| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-zynqmp-gqspi: return -ENOMEM if dma_map_single fails
The spi controller supports 44-bit address space on AXI in DMA mode,
so set dma_addr_t width to 44-bit to avoid using a swiotlb mapping.
In addition, if dma_map_single fails, it should return immediately
instead of continuing doing the DMA operation which bases on invalid
address.
This fixes the following crash which occurs in reading a big block
from flash:
[ 123.633577] zynqmp-qspi ff0f0000.spi: swiotlb buffer is full (sz: 4194304 bytes), total 32768 (slots), used 0 (slots)
[ 123.644230] zynqmp-qspi ff0f0000.spi: ERR:rxdma:memory not mapped
[ 123.784625] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000000003fffc0
[ 123.792536] Mem abort info:
[ 123.795313] ESR = 0x96000145
[ 123.798351] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 123.803655] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 123.806693] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 123.809818] Data abort info:
[ 123.812683] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000145
[ 123.816503] CM = 1, WnR = 1
[ 123.819455] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000805047000
[ 123.825887] [00000000003fffc0] pgd=0000000803b45003, p4d=0000000803b45003, pud=0000000000000000
[ 123.834586] Internal error: Oops: 96000145 [#1] PREEMPT SMP |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/64s: Fix pte update for kernel memory on radix
When adding a PTE a ptesync is needed to order the update of the PTE
with subsequent accesses otherwise a spurious fault may be raised.
radix__set_pte_at() does not do this for performance gains. For
non-kernel memory this is not an issue as any faults of this kind are
corrected by the page fault handler. For kernel memory these faults
are not handled. The current solution is that there is a ptesync in
flush_cache_vmap() which should be called when mapping from the
vmalloc region.
However, map_kernel_page() does not call flush_cache_vmap(). This is
troublesome in particular for code patching with Strict RWX on radix.
In do_patch_instruction() the page frame that contains the instruction
to be patched is mapped and then immediately patched. With no ordering
or synchronization between setting up the PTE and writing to the page
it is possible for faults.
As the code patching is done using __put_user_asm_goto() the resulting
fault is obscured - but using a normal store instead it can be seen:
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc008000008f24a3c
Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000008bd74
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
Modules linked in: nop_module(PO+) [last unloaded: nop_module]
CPU: 4 PID: 757 Comm: sh Tainted: P O 5.10.0-rc5-01361-ge3c1b78c8440-dirty #43
NIP: c00000000008bd74 LR: c00000000008bd50 CTR: c000000000025810
REGS: c000000016f634a0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: P O (5.10.0-rc5-01361-ge3c1b78c8440-dirty)
MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44002884 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c00000000007c68c DAR: c008000008f24a3c DSISR: 42000000 IRQMASK: 1
This results in the kind of issue reported here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/[email protected]/
Chris Riedl suggested a reliable way to reproduce the issue:
$ mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug
$ (while true; do echo function > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer ; echo nop > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer ; done) &
Turning ftrace on and off does a large amount of code patching which
in usually less then 5min will crash giving a trace like:
ftrace-powerpc: (____ptrval____): replaced (4b473b11) != old (60000000)
------------[ ftrace bug ]------------
ftrace failed to modify
[<c000000000bf8e5c>] napi_busy_loop+0xc/0x390
actual: 11:3b:47:4b
Setting ftrace call site to call ftrace function
ftrace record flags: 80000001
(1)
expected tramp: c00000000006c96c
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 809 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2065 ftrace_bug+0x28c/0x2e8
Modules linked in: nop_module(PO-) [last unloaded: nop_module]
CPU: 4 PID: 809 Comm: sh Tainted: P O 5.10.0-rc5-01360-gf878ccaf250a #1
NIP: c00000000024f334 LR: c00000000024f330 CTR: c0000000001a5af0
REGS: c000000004c8b760 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: P O (5.10.0-rc5-01360-gf878ccaf250a)
MSR: 900000000282b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28008848 XER: 20040000
CFAR: c0000000001a9c98 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c00000000024f330 c000000004c8b9f0 c000000002770600 0000000000000022
GPR04: 00000000ffff7fff c000000004c8b6d0 0000000000000027 c0000007fe9bcdd8
GPR08: 0000000000000023 ffffffffffffffd8 0000000000000027 c000000002613118
GPR12: 0000000000008000 c0000007fffdca00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000023ec37c5 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000008
GPR20: c000000004c8bc90 c0000000027a2d20 c000000004c8bcd0 c000000002612fe8
GPR24: 0000000000000038 0000000000000030 0000000000000028 0000000000000020
GPR28: c000000000ff1b68 c000000000bf8e5c c00000000312f700 c000000000fbb9b0
NIP ftrace_bug+0x28c/0x2e8
LR ftrace_bug+0x288/0x2e8
Call T
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: connac: fix kernel warning adding monitor interface
Fix the following kernel warning adding a monitor interface in
mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_dev routine.
[ 507.984882] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 507.989515] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3017 at mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_dev+0x178/0x190 [mt76_connac_lib]
[ 508.059379] CPU: 1 PID: 3017 Comm: ifconfig Not tainted 5.4.98 #0
[ 508.065461] Hardware name: MT7622_MT7531 RFB (DT)
[ 508.070156] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 508.074939] pc : mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_dev+0x178/0x190 [mt76_connac_lib]
[ 508.081806] lr : mt7921_eeprom_init+0x1288/0x1cb8 [mt7921e]
[ 508.087367] sp : ffffffc013a33930
[ 508.090671] x29: ffffffc013a33930 x28: ffffff801e628ac0
[ 508.095973] x27: ffffff801c7f1200 x26: ffffff801c7eb008
[ 508.101275] x25: ffffff801c7eaef0 x24: ffffff801d025610
[ 508.106577] x23: ffffff801d022990 x22: ffffff801d024de8
[ 508.111879] x21: ffffff801d0226a0 x20: ffffff801c7eaee8
[ 508.117181] x19: ffffff801d0226a0 x18: 000000005d00b000
[ 508.122482] x17: 00000000ffffffff x16: 0000000000000000
[ 508.127785] x15: 0000000000000080 x14: ffffff801d704000
[ 508.133087] x13: 0000000000000040 x12: 0000000000000002
[ 508.138389] x11: 000000000000000c x10: 0000000000000000
[ 508.143691] x9 : 0000000000000020 x8 : 0000000000000001
[ 508.148992] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[ 508.154294] x5 : ffffff801c7eaee8 x4 : 0000000000000006
[ 508.159596] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000000000000000
[ 508.164898] x1 : ffffff801c7eac08 x0 : ffffff801d0226a0
[ 508.170200] Call trace:
[ 508.172640] mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_dev+0x178/0x190 [mt76_connac_lib]
[ 508.179159] mt7921_eeprom_init+0x1288/0x1cb8 [mt7921e]
[ 508.184394] drv_add_interface+0x34/0x88 [mac80211]
[ 508.189271] ieee80211_add_virtual_monitor+0xe0/0xb48 [mac80211]
[ 508.195277] ieee80211_do_open+0x86c/0x918 [mac80211]
[ 508.200328] ieee80211_do_open+0x900/0x918 [mac80211]
[ 508.205372] __dev_open+0xcc/0x150
[ 508.208763] __dev_change_flags+0x134/0x198
[ 508.212937] dev_change_flags+0x20/0x60
[ 508.216764] devinet_ioctl+0x3e8/0x748
[ 508.220503] inet_ioctl+0x1e4/0x350
[ 508.223983] sock_do_ioctl+0x48/0x2a0
[ 508.227635] sock_ioctl+0x310/0x4f8
[ 508.231116] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0xac0
[ 508.234681] ksys_ioctl+0x44/0x90
[ 508.237985] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x1c/0x48
[ 508.241901] el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x7c/0x100
[ 508.246681] el0_svc_handler+0x18/0x20
[ 508.250421] el0_svc+0x8/0x1c8
[ 508.253465] ---[ end trace c7b90fee13d72c39 ]---
[ 508.261278] ------------[ cut here ]------------ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: mt7921: fix kernel crash when the firmware fails to download
Fix kernel crash when the firmware is missing or fails to download.
[ 9.444758] kernel BUG at drivers/pci/msi.c:375!
[ 9.449363] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 9.501033] pstate: a0400009 (NzCv daif +PAN -UAO)
[ 9.505814] pc : free_msi_irqs+0x180/0x184
[ 9.509897] lr : free_msi_irqs+0x40/0x184
[ 9.513893] sp : ffffffc015193870
[ 9.517194] x29: ffffffc015193870 x28: 00000000f0e94fa2
[ 9.522492] x27: 0000000000000acd x26: 000000000000009a
[ 9.527790] x25: ffffffc0152cee58 x24: ffffffdbb383e0d8
[ 9.533087] x23: ffffffdbb38628d0 x22: 0000000000040200
[ 9.538384] x21: ffffff8cf7de7318 x20: ffffff8cd65a2480
[ 9.543681] x19: ffffff8cf7de7000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 9.548979] x17: ffffff8cf9ca03b4 x16: ffffffdc13ad9a34
[ 9.554277] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000080800
[ 9.559575] x13: ffffff8cd65a2980 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 9.564873] x11: ffffff8cfa45d820 x10: ffffff8cfa45d6d0
[ 9.570171] x9 : 0000000000000040 x8 : ffffff8ccef1b780
[ 9.575469] x7 : aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa x6 : 0000000000000000
[ 9.580766] x5 : ffffffdc13824900 x4 : ffffff8ccefe0000
[ 9.586063] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000
[ 9.591362] x1 : 0000000000000125 x0 : ffffff8ccefe0000
[ 9.596660] Call trace:
[ 9.599095] free_msi_irqs+0x180/0x184
[ 9.602831] pci_disable_msi+0x100/0x130
[ 9.606740] pci_free_irq_vectors+0x24/0x30
[ 9.610915] mt7921_pci_probe+0xbc/0x250 [mt7921e]
[ 9.615693] pci_device_probe+0xd4/0x14c
[ 9.619604] really_probe+0x134/0x2ec
[ 9.623252] driver_probe_device+0x64/0xfc
[ 9.627335] device_driver_attach+0x4c/0x6c
[ 9.631506] __driver_attach+0xac/0xc0
[ 9.635243] bus_for_each_dev+0x8c/0xd4
[ 9.639066] driver_attach+0x2c/0x38
[ 9.642628] bus_add_driver+0xfc/0x1d0
[ 9.646365] driver_register+0x64/0xf8
[ 9.650101] __pci_register_driver+0x6c/0x7c
[ 9.654360] init_module+0x28/0xfdc [mt7921e]
[ 9.658704] do_one_initcall+0x13c/0x2d0
[ 9.662615] do_init_module+0x58/0x1e8
[ 9.666351] load_module+0xd80/0xeb4
[ 9.669912] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0xa8/0xe0
[ 9.674430] el0_svc_common+0xa4/0x16c
[ 9.678168] el0_svc_compat_handler+0x2c/0x40
[ 9.682511] el0_svc_compat+0x8/0x10
[ 9.686076] Code: a94257f6 f9400bf7 a8c47bfd d65f03c0 (d4210000)
[ 9.692155] ---[ end trace 7621f966afbf0a29 ]---
[ 9.697385] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 9.702599] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 9.706549] Kernel Offset: 0x1c03600000 from 0xffffffc010000000
[ 9.712456] PHYS_OFFSET: 0xfffffff440000000
[ 9.716625] CPU features: 0x080026,2a80aa18
[ 9.720795] Memory Limit: none |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/mediatek: Always enable the clk on resume
In mtk_iommu_runtime_resume always enable the clk, even
if m4u_dom is null. Otherwise the 'suspend' cb might
disable the clk which is already disabled causing the warning:
[ 1.586104] infra_m4u already disabled
[ 1.586133] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 121 at drivers/clk/clk.c:952 clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8
[ 1.594391] mtk-iommu 10205000.iommu: bound 18001000.larb (ops mtk_smi_larb_component_ops)
[ 1.598108] Modules linked in:
[ 1.598114] CPU: 0 PID: 121 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5 #69
[ 1.609246] mtk-iommu 10205000.iommu: bound 14027000.larb (ops mtk_smi_larb_component_ops)
[ 1.617487] Hardware name: Google Elm (DT)
[ 1.617491] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work
[ 1.620545] mtk-iommu 10205000.iommu: bound 19001000.larb (ops mtk_smi_larb_component_ops)
[ 1.627229] pstate: 60000085 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[ 1.659297] pc : clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8
[ 1.663475] lr : clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8
[ 1.667652] sp : ffff800011b9bbe0
[ 1.670959] x29: ffff800011b9bbe0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 1.676267] x27: ffff800011448000 x26: ffff8000100cfd98
[ 1.681574] x25: ffff800011b9bd48 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 1.686882] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff8000106fad90
[ 1.692189] x21: 000000000000000a x20: ffff0000c0048500
[ 1.697496] x19: ffff0000c0048500 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1.702804] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1.708112] x15: ffff800011460300 x14: fffffffffffe0000
[ 1.713420] x13: ffff8000114602d8 x12: 0720072007200720
[ 1.718727] x11: 0720072007200720 x10: 0720072007200720
[ 1.724035] x9 : ffff800011b9bbe0 x8 : ffff800011b9bbe0
[ 1.729342] x7 : 0000000000000009 x6 : ffff8000114b8328
[ 1.734649] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 1.739956] x3 : 00000000ffffffff x2 : ffff800011460298
[ 1.745263] x1 : 1af1d7de276f4500 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 1.750572] Call trace:
[ 1.753010] clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8
[ 1.756840] clk_core_disable_lock+0x24/0x40
[ 1.761105] clk_disable+0x20/0x30
[ 1.764501] mtk_iommu_runtime_suspend+0x88/0xa8
[ 1.769114] pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x2c/0x48
[ 1.773815] __rpm_callback+0xe0/0x178
[ 1.777559] rpm_callback+0x24/0x88
[ 1.781041] rpm_suspend+0xdc/0x470
[ 1.784523] rpm_idle+0x12c/0x170
[ 1.787831] pm_runtime_work+0xa8/0xc0
[ 1.791573] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x360
[ 1.795580] worker_thread+0x44/0x478
[ 1.799237] kthread+0x150/0x158
[ 1.802460] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
[ 1.806034] ---[ end trace 82402920ef64573b ]---
[ 1.810728] ------------[ cut here ]------------
In addition, we now don't need to enable the clock from the
function mtk_iommu_hw_init since it is already enabled by the resume. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: mt7921: fix possible invalid register access
Disable the interrupt and synchronze for the pending irq handlers to ensure
the irq tasklet is not being scheduled after the suspend to avoid the
possible invalid register access acts when the host pcie controller is
suspended.
[17932.910534] mt7921e 0000:01:00.0: pci_pm_suspend+0x0/0x22c returned 0 after 21375 usecs
[17932.910590] pcieport 0000:00:00.0: calling pci_pm_suspend+0x0/0x22c @ 18565, parent: pci0000:00
[17932.910602] pcieport 0000:00:00.0: pci_pm_suspend+0x0/0x22c returned 0 after 8 usecs
[17932.910671] mtk-pcie 11230000.pcie: calling platform_pm_suspend+0x0/0x60 @ 22783, parent: soc
[17932.910674] mtk-pcie 11230000.pcie: platform_pm_suspend+0x0/0x60 returned 0 after 0 usecs
...
17933.615352] x1 : 00000000000d4200 x0 : ffffff8269ca2300
[17933.620666] Call trace:
[17933.623127] mt76_mmio_rr+0x28/0xf0 [mt76]
[17933.627234] mt7921_rr+0x38/0x44 [mt7921e]
[17933.631339] mt7921_irq_tasklet+0x54/0x1d8 [mt7921e]
[17933.636309] tasklet_action_common+0x12c/0x16c
[17933.640754] tasklet_action+0x24/0x2c
[17933.644418] __do_softirq+0x16c/0x344
[17933.648082] irq_exit+0xa8/0xac
[17933.651224] scheduler_ipi+0xd4/0x148
[17933.654890] handle_IPI+0x164/0x2d4
[17933.658379] gic_handle_irq+0x140/0x178
[17933.662216] el1_irq+0xb8/0x180
[17933.665361] cpuidle_enter_state+0xf8/0x204
[17933.669544] cpuidle_enter+0x38/0x4c
[17933.673122] do_idle+0x1a4/0x2a8
[17933.676352] cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x28
[17933.680276] rest_init+0xd4/0xe0
[17933.683508] arch_call_rest_init+0x10/0x18
[17933.687606] start_kernel+0x340/0x3b4
[17933.691279] Code: aa0003f5 d503201f f953eaa8 8b344108 (b9400113)
[17933.697373] ---[ end trace a24b8e26ffbda3c5 ]---
[17933.767846] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/64: Fix the definition of the fixmap area
At the time being, the fixmap area is defined at the top of
the address space or just below KASAN.
This definition is not valid for PPC64.
For PPC64, use the top of the I/O space.
Because of circular dependencies, it is not possible to include
asm/fixmap.h in asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h , so define a fixed size
AREA at the top of the I/O space for fixmap and ensure during
build that the size is big enough. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
m68k: mvme147,mvme16x: Don't wipe PCC timer config bits
Don't clear the timer 1 configuration bits when clearing the interrupt flag
and counter overflow. As Michael reported, "This results in no timer
interrupts being delivered after the first. Initialization then hangs
in calibrate_delay as the jiffies counter is not updated."
On mvme16x, enable the timer after requesting the irq, consistent with
mvme147. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: 9064/1: hw_breakpoint: Do not directly check the event's overflow_handler hook
The commit 1879445dfa7b ("perf/core: Set event's default
::overflow_handler()") set a default event->overflow_handler in
perf_event_alloc(), and replace the check event->overflow_handler with
is_default_overflow_handler(), but one is missing.
Currently, the bp->overflow_handler can not be NULL. As a result,
enable_single_step() is always not invoked.
Comments from Zhen Lei:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-arm-kernel/patch/[email protected]/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid touching checkpointed data in get_victim()
In CP disabling mode, there are two issues when using LFS or SSR | AT_SSR
mode to select victim:
1. LFS is set to find source section during GC, the victim should have
no checkpointed data, since after GC, section could not be set free for
reuse.
Previously, we only check valid chpt blocks in current segment rather
than section, fix it.
2. SSR | AT_SSR are set to find target segment for writes which can be
fully filled by checkpointed and newly written blocks, we should never
select such segment, otherwise it can cause panic or data corruption
during allocation, potential case is described as below:
a) target segment has 'n' (n < 512) ckpt valid blocks
b) GC migrates 'n' valid blocks to other segment (segment is still
in dirty list)
c) GC migrates '512 - n' blocks to target segment (segment has 'n'
cp_vblocks and '512 - n' vblocks)
d) If GC selects target segment via {AT,}SSR allocator, however there
is no free space in targe segment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: entry: always set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET during entry
Zenghui reports that booting a kernel with "irqchip.gicv3_pseudo_nmi=1"
on the command line hits a warning during kernel entry, due to the way
we manipulate the PMR.
Early in the entry sequence, we call lockdep_hardirqs_off() to inform
lockdep that interrupts have been masked (as the HW sets DAIF wqhen
entering an exception). Architecturally PMR_EL1 is not affected by
exception entry, and we don't set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET in the PMR early in
the exception entry sequence, so early in exception entry the PMR can
indicate that interrupts are unmasked even though they are masked by
DAIF.
If DEBUG_LOCKDEP is selected, lockdep_hardirqs_off() will check that
interrupts are masked, before we set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET in any of the
exception entry paths, and hence lockdep_hardirqs_off() will WARN() that
something is amiss.
We can avoid this by consistently setting GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET during
exception entry so that kernel code sees a consistent environment. We
must also update local_daif_inherit() to undo this, as currently only
touches DAIF. For other paths, local_daif_restore() will update both
DAIF and the PMR. With this done, we can remove the existing special
cases which set this later in the entry code.
We always use (GIC_PRIO_IRQON | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET) for consistency with
local_daif_save(), as this will warn if it ever encounters
(GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET), and never sets this itself. This
matches the gic_prio_kentry_setup that we have to retain for
ret_to_user.
The original splat from Zenghui's report was:
| DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled())
| WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 125 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4258 lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 3 PID: 125 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 5.12.0-rc8+ #463
| Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
| pstate: 604003c5 (nZCv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
| pc : lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| lr : lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| sp : ffff80002a39bad0
| pmr_save: 000000e0
| x29: ffff80002a39bad0 x28: ffff0000de214bc0
| x27: ffff0000de1c0400 x26: 000000000049b328
| x25: 0000000000406f30 x24: ffff0000de1c00a0
| x23: 0000000020400005 x22: ffff8000105f747c
| x21: 0000000096000044 x20: 0000000000498ef9
| x19: ffff80002a39bc88 x18: ffffffffffffffff
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff800011c61eb0
| x15: ffff800011700a88 x14: 0720072007200720
| x13: 0720072007200720 x12: 0720072007200720
| x11: 0720072007200720 x10: 0720072007200720
| x9 : ffff80002a39bad0 x8 : ffff80002a39bad0
| x7 : ffff8000119f0800 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff
| x5 : ffff8000119f07a8 x4 : 0000000000000001
| x3 : 9bcdab23f2432800 x2 : ffff800011730538
| x1 : 9bcdab23f2432800 x0 : 0000000000000000
| Call trace:
| lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| enter_from_kernel_mode.isra.5+0x7c/0xa8
| el1_abort+0x24/0x100
| el1_sync_handler+0x80/0xd0
| el1_sync+0x6c/0x100
| __arch_clear_user+0xc/0x90
| load_elf_binary+0x9fc/0x1450
| bprm_execve+0x404/0x880
| kernel_execve+0x180/0x188
| call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0xdc/0x158
| ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nVMX: Always make an attempt to map eVMCS after migration
When enlightened VMCS is in use and nested state is migrated with
vmx_get_nested_state()/vmx_set_nested_state() KVM can't map evmcs
page right away: evmcs gpa is not 'struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr'
and we can't read it from VP assist page because userspace may decide
to restore HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE after restoring nested state
(and QEMU, for example, does exactly that). To make sure eVMCS is
mapped /vmx_set_nested_state() raises KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES
request.
Commit f2c7ef3ba955 ("KVM: nSVM: cancel KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES
on nested vmexit") added KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES clearing to
nested_vmx_vmexit() to make sure MSR permission bitmap is not switched
when an immediate exit from L2 to L1 happens right after migration (caused
by a pending event, for example). Unfortunately, in the exact same
situation we still need to have eVMCS mapped so
nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow() reflects changes in VMCS12 to eVMCS.
As a band-aid, restore nested_get_evmcs_page() when clearing
KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES in nested_vmx_vmexit(). The 'fix' is far
from being ideal as we can't easily propagate possible failures and even if
we could, this is most likely already too late to do so. The whole
'KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES' idea for mapping eVMCS after migration
seems to be fragile as we diverge too much from the 'native' path when
vmptr loading happens on vmx_set_nested_state(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Fix crash in auto_retire
The retire logic uses the 2 lower bits of the pointer to the retire
function to store flags. However, the auto_retire function is not
guaranteed to be aligned to a multiple of 4, which causes crashes as
we jump to the wrong address, for example like this:
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804300Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876901] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804310Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876906] CPU: 7 PID: 146 Comm: kworker/u16:6 Tainted: G U 5.4.105-13595-g3cd84167b2df #1
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804311Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876907] Hardware name: Google Volteer2/Volteer2, BIOS Google_Volteer2.13672.76.0 02/22/2021
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804312Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876911] Workqueue: events_unbound active_work
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804313Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876914] RIP: 0010:auto_retire+0x1/0x20
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804314Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876916] Code: e8 01 f2 ff ff eb 02 31 db 48 89 d8 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 f0 ff 87 c8 00 00 00 0f 88 ab 47 4a 00 31 c0 5d c3 0f <1f> 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 f0 ff 8f c8 00 00 00 0f 88 9a 47 4a 00 74
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804319Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876918] RSP: 0018:ffff9b4d809fbe38 EFLAGS: 00010286
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804320Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876919] RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffff927915079600 RCX: 0000000000000007
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804320Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876921] RDX: ffff9b4d809fbe40 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffff927915079600
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804321Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876922] RBP: ffff9b4d809fbe68 R08: 8080808080808080 R09: fefefefefefefeff
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804321Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876924] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: ffffffff92e44bd8 R12: ffff9279150796a0
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804322Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876925] R13: ffff92791c368180 R14: ffff927915079640 R15: 000000001c867605
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804323Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876926] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92791ffc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804323Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876928] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804324Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876929] CR2: 0000239514955000 CR3: 00000007f82da001 CR4: 0000000000760ee0
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804325Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876930] PKRU: 55555554
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804325Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876931] Call Trace:
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804326Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876935] __active_retire+0x77/0xcf
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804326Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876939] process_one_work+0x1da/0x394
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804327Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876941] worker_thread+0x216/0x375
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804327Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876944] kthread+0x147/0x156
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804335Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876946] ? pr_cont_work+0x58/0x58
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804335Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876948] ? kthread_blkcg+0x2e/0x2e
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804336Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876950] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804336Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876952] Modules linked in: cdc_mbim cdc_ncm cdc_wdm xt_cgroup rfcomm cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg xt_MASQUERADE uinput snd_soc_rt5682_sdw snd_soc_rt5682 snd_soc_max98373_sdw snd_soc_max98373 snd_soc_rl6231 regmap_sdw snd_soc_sof_sdw snd_soc_hdac_hdmi snd_soc_dmic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_sof_pci snd_sof_intel_hda_common intel_ipu6_psys snd_sof_xtensa_dsp soundwire_intel soundwire_generic_allocation soundwire_cadence snd_sof_intel_hda snd_sof snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_hda_ext_core soundwire_bus snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core intel_ipu6_isys videobuf2_dma_contig videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common videobuf2_memops mei_hdcp intel_ipu6 ov2740 ov8856 at24 sx9310 dw9768 v4l2_fwnode cros_ec_typec intel_pmc_mux roles acpi_als typec fuse iio_trig_sysfs cros_ec_light_prox cros_ec_lid_angle cros_ec_sensors cros
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call
Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though
its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in
attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM,
it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation.
SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current
task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission
("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means
that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored
generates a bogus permission check and audit record.
Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when
its result would be honored. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: mhi: pci_generic: Remove WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag from state workqueue
A recent change created a dedicated workqueue for the state-change work
with WQ_HIGHPRI (no strong reason for that) and WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flags,
but the state-change work (mhi_pm_st_worker) does not guarantee forward
progress under memory pressure, and will even wait on various memory
allocations when e.g. creating devices, loading firmware, etc... The
work is then not part of a memory reclaim path...
Moreover, this causes a warning in check_flush_dependency() since we end
up in code that flushes a non-reclaim workqueue:
[ 40.969601] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM mhi_hiprio_wq:mhi_pm_st_worker [mhi] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM events_highpri:flush_backlog
[ 40.969612] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 158 at kernel/workqueue.c:2607 check_flush_dependency+0x11c/0x140
[ 40.969733] Call Trace:
[ 40.969740] __flush_work+0x97/0x1d0
[ 40.969745] ? wake_up_process+0x15/0x20
[ 40.969749] ? insert_work+0x70/0x80
[ 40.969750] ? __queue_work+0x14a/0x3e0
[ 40.969753] flush_work+0x10/0x20
[ 40.969756] rollback_registered_many+0x1c9/0x510
[ 40.969759] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x94/0x120
[ 40.969761] unregister_netdev+0x1d/0x30
[ 40.969765] mhi_net_remove+0x1a/0x40 [mhi_net]
[ 40.969770] mhi_driver_remove+0x124/0x250 [mhi]
[ 40.969776] device_release_driver_internal+0xf0/0x1d0
[ 40.969778] device_release_driver+0x12/0x20
[ 40.969782] bus_remove_device+0xe1/0x150
[ 40.969786] device_del+0x17b/0x3e0
[ 40.969791] mhi_destroy_device+0x9a/0x100 [mhi]
[ 40.969796] ? mhi_unmap_single_use_bb+0x50/0x50 [mhi]
[ 40.969799] device_for_each_child+0x5e/0xa0
[ 40.969804] mhi_pm_st_worker+0x921/0xf50 [mhi] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/gic-v3: Do not enable irqs when handling spurious interrups
We triggered the following error while running our 4.19 kernel
with the pseudo-NMI patches backported to it:
[ 14.816231] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 14.816231] kernel BUG at irq.c:99!
[ 14.816232] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
[ 14.816232] Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x(____ptrval____))
[ 14.816233] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G O 4.19.95.aarch64 #14
[ 14.816233] Hardware name: evb (DT)
[ 14.816234] pstate: 80400085 (Nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO)
[ 14.816234] pc : asm_nmi_enter+0x94/0x98
[ 14.816235] lr : asm_nmi_enter+0x18/0x98
[ 14.816235] sp : ffff000008003c50
[ 14.816235] pmr_save: 00000070
[ 14.816237] x29: ffff000008003c50 x28: ffff0000095f56c0
[ 14.816238] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff000008004000
[ 14.816239] x25: 00000000015e0000 x24: ffff8008fb916000
[ 14.816240] x23: 0000000020400005 x22: ffff0000080817cc
[ 14.816241] x21: ffff000008003da0 x20: 0000000000000060
[ 14.816242] x19: 00000000000003ff x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 14.816243] x17: 0000000000000008 x16: 003d090000000000
[ 14.816244] x15: ffff0000095ea6c8 x14: ffff8008fff5ab40
[ 14.816244] x13: ffff8008fff58b9d x12: 0000000000000000
[ 14.816245] x11: ffff000008c8a200 x10: 000000008e31fca5
[ 14.816246] x9 : ffff000008c8a208 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 14.816247] x7 : 0000000000000004 x6 : ffff8008fff58b9e
[ 14.816248] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000080000000
[ 14.816249] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000080000000
[ 14.816250] x1 : 0000000000120000 x0 : ffff0000095f56c0
[ 14.816251] Call trace:
[ 14.816251] asm_nmi_enter+0x94/0x98
[ 14.816251] el1_irq+0x8c/0x180 (IRQ C)
[ 14.816252] gic_handle_irq+0xbc/0x2e4
[ 14.816252] el1_irq+0xcc/0x180 (IRQ B)
[ 14.816253] arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x58
[ 14.816253] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x90/0x240
[ 14.816253] generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x50
[ 14.816254] __handle_domain_irq+0x68/0xc0
[ 14.816254] gic_handle_irq+0xf8/0x2e4
[ 14.816255] el1_irq+0xcc/0x180 (IRQ A)
[ 14.816255] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1c8
[ 14.816255] default_idle_call+0x24/0x44
[ 14.816256] do_idle+0x1d0/0x2c8
[ 14.816256] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 14.816256] rest_init+0xb8/0xc8
[ 14.816257] start_kernel+0x4c8/0x4f4
[ 14.816257] Code: 940587f1 d5384100 b9401001 36a7fd01 (d4210000)
[ 14.816258] Modules linked in: start_dp(O) smeth(O)
[ 15.103092] ---[ end trace 701753956cb14aa8 ]---
[ 15.103093] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 15.103099] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 15.103100] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 15.103100] CPU features: 0x36,a2400218
[ 15.103100] Memory Limit: none
which is cause by a 'BUG_ON(in_nmi())' in nmi_enter().
From the call trace, we can find three interrupts (noted A, B, C above):
interrupt (A) is preempted by (B), which is further interrupted by (C).
Subsequent investigations show that (B) results in nmi_enter() being
called, but that it actually is a spurious interrupt. Furthermore,
interrupts are reenabled in the context of (B), and (C) fires with
NMI priority. We end-up with a nested NMI situation, something
we definitely do not want to (and cannot) handle.
The bug here is that spurious interrupts should never result in any
state change, and we should just return to the interrupted context.
Moving the handling of spurious interrupts as early as possible in
the GICv3 handler fixes this issue.
[maz: rewrote commit message, corrected Fixes: tag] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv/kprobe: fix kernel panic when invoking sys_read traced by kprobe
The execution of sys_read end up hitting a BUG_ON() in __find_get_block
after installing kprobe at sys_read, the BUG message like the following:
[ 65.708663] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 65.709987] kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:1251!
[ 65.711283] Kernel BUG [#1]
[ 65.712032] Modules linked in:
[ 65.712925] CPU: 0 PID: 51 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4 #1
[ 65.714407] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 65.715696] epc : __find_get_block+0x218/0x2c8
[ 65.716835] ra : __getblk_gfp+0x1c/0x4a
[ 65.717831] epc : ffffffe00019f11e ra : ffffffe00019f56a sp : ffffffe002437930
[ 65.719553] gp : ffffffe000f06030 tp : ffffffe0015abc00 t0 : ffffffe00191e038
[ 65.721290] t1 : ffffffe00191e038 t2 : 000000000000000a s0 : ffffffe002437960
[ 65.723051] s1 : ffffffe00160ad00 a0 : ffffffe00160ad00 a1 : 000000000000012a
[ 65.724772] a2 : 0000000000000400 a3 : 0000000000000008 a4 : 0000000000000040
[ 65.726545] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffffe00191e000 a7 : 0000000000000000
[ 65.728308] s2 : 000000000000012a s3 : 0000000000000400 s4 : 0000000000000008
[ 65.730049] s5 : 000000000000006c s6 : ffffffe00240f800 s7 : ffffffe000f080a8
[ 65.731802] s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : 000000000000012a s10: 0000000000000008
[ 65.733516] s11: 0000000000000008 t3 : 00000000000003ff t4 : 000000000000000f
[ 65.734434] t5 : 00000000000003ff t6 : 0000000000040000
[ 65.734613] status: 0000000000000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003
[ 65.734901] Call Trace:
[ 65.735076] [<ffffffe00019f11e>] __find_get_block+0x218/0x2c8
[ 65.735417] [<ffffffe00020017a>] __ext4_get_inode_loc+0xb2/0x2f6
[ 65.735618] [<ffffffe000201b6c>] ext4_get_inode_loc+0x3a/0x8a
[ 65.735802] [<ffffffe000203380>] ext4_reserve_inode_write+0x2e/0x8c
[ 65.735999] [<ffffffe00020357a>] __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x4c/0x18e
[ 65.736208] [<ffffffe000206bb0>] ext4_dirty_inode+0x46/0x66
[ 65.736387] [<ffffffe000192914>] __mark_inode_dirty+0x12c/0x3da
[ 65.736576] [<ffffffe000180dd2>] touch_atime+0x146/0x150
[ 65.736748] [<ffffffe00010d762>] filemap_read+0x234/0x246
[ 65.736920] [<ffffffe00010d834>] generic_file_read_iter+0xc0/0x114
[ 65.737114] [<ffffffe0001f5d7a>] ext4_file_read_iter+0x42/0xea
[ 65.737310] [<ffffffe000163f2c>] new_sync_read+0xe2/0x15a
[ 65.737483] [<ffffffe000165814>] vfs_read+0xca/0xf2
[ 65.737641] [<ffffffe000165bae>] ksys_read+0x5e/0xc8
[ 65.737816] [<ffffffe000165c26>] sys_read+0xe/0x16
[ 65.737973] [<ffffffe000003972>] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2
[ 65.738858] ---[ end trace fe93f985456c935d ]---
A simple reproducer looks like:
echo 'p:myprobe sys_read fd=%a0 buf=%a1 count=%a2' > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/myprobe/enable
cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
Here's what happens to hit that BUG_ON():
1) After installing kprobe at entry of sys_read, the first instruction
is replaced by 'ebreak' instruction on riscv64 platform.
2) Once kernel reach the 'ebreak' instruction at the entry of sys_read,
it trap into the riscv breakpoint handler, where it do something to
setup for coming single-step of origin instruction, including backup
the 'sstatus' in pt_regs, followed by disable interrupt during single
stepping via clear 'SIE' bit of 'sstatus' in pt_regs.
3) Then kernel restore to the instruction slot contains two instructions,
one is original instruction at entry of sys_read, the other is 'ebreak'.
Here it trigger a 'Instruction page fault' exception (value at 'scause'
is '0xc'), if PF is not filled into PageTabe for that slot yet.
4) Again kernel trap into page fault exception handler, where it choose
different policy according to the state of running kprobe. Because
afte 2) the state is KPROBE_HIT_SS, so kernel reset the current kp
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: GTDT: Don't corrupt interrupt mappings on watchdow probe failure
When failing the driver probe because of invalid firmware properties,
the GTDT driver unmaps the interrupt that it mapped earlier.
However, it never checks whether the mapping of the interrupt actially
succeeded. Even more, should the firmware report an illegal interrupt
number that overlaps with the GIC SGI range, this can result in an
IPI being unmapped, and subsequent fireworks (as reported by Dann
Frazier).
Rework the driver to have a slightly saner behaviour and actually
check whether the interrupt has been mapped before unmapping things. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: always panic when errors=panic is specified
Before commit 014c9caa29d3 ("ext4: make ext4_abort() use
__ext4_error()"), the following series of commands would trigger a
panic:
1. mount /dev/sda -o ro,errors=panic test
2. mount /dev/sda -o remount,abort test
After commit 014c9caa29d3, remounting a file system using the test
mount option "abort" will no longer trigger a panic. This commit will
restore the behaviour immediately before commit 014c9caa29d3.
(However, note that the Linux kernel's behavior has not been
consistent; some previous kernel versions, including 5.4 and 4.19
similarly did not panic after using the mount option "abort".)
This also makes a change to long-standing behaviour; namely, the
following series commands will now cause a panic, when previously it
did not:
1. mount /dev/sda -o ro,errors=panic test
2. echo test > /sys/fs/ext4/sda/trigger_fs_error
However, this makes ext4's behaviour much more consistent, so this is
a good thing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: fix shared sqpoll cancellation hangs
[ 736.982891] INFO: task iou-sqp-4294:4295 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
[ 736.982897] Call Trace:
[ 736.982901] schedule+0x68/0xe0
[ 736.982903] io_uring_cancel_sqpoll+0xdb/0x110
[ 736.982908] io_sqpoll_cancel_cb+0x24/0x30
[ 736.982911] io_run_task_work_head+0x28/0x50
[ 736.982913] io_sq_thread+0x4e3/0x720
We call io_uring_cancel_sqpoll() one by one for each ctx either in
sq_thread() itself or via task works, and it's intended to cancel all
requests of a specified context. However the function uses per-task
counters to track the number of inflight requests, so it counts more
requests than available via currect io_uring ctx and goes to sleep for
them to appear (e.g. from IRQ), that will never happen.
Cancel a bit more than before, i.e. all ctxs that share sqpoll
and continue to use shared counters. Don't forget that we should not
remove ctx from the list before running that task_work sqpoll-cancel,
otherwise the function wouldn't be able to find the context and will
hang. |
