result of reading data from decoded JSON or a numeric database column. It can also be triggered when using a blessed object as a haystack. |
| In libsmpp35 from 0.1.0 through 1.8.0 out of bound read issue was found in the at smpp34_unpack() function via attacker controlled SMPP PDUs, leading to memory corruption. |
| pgPointcloud through 1.2.5 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in dimensional patch WKB deserialization that allows authenticated database users to read adjacent heap memory. Attackers can supply crafted pcpatch values with attacker-controlled size fields to copy heap memory into stored patches for exfiltration or crash the PostgreSQL backend. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Standard XPS allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| IBM OPENBMC FW1120.00 through FW1120.01, FW1110.00 through FW1110.31, and FW1060.00 through FW1060.81 is affected by a vulnerability in the BMC firmware management interface. The host system can cause the BMC firmware management service to crash or allow a limited amount of BMC internal memory to be read, resulting in a confidentiality and availability impact to the managed system. |
| The CoAP link-format helper match_path_uri() in subsys/net/lib/coap/coap_link_format.c compares a registered resource path against the URI carried in a Uri-Query href= option. That URI is not NUL terminated, but the inner character loop advanced its index k once per path character without ever testing it against the option length len. When a registered path segment is longer than the supplied URI and the URI is a prefix of it, the loop reads uri[len] and beyond, past the end of the option value.
The path is reached from coap_well_known_core_get_len() and coap_well_known_core_get() via match_queries_resource(), i.e. by any unauthenticated GET /.well-known/core?href=/<prefix> request to a device that serves /.well-known/core (for the CoAP server subsystem, CONFIG_COAP_SERVER_WELL_KNOWN_CORE, default y) and has at least one resource that declares struct coap_core_metadata attributes.
The over-read does not reach the receive buffer. The well-known-core builders parse the query into a stack-local struct coap_option, whose value is a fixed array (value[12], or CONFIG_COAP_EXTENDED_OPTIONS_LEN_VALUE bytes) that the option bytes are copied into, so uri points into that copy. Reading past len therefore reads the unused, uninitialized tail of the array and, when the option fills it, the bytes just past it in the same stack frame. (In the ZoAP library of v1.8.0 to v1.9.x the option value was instead a pointer into the received packet, and the over-read ran past the option inside the packet buffer.)
The impact is bounded. The number of bytes read past the end is limited by the length of the resource path segment, and each additional byte is only read if it happens to equal the next path character, so in practice the over-read is one byte. It also cannot influence the response: returning a match requires the final compared index to be len - 1 or len, both in bounds, so out-of-bounds bytes only ever steer the loop to the next candidate resource. The consequence is undefined behaviour, not information disclosure and not a matching error.
The fix adds a k >= len guard at the top of the inner loop, so every uri[k] dereference is within the option value while still allowing a trailing * wildcard to match a longer path. |
| IBM PowerVM Hypervisor FW1120.00 through FW1120.01, FW1110.00 through FW1110.31, FW1060.00 through FW1060.81, and FW950.00 through FW950.H3 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an out-of-bounds read. |
| Out of bounds read in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.92 allowed a remote attacker to read memory outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| IBM Server Firmware FW1120.00 through FW1120.01, FW1110.00 through FW1110.31, FW1060.00 through FW1060.81, and FW950.00 through FW950.H3 is affected by a vulnerability in the ASMI web interface. An unauthenticated attacker on the management network can send a malformed HTTPS request to ASMI, causing the web server to crash with possible memory corruption and generate an error log. The ASMI web interface will restart automatically; however, repeated exploitation could result in a sustained loss of access to the ASMI management interface, resulting in an integrity and availability impact. |
| The MCUmgr SMP-over-console transport decodes a base64 frame, reads a 16-bit packet length from it, verifies a CRC and then unconditionally strips the trailing CRC with rx_ctxt->nb->len -= 2U; in mcumgr_serial_process_frag() (subsys/mgmt/mcumgr/transport/src/serial_util.c). mcumgr_serial_extract_len() accepted any declared length, including 0 and 1, and a packet declaring length 0 passes the checksum test for free because crc16_itu_t() over zero bytes returns the zero seed. Since net_buf::len is a uint16_t, the subtraction underflows and the buffer is handed to SMP claiming roughly 65 KB of payload while its data area is only CONFIG_MCUMGR_TRANSPORT_NETBUF_SIZE bytes (default 384).
The trigger is a single unauthenticated 7-byte line on the management console — the 0x06 0x09 packet marker followed by the base64 group AAA= and a newline — delivered to any transport built on this helper: CONFIG_MCUMGR_TRANSPORT_UART (smp_uart.c) or CONFIG_MCUMGR_TRANSPORT_SHELL (smp_shell.c), both of which select MCUMGR_TRANSPORT_SERIAL_HAS_SMP_OVER_CONSOLE. No prior session state, fragmentation or credentials are required to trigger the underflow, and the malformed frame is mishandled before any command handler or command-level access control runs. The attacker only needs write access to that console, which on many boards is a USB CDC-ACM port rather than a bare UART header.
With the inflated length, smp_process_request_packet() in subsys/mgmt/mcumgr/smp/src/smp.c loses its bound: cbor_nb_reader_init() gives the CBOR decoder a ~65 KB window into a 384-byte buffer, and each request header's nh_len is checked only against the inflated length. On its own the 7-byte frame re-parses whatever stale bytes the reused pool buffer still holds, typically a replay of the previously received request followed by a parse error, without leaving the buffer. Because the transport is unauthenticated, though, the attacker also controls the frames sent before the trigger, and can stage buffer contents so that a request succeeds with an nh_len larger than the buffer; net_buf_pull(), guarded only by __ASSERT_NO_MSG, then moves the parse cursor out of bounds and the loop reads further headers and CBOR from adjacent memory. The consequence is an out-of-bounds read that can fault the MCUmgr thread (denial of service); memory disclosure is also possible, since the default-enabled os echo handler (CONFIG_MCUMGR_GRP_OS_ECHO) decodes its string inside that window and copies it into its response. There is no integrity gain beyond what the unauthenticated transport already permits.
The fix rejects any declared packet length of two bytes or fewer in mcumgr_serial_extract_len(), so the CRC-strip subtraction can no longer underflow. The identical pattern remains in the test-only loopback transport subsys/mgmt/mcumgr/transport/src/smp_dummy.c (CONFIG_MCUMGR_TRANSPORT_DUMMY), which has no external input path and therefore carries no practical exposure. |
| An out-of-bounds read in libXtst's RECORD reply parser in libXtst before 1.2.6 could be used by malicious X servers to crash attached X clients. |
