| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Validate BSG request_len before reading vendor_cmd[]
The FC BSG transport allocates job->request via memdup_user() using the
exact user-supplied request_len. For FC_BSG_HST_VENDOR,
fc_bsg_host_dispatch() only guarantees request_len covers msgcode and
vendor_id; it does not account for the vendor_cmd[] flexible array.
qla2xxx then reads the command selector vendor_cmd[0] and, in several
sub-handlers, vendor_cmd[1]/[2] or structures overlaid on the vendor
command area without verifying request_len. A caller holding
CAP_SYS_RAWIO can submit a short request whose vendor_id matches the
host, triggering out-of-bounds heap reads (KASAN-detectable, and able to
mis-select a command or panic).
Add a central guard in qla2x00_process_vendor_specific() so the selector
is always in bounds, restrict the early vendor_cmd[0] read in
qla24xx_bsg_request() to sufficiently long vendor messages, and add
request_len checks to the sub-handlers that read further:
qla24xx_proc_fcp_prio_cfg_cmd(), qla2x00_process_loopback(),
qla84xx_reset(), qla84xx_updatefw(), qla2x00_read_optrom(),
qla2x00_update_optrom(), qlafx00_mgmt_cmd() and
qla28xx_validate_flash_image(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding
ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb->data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH)
while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header.
When segments_left > 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb->data
position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately
followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a
Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset()
remained negative.
This led to two problems:
1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes
__skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset()
to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic.
2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream
handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative
offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows.
Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring
skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as
downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb)
to restore skb->data to the SRH before looping back. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel: ethosu: Don't read the U65 rounding mode as a storage mode
Bits 15:14 of NPU_SET_{IFM,OFM}_PRECISION select the activation storage
mode on U85 only. On U65 the same field holds the rounding mode, and the
command stream parser has read it as a storage mode since the driver was
added.
That went unnoticed while unknown values fell through the switch, but
now that they are rejected, every U65 command stream that asks for
natural rounding (2) fails CMDSTREAM_BO_CREATE with -EINVAL. Mesa emits
it for average pooling, concatenation, split, unpack, strided slice, LUT
and argmax, which is 72 failures of the Teflon test suite on an i.MX93.
Truncating rounding (1) is misread as well: it picks the two-tile
address path and computes a bogus feature map size from tile bases the
command stream never set.
Read the field as a storage mode only on the hardware where it is one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: rockchip: guard VPU981 AV1 divisor and tile buffer
rockchip_vpu981_av1_dec_set_tile_info() divides context_update_tile_id by
tile_info->tile_cols and writes one descriptor per tile into the tile_info
DMA buffer, which holds AV1_MAX_TILES entries; tile_cols and tile_rows
come from the bitstream. Guard the division against a zero tile_cols by
initialising the context-update values to zero and computing them only
when tile_cols is non-zero, and stop the descriptor writes once the
tile_info buffer is full. The tile geometry written to the hardware
registers is left unmodified; the per-dimension and total tile bounds are
enforced by the control validation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mediatek: vcodec: bound AV1 tile-start copy to the array capacity
vdec_av1_slice_setup_tile() copies tile_cols + 1 / tile_rows + 1 entries
into mi_col_starts[] / mi_row_starts[] from the bitstream tile_info. Bound
the copy to the array capacity. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped
skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated
on !skb->inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it
outlives the encapsulation it describes.
Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose
inner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a
label, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives
key->eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push
again. ovs_fragment() trusts the record:
skb->network_header = skb->inner_network_header;
so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed:
if (skb_network_offset(skb) > MAX_L2_LEN)
a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value:
unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb);
memcpy(&data->l2_data, skb->data, hlen);
which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer.
Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8):
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8/0x20
RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000
prepare_frag+0x3df/0x4e0
ovs_fragment+0x589/0x7e0
do_output+0x4ce/0x5e0
do_execute_actions+0x55d2/0x7b30
ovs_execute_actions+0xea/0x450
Same root-cause shape as commit 975b5b067f52 ("ipv6: sr: restore network
header before routing and forwarding"): a stale network header offset
reaching a consumer that widens it. Here it originates in the MPLS
push/pop path.
Clear inner_protocol once the packet is no longer MPLS, so a later push
re-records the current header. net/sched/act_mpls.c is the only other
skb_mpls_pop() caller and gets the same fix; sch_frag.c saves and
restores inner_protocol around fragmentation in the same way OVS does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: analogix_dp: fix unchecked bound endpoint name length
rockchip_dp_drm_encoder_enable() uses sprintf() to format a device tree
path into a 32-byte stack buffer. Device tree paths are not limited to
this size, so a sufficiently long path can overflow the buffer.
Use snprintf() with the destination size to truncate the generated name
and keep the writes within bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: sprd: validate compress buffer sizes against fixed allocations
sprd_platform_compr_open() allocates the stage 0 IRAM buffer (32K data
area) and the stage 1 DDR buffer (2M data area) with fixed sizes, but
sprd_platform_compr_copy() derives all copy lengths from the user
controlled runtime->fragment_size and the write() count, never
comparing them against the physical buffer sizes. The compress core
only checks fragment_size * fragments for an u32 overflow in
snd_compress_check_input(), so a local user can configure a logical
buffer of up to ~4GB via SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS, far exceeding the
fixed allocations.
A fragment_size larger than the 32K IRAM data area makes the stage 0
copy_from_user() overflow past the IRAM allocation, and a buffer_size
larger than the 2M DDR buffer makes the wrapping copy at the end of
sprd_platform_compr_copy() write fully user controlled data past the
buffer. No SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START is needed, a write() in SETUP
state reaches the copy callback directly.
Reject parameters that do not fit into the fixed buffers in
set_params(), and fix the advertised max fragment size: 128K never
fitted into the 32K IRAM buffer. The caps values may have been carried over
from the qdsp6 driver, which allocates its buffers according to the
advertised maxima, unlike this driver. With 32K as max fragment size
the advertised limits are self-consistent: 32K * 64 = 2M equals the
DDR buffer size.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hinic: fix mailbox segment buffer overflow
check_mbox_seq_id_and_seg_len() validates that seq_id does not
exceed SEQ_ID_MAX_VAL (42) and seg_len does not exceed
MBOX_SEG_LEN (48). However, this allows the last segment
(seq_id=42) to carry a full 48-byte payload, writing to offset
42*48=2016 for 48 bytes (ending at byte 2064). The receive
buffer is only MBOX_MAX_BUF_SZ (2048) bytes, resulting in a
16-byte heap buffer overflow.
The hinic3 driver already handles this correctly by defining
MBOX_LAST_SEG_MAX_LEN and rejecting the last segment when it
exceeds the remaining buffer space. Apply the same fix to the
hinic driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: hantro: bound G2 HEVC tile loop to the buffer capacity
prepare_tile_info_buffer() writes one entry per tile into the tile_sizes
DMA buffer, sized for a grid equal to the PPS uAPI array capacity. Use the
bounded v4l2_hevc_pps_num_tile_columns() / v4l2_hevc_pps_num_tile_rows()
helpers so the loops stay inside the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost/vdpa: reject VRING_NUM larger than device max
vhost_vring_set_num() accepts any non-zero power-of-two queue size that
fits in 16 bits. vhost-vdpa then passes that value to set_vq_num()
without comparing it with get_vq_num_max().
A process with access to /dev/vhost-vdpa-* can therefore configure a
queue larger than the device advertises. With vdpa_sim, the worker can
walk descriptors beyond the mapped descriptor ring. KASAN reports a
16-byte out-of-bounds read, corresponding to one vring_desc, in the
vringh IOTLB path:
BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in _copy_from_iter
Read of size 16
copy_from_iotlb
copydesc_iotlb
vringh_getdesc_iotlb
vdpasim_net_work
Cache get_vq_num_max() immediately after reset. Some backends derive
it from writable queue-size state, so querying it after SET_NUM may
return the current size instead of the device capability. Invalidate
the cached value before reset so a failed reset leaves SET_NUM
disabled.
For VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM, copy the complete vring state once and use
the same index and size for validation, vq->num, and set_vq_num().
This ensures that validation and use operate on the same copied values. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_console: do not free control-out buffers on remove
__send_control_msg() publishes &portdev->cpkt as the control-out
virtqueue cookie. remove_vqs() walks every virtqueue and passes leftover
cookies to free_buf(), which treats them as struct port_buffer and
reads sgpages.
If a control message is still on c_ovq when the device is unbound,
free_buf() reads past the ports_device object.
KASAN reported slab-out-of-bounds in free_buf():
free_buf
remove_vqs
virtcons_remove
unbind_store
The object was the ports_device allocated in virtcons_probe().
Drain c_ovq without freeing. The packet lives in portdev and is released
with it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: backtrack_insn(): Handle ld_{abs,ind} subprog exit edge
Nicholas Carlini reported a bug in precision backtracking mechanism
for BPF_LD | BPF_{IND,ABS} instructions. These instructions are
modelled as two branches:
- fallthrough;
- implicit exit from current subprogram.
The implicit exit case was not handled by the backtrack_insn()
function. When backtracking such a path backtrack_insn() did not
call bt_subprog_enter(), which meant that backtracking continued
manipulating precision marks in a caller frame, while looking at
instructions in a callee frame.
This lead to segmentation faults during verification (see the
selftest), or unsound state pruning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mei: pass correct argument to function
The first argument to iwl_mei_write_cyclic_buf() should be the cldev
but the q_head pointer is passed instead. Fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: reject short READ responses in CIFSSMBRead()
CIFSSMBRead() reads DataLengthHigh, DataLength and DataOffset out of
the READ_RSP returned by the server without first checking that a
whole READ_RSP was actually received. The length of the response is
recorded in rsp_iov.iov_len, but nothing constrains it to be at least
read_rsp_size before those fields are dereferenced.
A malicious or compromised SMB1 server can return a response shorter
than the READ_RSP header, so that parsing the header itself reads past
the end of the receive buffer. SMB1 is not negotiated by default;
reaching this code requires an explicit vers=1.0 mount.
Reject the response unless it is at least read_rsp_size bytes long. |
| A vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) and Cisco ISE Passive Identity Connector (ISE-PIC) could allow an authenticated, local attacker with administrative privileges to perform a command injection attack on the underlying operating system and elevate privileges to root.
This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by providing crafted input to a specific CLI command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to elevate their privileges to root on the underlying operating system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: fix reversed sequence option serialization
hton_seq() expects the host-order source first and the unaligned
network-order destination second. The version 1 sync sender passes these
arguments in reverse for both sequence blocks. This leaves 24 bytes of the
kmalloc-backed message unwritten. It may disclose stale heap data and
replace the live connection sequence state with values read from the
buffer.
Pass the connection sequence state as the source and the message payload as
the destination for both blocks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921: validate CLC firmware records
The CLC region is supplied by firmware, but the loader trusts the
region count and each record length. A malformed image can make the
region table pointer precede the firmware buffer, make the record loop
fail to advance, or index phy->clc past its end. Validate the table and
record bounds before dereferencing or copying. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Bound VP index against VP_CTRL IOCB bitmap size
The VP control IOCB selects its target virtual port by setting one bit
in vp_idx_map, a fixed 16-byte (128-bit) array in both
vp_ctrl_entry_24xx and vp_ctrl_entry_24xx_ext. qla25xx_ctrlvp_iocb()
computes map = (vp_index - 1) / 8 and writes vce->vp_idx_map[map]
without checking that map stays within the array.
max_npiv_vports is taken from firmware and only sanitized to a
MIN_MULTI_ID_FABRIC-aligned boundary, so it can legitimately be 191 or
255, and qla24xx_control_vp() only rejects vp_index >= max_npiv_vports.
A vp_index above 128 therefore yields map >= 16 and an out-of-bounds
write of up to 16 bytes past vp_idx_map, corrupting the trailing IOCB
fields (or the adjacent request-ring slot on the 64-byte layout).
Reject a vp_index that cannot be represented in the IOCB bitmap in
qla24xx_control_vp(), and add a defensive ARRAY_SIZE() guard in
qla25xx_ctrlvp_iocb() before the write. Adapters that report the usual
63 or 127 NPIV vports are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp_synctty: ensure a writeable skb header
ppp_sync_txmunge() checks headroom before prepending the address and
control bytes, but does not ensure that the skb header is writable.
A received skb can reach this function through PPP channel bridging
without passing through ppp_start_xmit(), which calls skb_cow_head().
For example, a PPPoE frame may share its buffer with a clone queued to
an AF_PACKET socket. If it is bridged to a synchronous tty channel, the
address/control bytes can overwrite data still visible to that socket.
Use skb_cow_head() to ensure both sufficient headroom and a writable
header. |
