| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| U-Boot through 2026.04-rc3 contains an integer underflow vulnerability in the tcp_rx_state_machine() function (net/tcp.c) that allows a network-adjacent attacker to crash the bootloader by sending a malformed TCP SYN+ACK packet with a manipulated data offset field causing payload_len to become negative. When the TCP_SYN_SENT handler calls tcp_rx_user_data() without invoking tcp_seg_in_wnd() validation, the negative payload_len is implicitly converted to a large unsigned integer (e.g., 0xFFFFFFD8) and passed to memcpy() in store_block(), causing an immediate crash that prevents device boot and may enable memory corruption when CONFIG_LMB is disabled. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Microsoft Defender allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows NTFS allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| strongSwan versions 4.5.0 prior to 6.0.5 contain an integer underflow vulnerability in the EAP-TTLS AVP parser that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to cause a denial of service by sending crafted AVP data with invalid length fields during IKEv2 authentication. Attackers can exploit the failure to validate AVP length fields before subtraction to trigger excessive memory allocation or NULL pointer dereference, crashing the charon IKE daemon. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| OpenWrt is a Linux operating system targeting embedded devices. Before v25.12.5, an integer underflow in handle_send_a() of the Emergency Access Daemon allows any unauthenticated attacker on the local network to crash the daemon by sending a single crafted UDP packet. The message length underflows before a bounds check and is then passed to memcpy as a very large size. This issue is fixed v25.12.5. |
| A flaw was found in the soup_multipart_new_from_message() function of the libsoup HTTP library, which is commonly used by GNOME and other applications to handle web communications. The issue occurs when the library processes specially crafted multipart messages. Due to improper validation, an internal calculation can go wrong, leading to an integer underflow. This can cause the program to access invalid memory and crash. As a result, any application or server using libsoup could be forced to exit unexpectedly, creating a denial-of-service (DoS) risk. |
| Nmap through 7.99 does not keep the IPv6 extension-header walk within the captured packet in ipv6_get_data_primitive (libnetutil/netutil.cc), so the pointer advances past the buffer and the remaining-length computation underflows to a large value. A scanned target or on-path attacker returning a crafted IPv6 response with a truncated extension header can trigger out-of-bounds reads and a crash during raw IPv6 scans. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: rtw_mlme: add bounds checks before ie_length subtraction
Add guards to ensure ie_length is large enough before subtracting
fixed IE offsets to prevent unsigned integer underflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: Reject login PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN
In drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c, isert_login_recv_done()
computes the login request payload length as wc->byte_len minus
ISER_HEADERS_LEN with no lower bound, and login_req_len is a signed int.
A remote iSER initiator can post a login Send work request carrying
fewer than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (76) bytes, so the subtraction underflows
and login_req_len becomes negative.
isert_rx_login_req() then reads that negative length back into a signed
int, takes size = min(rx_buflen, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS), and because the
min() is signed it keeps the negative value; the value is then passed as
the memcpy() length and sign-extended to a multi-gigabyte size_t. The
copy into the 8192-byte login->req_buf runs far out of bounds and
faults, crashing the target node. The login phase precedes iSCSI
authentication, so no credentials are required to reach this path.
Reject any login PDU shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN before the
subtraction, mirroring the existing early return on a failed work
completion, so login_req_len can never go negative. The upper bound was
already safe: a posted login buffer cannot deliver more than
ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so the difference stays at or below
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the existing min() clamps it; only the missing
lower bound needs to be added. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: fix tp_meter counter underflow during shutdown
batadv_tp_sender_shutdown() unconditionally decrements the "sending"
atomic counter. If multiple paths (e.g. timeout, user cancel, and
normal finish) call this function, the counter can underflow to -1.
Since the sender logic treats any non-zero value as "still sending",
a negative value causes the sender kthread to loop indefinitely.
This leads to a use-after-free when the interface is removed while
the zombie thread is still active.
Fix this by using atomic_xchg() to ensure the counter only transitions
from 1 to 0 once.
[sven: added missing change in batadv_tp_send] |
| libnfs through 6.0.2 before 935b8db has an xid integer underflow in READ_IOVEC in rpc_read_from_socket in lib/socket.c during a connection to a crafted NFS server, when the expected pdu size exceeds the absolute pdu size from the xid/record-marker. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Reject zero-length property entries in validator
tb_property_entry_valid() accepts entries with length == 0 for
DIRECTORY, DATA, and TEXT types. A zero-length TEXT entry passes
validation but causes an underflow in the null-termination logic:
property->value.text[property->length * 4 - 1] = '\0';
When property->length is 0 this writes to offset -1 relative to
the allocation.
Reject zero-length entries early in the validator since they have no
valid representation in the XDomain property protocol. |
| Integer underflow in wc_PKCS7_DecryptOri when handling crafted Other Recipient Info, leading to incorrect length handling during decryption. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0671, when Vim opens a file encrypted with the VimCrypt~04! or VimCrypt~05!
method (xchacha20poly1305, requires the +sodium feature) whose body is shorter than a single libsodium secretstream header, an unsigned length calculation underflows and a subsequent decryption call reads far past the end of the input buffer, crashing Vim. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.2.0671. |
| Xcitium Client Security (XCS) before 13.8.2.10019 and Comodo Internet Security (CIS) through 12.3.4.8162 (fix expected by 2026 Q3) contain an integer underflow vulnerability in the firewall driver Inspect.sys that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to crash the system by sending a crafted IPv6 packet with a declared payload length smaller than the sum of its extension-header lengths. The unsigned 64-bit payload-length value underflows to a near-maximal integer, triggering an out-of-bounds read and oversized memcpy in the Windows kernel at DISPATCH_LEVEL, resulting in a blue screen of death even on hosts with all ports blocked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-thin: fix metadata refcount underflow
There's a bug in dm-thin in the function rebalance_children. If the
internal btree node has one entry, the code tries to copy all btree
entries from the node's child to the node itself and then decrement the
child's reference count.
If the child node is shared (it has reference count > 1), we won't free
it, so there would be two pointers to each of the grandchildren nodes.
But the reference counts of the grandchildren is not increased, thus the
reference count doesn't match the number of pointers that point to the
grandchildren. This results in "device mapper: space map common: unable
to decrement block" errors.
Fix this bug by incrementing reference counts on the grandchildren if the
btree node is shared. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: fix unsigned underflow in z_erofs_lz4_handle_overlap()
Some crafted images can have illegal (!partial_decoding &&
m_llen < m_plen) extents, and the LZ4 inplace decompression path
can be wrongly hit, but it cannot handle (outpages < inpages)
properly: "outpages - inpages" wraps to a large value and
the subsequent rq->out[] access reads past the decompressed_pages
array.
However, such crafted cases can correctly result in a corruption
report in the normal LZ4 non-inplace path.
Let's add an additional check to fix this for backporting.
Reproducible image (base64-encoded gzipped blob):
H4sIAJGR12kCA+3SPUoDQRgG4MkmkkZk8QRbRFIIi9hbpEjrHQI5ghfwCN5BLCzTGtLbBI+g
dilSJo1CnIm7GEXFxhT6PDDwfrs73/ywIQD/1ePD4r7Ou6ETsrq4mu7XcWfj++Pb58nJU/9i
PNtbjhan04/9GtX4qVYc814WDqt6FaX5s+ZwXXeq52lndT6IuVvlblytLMvh4Gzwaf90nsvz
2DF/21+20T/ldgp5s1jXRaN4t/8izsy/OUB6e/Qa79r+JwAAAAAAAL52vQVuGQAAAP6+my1w
ywAAAAAAAADwu14ATsEYtgBQAAA=
$ mount -t erofs -o cache_strategy=disabled foo.erofs /mnt
$ dd if=/mnt/data of=/dev/null bs=4096 count=1 |
| Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound) vulnerability in RTI Connext Micro (Core Libraries) allows Overread Buffers.This issue affects Connext Micro: from 4.0.0 before 4.3.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv
rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least
header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used.
However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad
field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen:
payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt)
- RXE_ICRC_SIZE
This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even
if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring
header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a
packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size()
negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users.
Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length
required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) +
RXE_ICRC_SIZE. |
