| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: fix inverted genmask check in nft_map_catchall_activate()
nft_map_catchall_activate() has an inverted element activity check
compared to its non-catchall counterpart nft_mapelem_activate() and
compared to what is logically required.
nft_map_catchall_activate() is called from the abort path to re-activate
catchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction.
It should skip elements that are already active (they don't need
re-activation) and process elements that are inactive (they need to be
restored). Instead, the current code does the opposite: it skips inactive
elements and processes active ones.
Compare the non-catchall activate callback, which is correct:
nft_mapelem_activate():
if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, iter->genmask))
return 0; /* skip active, process inactive */
With the buggy catchall version:
nft_map_catchall_activate():
if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))
continue; /* skip inactive, process active */
The consequence is that when a DELSET operation is aborted,
nft_setelem_data_activate() is never called for the catchall element.
For NFT_GOTO verdict elements, this means nft_data_hold() is never
called to restore the chain->use reference count. Each abort cycle
permanently decrements chain->use. Once chain->use reaches zero,
DELCHAIN succeeds and frees the chain while catchall verdict elements
still reference it, resulting in a use-after-free.
This is exploitable for local privilege escalation from an unprivileged
user via user namespaces + nftables on distributions that enable
CONFIG_USER_NS and CONFIG_NF_TABLES.
Fix by removing the negation so the check matches nft_mapelem_activate():
skip active elements, process inactive ones. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: Wake up the error handler when final completions race against each other
The fragile ordering between marking commands completed or failed so
that the error handler only wakes when the last running command
completes or times out has race conditions. These race conditions can
cause the SCSI layer to fail to wake the error handler, leaving I/O
through the SCSI host stuck as the error state cannot advance.
First, there is an memory ordering issue within scsi_dec_host_busy().
The write which clears SCMD_STATE_INFLIGHT may be reordered with reads
counting in scsi_host_busy(). While the local CPU will see its own
write, reordering can allow other CPUs in scsi_dec_host_busy() or
scsi_eh_inc_host_failed() to see a raised busy count, causing no CPU to
see a host busy equal to the host_failed count.
This race condition can be prevented with a memory barrier on the error
path to force the write to be visible before counting host busy
commands.
Second, there is a general ordering issue with scsi_eh_inc_host_failed(). By
counting busy commands before incrementing host_failed, it can race with a
final command in scsi_dec_host_busy(), such that scsi_dec_host_busy() does
not see host_failed incremented but scsi_eh_inc_host_failed() counts busy
commands before SCMD_STATE_INFLIGHT is cleared by scsi_dec_host_busy(),
resulting in neither waking the error handler task.
This needs the call to scsi_host_busy() to be moved after host_failed is
incremented to close the race condition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb_pmd_shared()
Patch series "mm/hugetlb: fixes for PMD table sharing (incl. using
mmu_gather)", v3.
One functional fix, one performance regression fix, and two related
comment fixes.
I cleaned up my prototype I recently shared [1] for the performance fix,
deferring most of the cleanups I had in the prototype to a later point.
While doing that I identified the other things.
The goal of this patch set is to be backported to stable trees "fairly"
easily. At least patch #1 and #4.
Patch #1 fixes hugetlb_pmd_shared() not detecting any sharing
Patch #2 + #3 are simple comment fixes that patch #4 interacts with.
Patch #4 is a fix for the reported performance regression due to excessive
IPI broadcasts during fork()+exit().
The last patch is all about TLB flushes, IPIs and mmu_gather.
Read: complicated
There are plenty of cleanups in the future to be had + one reasonable
optimization on x86. But that's all out of scope for this series.
Runtime tested, with a focus on fixing the performance regression using
the original reproducer [2] on x86.
This patch (of 4):
We switched from (wrongly) using the page count to an independent shared
count. Now, shared page tables have a refcount of 1 (excluding
speculative references) and instead use ptdesc->pt_share_count to identify
sharing.
We didn't convert hugetlb_pmd_shared(), so right now, we would never
detect a shared PMD table as such, because sharing/unsharing no longer
touches the refcount of a PMD table.
Page migration, like mbind() or migrate_pages() would allow for migrating
folios mapped into such shared PMD tables, even though the folios are not
exclusive. In smaps we would account them as "private" although they are
"shared", and we would be wrongly setting the PM_MMAP_EXCLUSIVE in the
pagemap interface.
Fix it by properly using ptdesc_pmd_is_shared() in hugetlb_pmd_shared(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gue: Fix skb memleak with inner IP protocol 0.
syzbot reported skb memleak below. [0]
The repro generated a GUE packet with its inner protocol 0.
gue_udp_recv() returns -guehdr->proto_ctype for "resubmit"
in ip_protocol_deliver_rcu(), but this only works with
non-zero protocol number.
Let's drop such packets.
Note that 0 is a valid number (IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option).
I think it is not practical to encap HOPOPT in GUE, so once
someone starts to complain, we could pass down a resubmit
flag pointer to distinguish two zeros from the upper layer:
* no error
* resubmit HOPOPT
[0]
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888109695a00 (size 240):
comm "syz.0.17", pid 6088, jiffies 4294943096
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 40 c2 10 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .@..............
backtrace (crc a84b336f):
kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:44 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4958 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x3b4/0x590 mm/slub.c:5270
__build_skb+0x23/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:474
build_skb+0x20/0x190 net/core/skbuff.c:490
__tun_build_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1541 [inline]
tun_build_skb+0x4a1/0xa40 drivers/net/tun.c:1636
tun_get_user+0xc12/0x2030 drivers/net/tun.c:1770
tun_chr_write_iter+0x71/0x120 drivers/net/tun.c:1999
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0x45d/0x710 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0xa7/0x170 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: xen: scsiback: Fix potential memory leak in scsiback_remove()
Memory allocated for struct vscsiblk_info in scsiback_probe() is not
freed in scsiback_remove() leading to potential memory leaks on remove,
as well as in the scsiback_probe() error paths. Fix that by freeing it
in scsiback_remove(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: cap TX credit to local buffer size
The virtio transports derives its TX credit directly from peer_buf_alloc,
which is set from the remote endpoint's SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_SIZE value.
On the host side this means that the amount of data we are willing to
queue for a connection is scaled by a guest-chosen buffer size, rather
than the host's own vsock configuration. A malicious guest can advertise
a large buffer and read slowly, causing the host to allocate a
correspondingly large amount of sk_buff memory.
The same thing would happen in the guest with a malicious host, since
virtio transports share the same code base.
Introduce a small helper, virtio_transport_tx_buf_size(), that
returns min(peer_buf_alloc, buf_alloc), and use it wherever we consume
peer_buf_alloc.
This ensures the effective TX window is bounded by both the peer's
advertised buffer and our own buf_alloc (already clamped to
buffer_max_size via SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_MAX_SIZE), so a remote peer
cannot force the other to queue more data than allowed by its own
vsock settings.
On an unpatched Ubuntu 22.04 host (~64 GiB RAM), running a PoC with
32 guest vsock connections advertising 2 GiB each and reading slowly
drove Slab/SUnreclaim from ~0.5 GiB to ~57 GiB; the system only
recovered after killing the QEMU process. That said, if QEMU memory is
limited with cgroups, the maximum memory used will be limited.
With this patch applied:
Before:
MemFree: ~61.6 GiB
Slab: ~142 MiB
SUnreclaim: ~117 MiB
After 32 high-credit connections:
MemFree: ~61.5 GiB
Slab: ~178 MiB
SUnreclaim: ~152 MiB
Only ~35 MiB increase in Slab/SUnreclaim, no host OOM, and the guest
remains responsive.
Compatibility with non-virtio transports:
- VMCI uses the AF_VSOCK buffer knobs to size its queue pairs per
socket based on the local vsk->buffer_* values; the remote side
cannot enlarge those queues beyond what the local endpoint
configured.
- Hyper-V's vsock transport uses fixed-size VMBus ring buffers and
an MTU bound; there is no peer-controlled credit field comparable
to peer_buf_alloc, and the remote endpoint cannot drive in-flight
kernel memory above those ring sizes.
- The loopback path reuses virtio_transport_common.c, so it
naturally follows the same semantics as the virtio transport.
This change is limited to virtio_transport_common.c and thus affects
virtio-vsock, vhost-vsock, and loopback, bringing them in line with the
"remote window intersected with local policy" behaviour that VMCI and
Hyper-V already effectively have.
[Stefano: small adjustments after changing the previous patch]
[Stefano: tweak the commit message] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
be2net: Fix NULL pointer dereference in be_cmd_get_mac_from_list
When the parameter pmac_id_valid argument of be_cmd_get_mac_from_list() is
set to false, the driver may request the PMAC_ID from the firmware of the
network card, and this function will store that PMAC_ID at the provided
address pmac_id. This is the contract of this function.
However, there is a location within the driver where both
pmac_id_valid == false and pmac_id == NULL are being passed. This could
result in dereferencing a NULL pointer.
To resolve this issue, it is necessary to pass the address of a stub
variable to the function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: authencesn - reject too-short AAD (assoclen<8) to match ESP/ESN spec
authencesn assumes an ESP/ESN-formatted AAD. When assoclen is shorter than
the minimum expected length, crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt() can advance past
the end of the destination scatterlist and trigger a NULL pointer dereference
in scatterwalk_map_and_copy(), leading to a kernel panic (DoS).
Add a minimum AAD length check to fail fast on invalid inputs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hv_netvsc: reject RSS hash key programming without RX indirection table
RSS configuration requires a valid RX indirection table. When the device
reports a single receive queue, rndis_filter_device_add() does not
allocate an indirection table, accepting RSS hash key updates in this
state leads to a hang.
Fix this by gating netvsc_set_rxfh() on ndc->rx_table_sz and return
-EOPNOTSUPP when the table is absent. This aligns set_rxfh with the device
capabilities and prevents incorrect behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pnfs/flexfiles: Fix memory leak in nfs4_ff_alloc_deviceid_node()
In nfs4_ff_alloc_deviceid_node(), if the allocation for ds_versions fails,
the function jumps to the out_scratch label without freeing the already
allocated dsaddrs list, leading to a memory leak.
Fix this by jumping to the out_err_drain_dsaddrs label, which properly
frees the dsaddrs list before cleaning up other resources. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: qcom: gpi: Fix memory leak in gpi_peripheral_config()
Fix a memory leak in gpi_peripheral_config() where the original memory
pointed to by gchan->config could be lost if krealloc() fails.
The issue occurs when:
1. gchan->config points to previously allocated memory
2. krealloc() fails and returns NULL
3. The function directly assigns NULL to gchan->config, losing the
reference to the original memory
4. The original memory becomes unreachable and cannot be freed
Fix this by using a temporary variable to hold the krealloc() result
and only updating gchan->config when the allocation succeeds.
Found via static analysis and code review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: marvell: prestera: fix NULL dereference on devlink_alloc() failure
devlink_alloc() may return NULL on allocation failure, but
prestera_devlink_alloc() unconditionally calls devlink_priv() on
the returned pointer.
This leads to a NULL pointer dereference if devlink allocation fails.
Add a check for a NULL devlink pointer and return NULL early to avoid
the crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix use-after-free in inet6_addr_del().
syzbot reported use-after-free of inet6_ifaddr in
inet6_addr_del(). [0]
The cited commit accidentally moved ipv6_del_addr() for
mngtmpaddr before reading its ifp->flags for temporary
addresses in inet6_addr_del().
Let's move ipv6_del_addr() down to fix the UAF.
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in inet6_addr_del.constprop.0+0x67a/0x6b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3117
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88807b89c86c by task syz.3.1618/9593
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9593 Comm: syz.3.1618 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xcd/0x630 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:595
inet6_addr_del.constprop.0+0x67a/0x6b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3117
addrconf_del_ifaddr+0x11e/0x190 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3181
inet6_ioctl+0x1e5/0x2b0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:582
sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1254
sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1375
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f164cf8f749
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f164de64038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f164d1e5fa0 RCX: 00007f164cf8f749
RDX: 0000200000000000 RSI: 0000000000008936 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f164d013f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f164d1e6038 R14: 00007f164d1e5fa0 R15: 00007ffde15c8288
</TASK>
Allocated by task 9593:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:77
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:397 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:414
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:957 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline]
ipv6_add_addr+0x4e3/0x2010 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:1120
inet6_addr_add+0x256/0x9b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3050
addrconf_add_ifaddr+0x1fc/0x450 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3160
inet6_ioctl+0x103/0x2b0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:580
sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1254
sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1375
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 6099:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:77
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:584
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:252 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:284
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:234 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2540 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:2569 [inline]
slab_free_bulk mm/slub.c:6696 [inline]
kmem_cache_free_bulk mm/slub.c:7383 [inline]
kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x2bf/0x680 mm/slub.c:7362
kfree_bulk include/linux/slab.h:830 [inline]
kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x1b7/0x1e0 mm/slab_common.c:1523
kvfree_rcu_drain_ready mm/slab_common.c:1728 [inline]
kfree_rcu_monitor+0x1d0/0x2f0 mm/slab_common.c:1801
process_one_work+0x9ba/0x1b20 kernel/workqueue.c:3257
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqu
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix reference count leak in bpf_prog_test_run_xdp()
syzbot is reporting
unregister_netdevice: waiting for sit0 to become free. Usage count = 2
problem. A debug printk() patch found that a refcount is obtained at
xdp_convert_md_to_buff() from bpf_prog_test_run_xdp().
According to commit ec94670fcb3b ("bpf: Support specifying ingress via
xdp_md context in BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN"), the refcount obtained by
xdp_convert_md_to_buff() will be released by xdp_convert_buff_to_md().
Therefore, we can consider that the error handling path introduced by
commit 1c1949982524 ("bpf: introduce frags support to
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp()") forgot to call xdp_convert_buff_to_md(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mscc: ocelot: Fix crash when adding interface under a lag
Commit 15faa1f67ab4 ("lan966x: Fix crash when adding interface under a lag")
fixed a similar issue in the lan966x driver caused by a NULL pointer dereference.
The ocelot_set_aggr_pgids() function in the ocelot driver has similar logic
and is susceptible to the same crash.
This issue specifically affects the ocelot_vsc7514.c frontend, which leaves
unused ports as NULL pointers. The felix_vsc9959.c frontend is unaffected as
it uses the DSA framework which registers all ports.
Fix this by checking if the port pointer is valid before accessing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix memory leak in skb_segment_list for GRO packets
When skb_segment_list() is called during packet forwarding, it handles
packets that were aggregated by the GRO engine.
Historically, the segmentation logic in skb_segment_list assumes that
individual segments are split from a parent SKB and may need to carry
their own socket memory accounting. Accordingly, the code transfers
truesize from the parent to the newly created segments.
Prior to commit ed4cccef64c1 ("gro: fix ownership transfer"), this
truesize subtraction in skb_segment_list() was valid because fragments
still carry a reference to the original socket.
However, commit ed4cccef64c1 ("gro: fix ownership transfer") changed
this behavior by ensuring that fraglist entries are explicitly
orphaned (skb->sk = NULL) to prevent illegal orphaning later in the
stack. This change meant that the entire socket memory charge remained
with the head SKB, but the corresponding accounting logic in
skb_segment_list() was never updated.
As a result, the current code unconditionally adds each fragment's
truesize to delta_truesize and subtracts it from the parent SKB. Since
the fragments are no longer charged to the socket, this subtraction
results in an effective under-count of memory when the head is freed.
This causes sk_wmem_alloc to remain non-zero, preventing socket
destruction and leading to a persistent memory leak.
The leak can be observed via KMEMLEAK when tearing down the networking
environment:
unreferenced object 0xffff8881e6eb9100 (size 2048):
comm "ping", pid 6720, jiffies 4295492526
backtrace:
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x5c6/0x800
sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220
sk_alloc+0x35/0xa00
inet6_create.part.0+0x303/0x10d0
__sock_create+0x248/0x640
__sys_socket+0x11b/0x1d0
Since skb_segment_list() is exclusively used for SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST
packets constructed by GRO, the truesize adjustment is removed.
The call to skb_release_head_state() must be preserved. As documented in
commit cf673ed0e057 ("net: fix fraglist segmentation reference count
leak"), it is still required to correctly drop references to SKB
extensions that may be overwritten during __copy_skb_header(). |
| SQLite before 3.53.2 contains a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the FTS5 full-text search extension that allows attackers to cause a crash or execute arbitrary code by supplying a crafted database with malicious continuation page metadata specifying a szLeaf value smaller than 4. Attackers can trigger an integer underflow in fts5ChunkIterate() causing an inflated remaining byte count during FTS5 MATCH query processing, leading to a heap buffer overflow of attacker-controlled data in applications compiled with SQLITE_ENABLE_FTS5. |
| SQLite before 3.53.2 contains memory corruption vulnerabilities in the FTS5 full-text search extension that allow attackers to cause process crashes, memory exhaustion, or arbitrary code execution by supplying a crafted database with malformed FTS5 page data. Attackers can trigger an out-of-bounds read in fts5LeafSeek() via an attacker-controlled loop bound and a heap buffer overflow write in fts5ChunkIterate() through a crafted continuation page causing an integer underflow, exploitable when an FTS5 MATCH query is executed against the malicious database. |
| A buffer overflow vulnerability in the XML processing functionality of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS® software enables an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the management web or dataplane interface to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on VM-Series firewalls or execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the PA-Series firewalls.
The security risk posed by this issue is minimized when the management interface is restricted to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practice deployment guidelines https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431 .
Panorama is impacted by this vulnerability. |
| A command injection vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS® software enables an authenticated administrator to bypass system restrictions and run arbitrary commands as a root user. To be able to exploit this issue, the user must have access to the PAN-OS CLI and the device must be configured with a Luna Hardware Security Module (HSM).
The security risk posed by this issue is significantly minimized when CLI access is restricted to a limited group of administrators.
Panorama, Cloud NGFW, and Prisma® Access are not impacted by this vulnerability. |
