| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An out-of-bounds read flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in __glXDisp_ChangeDrawableAttributes(). A wrong size validation check can read a client-controlled number of bytes, exceeding the request buffer, leading to information disclosure. A write path also exists but requires byte-swapped clients which is disabled by default. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland. The X server has multiple stack buffers sized XkbMaxShiftLevel * XkbNumKbdGroups but CheckKeyTypes() does not verify or clamp non-canonical key types to XkbMaxShiftLevel. A client can change key types to excessive shift levels and trigger stack overflows. This is caused by an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-26597. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root. |
| A use-after-free flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in SyncChangeCounter(). A client that sets up multiple SyncCounters can trigger a use-after-free when destroying those counters via a second client connection while changing those counters. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root. |
| A use-after-free flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in FreeCounter(). A client that sets up multiple SyncCounters and awaits on those triggers can trigger a use-after-free when destroying those counters via a second client connection. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland. _XkbSetMapChecks() declares a fixed-size stack buffer mapWidths[256] indexed by key type index. The helper function CheckKeyTypes() writes to this buffer at a client-controlled offset, allowing a stack buffer overflow. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root. |
| A use-after-free flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in CreateSaverWindow(). A client can trigger a use-after-free read after changing window attributes and forcing the screen saver, leading to information disclosure. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland. A mismatch between the X server and the libXfont2 library's maximum font name length can cause a stack buffer overflow during font alias resolution. The server allocates a 256 byte stack buffer but libXfont2's alias target name length is 1024 bytes. A font alias name between 257 and 1023 bytes causes the X server to copy that name into the undersized stack buffer without further checks. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root. |
| A flaw was found in the libssh library in versions less than 0.11.2. An out-of-bounds read can be triggered in the sftp_handle function due to an incorrect comparison check that permits the function to access memory beyond the valid handle list and to return an invalid pointer, which is used in further processing. This vulnerability allows an authenticated remote attacker to potentially read unintended memory regions, exposing sensitive information or affect service behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: cope racing subflow creation in mptcp_rcv_space_adjust
Additional active subflows - i.e. created by the in kernel path
manager - are included into the subflow list before starting the
3whs.
A racing recvmsg() spooling data received on an already established
subflow would unconditionally call tcp_cleanup_rbuf() on all the
current subflows, potentially hitting a divide by zero error on
the newly created ones.
Explicitly check that the subflow is in a suitable state before
invoking tcp_cleanup_rbuf(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: pm: Fix uaf in __timer_delete_sync
There are two paths to access mptcp_pm_del_add_timer, result in a race
condition:
CPU1 CPU2
==== ====
net_rx_action
napi_poll netlink_sendmsg
__napi_poll netlink_unicast
process_backlog netlink_unicast_kernel
__netif_receive_skb genl_rcv
__netif_receive_skb_one_core netlink_rcv_skb
NF_HOOK genl_rcv_msg
ip_local_deliver_finish genl_family_rcv_msg
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu genl_family_rcv_msg_doit
tcp_v4_rcv mptcp_pm_nl_flush_addrs_doit
tcp_v4_do_rcv mptcp_nl_remove_addrs_list
tcp_rcv_established mptcp_pm_remove_addrs_and_subflows
tcp_data_queue remove_anno_list_by_saddr
mptcp_incoming_options mptcp_pm_del_add_timer
mptcp_pm_del_add_timer kfree(entry)
In remove_anno_list_by_saddr(running on CPU2), after leaving the critical
zone protected by "pm.lock", the entry will be released, which leads to the
occurrence of uaf in the mptcp_pm_del_add_timer(running on CPU1).
Keeping a reference to add_timer inside the lock, and calling
sk_stop_timer_sync() with this reference, instead of "entry->add_timer".
Move list_del(&entry->list) to mptcp_pm_del_add_timer and inside the pm lock,
do not directly access any members of the entry outside the pm lock, which
can avoid similar "entry->x" uaf. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tun: add missing verification for short frame
The cited commit missed to check against the validity of the frame length
in the tun_xdp_one() path, which could cause a corrupted skb to be sent
downstack. Even before the skb is transmitted, the
tun_xdp_one-->eth_type_trans() may access the Ethernet header although it
can be less than ETH_HLEN. Once transmitted, this could either cause
out-of-bound access beyond the actual length, or confuse the underlayer
with incorrect or inconsistent header length in the skb metadata.
In the alternative path, tun_get_user() already prohibits short frame which
has the length less than Ethernet header size from being transmitted for
IFF_TAP.
This is to drop any frame shorter than the Ethernet header size just like
how tun_get_user() does.
CVE: CVE-2024-41091 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tap: add missing verification for short frame
The cited commit missed to check against the validity of the frame length
in the tap_get_user_xdp() path, which could cause a corrupted skb to be
sent downstack. Even before the skb is transmitted, the
tap_get_user_xdp()-->skb_set_network_header() may assume the size is more
than ETH_HLEN. Once transmitted, this could either cause out-of-bound
access beyond the actual length, or confuse the underlayer with incorrect
or inconsistent header length in the skb metadata.
In the alternative path, tap_get_user() already prohibits short frame which
has the length less than Ethernet header size from being transmitted.
This is to drop any frame shorter than the Ethernet header size just like
how tap_get_user() does.
CVE: CVE-2024-41090 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: add bounds checking to xlog_recover_process_data
There is a lack of verification of the space occupied by fixed members
of xlog_op_header in the xlog_recover_process_data.
We can create a crafted image to trigger an out of bounds read by
following these steps:
1) Mount an image of xfs, and do some file operations to leave records
2) Before umounting, copy the image for subsequent steps to simulate
abnormal exit. Because umount will ensure that tail_blk and
head_blk are the same, which will result in the inability to enter
xlog_recover_process_data
3) Write a tool to parse and modify the copied image in step 2
4) Make the end of the xlog_op_header entries only 1 byte away from
xlog_rec_header->h_size
5) xlog_rec_header->h_num_logops++
6) Modify xlog_rec_header->h_crc
Fix:
Add a check to make sure there is sufficient space to access fixed members
of xlog_op_header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf
The BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular
buffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumer_pos is the
consumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed the
data, and producer_pos which is the producer counter denoting the amount of
data reserved by all producers.
Each time a record is reserved, the producer that "owns" the record will
successfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record is
read, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finished
processing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from user
space, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write.
One aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of both
producers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguously
back-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measures
for samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data
area, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page
again, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual
memory.
Each record has a struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr { u32 len; u32 pg_off; } header for
book-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program.
Helpers like bpf_ringbuf_reserve() return `(void *)hdr + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ`
for the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is however
possible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the first
chunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk's
header.
For example, consider the creation of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF map with size
of 0x4000. Next, the consumer_pos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call to
bpf_ringbuf_reserve() is made. This will allocate a chunk A, which is in
[0x0,0x3008], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x8,0x3008]. Now, lets
allocate a chunk B with size 0x3000. This will succeed because consumer_pos
was edited ahead of time to pass the `new_prod_pos - cons_pos > rb->mask`
check. Chunk B will be in range [0x3008,0x6010], and the BPF program is able
to edit [0x3010,0x6010]. Due to the ring buffer memory layout mentioned
earlier, the ranges [0x0,0x4000] and [0x4000,0x8000] point to the same data
pages. This means that chunk B at [0x4000,0x4008] is chunk A's header.
bpf_ringbuf_submit() / bpf_ringbuf_discard() use the header's pg_off to then
locate the bpf_ringbuf itself via bpf_ringbuf_restore_from_rec(). Once chunk
B modified chunk A's header, then bpf_ringbuf_commit() refers to the wrong
page and could cause a crash.
Fix it by calculating the oldest pending_pos and check whether the range
from the oldest outstanding record to the newest would span beyond the ring
buffer size. If that is the case, then reject the request. We've tested with
the ring buffer benchmark in BPF selftests (./benchs/run_bench_ringbufs.sh)
before/after the fix and while it seems a bit slower on some benchmarks, it
is still not significantly enough to matter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Fix potential glock use-after-free on unmount
When a DLM lockspace is released and there ares still locks in that
lockspace, DLM will unlock those locks automatically. Commit
fb6791d100d1b started exploiting this behavior to speed up filesystem
unmount: gfs2 would simply free glocks it didn't want to unlock and then
release the lockspace. This didn't take the bast callbacks for
asynchronous lock contention notifications into account, which remain
active until until a lock is unlocked or its lockspace is released.
To prevent those callbacks from accessing deallocated objects, put the
glocks that should not be unlocked on the sd_dead_glocks list, release
the lockspace, and only then free those glocks.
As an additional measure, ignore unexpected ast and bast callbacks if
the receiving glock is dead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Add BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB attach type enforcement in BPF_LINK_CREATE
bpf_prog_attach uses attach_type_to_prog_type to enforce proper
attach type for BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB. link_create uses
bpf_prog_get and relies on bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type
to properly verify prog_type <> attach_type association.
Add missing attach_type enforcement for the link_create case.
Otherwise, it's currently possible to attach cgroup_skb prog
types to other cgroup hooks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Discard command completions in internal error
Fix use after free when FW completion arrives while device is in
internal error state. Avoid calling completion handler in this case,
since the device will flush the command interface and trigger all
completions manually.
Kernel log:
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
...
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xd8/0xe0
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? __warn+0x79/0x120
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xd8/0xe0
? report_bug+0x17c/0x190
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x60
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xd8/0xe0
cmd_ent_put+0x13b/0x160 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_comp_handler+0x5f9/0x670 [mlx5_core]
cmd_comp_notifier+0x1f/0x30 [mlx5_core]
notifier_call_chain+0x35/0xb0
atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20
mlx5_eq_async_int+0xf6/0x290 [mlx5_core]
notifier_call_chain+0x35/0xb0
atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20
irq_int_handler+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4b/0x160
handle_irq_event+0x2e/0x80
handle_edge_irq+0x98/0x230
__common_interrupt+0x3b/0xa0
common_interrupt+0x7b/0xa0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: core: reject skb_copy(_expand) for fraglist GSO skbs
SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs must not be linearized, otherwise they become
invalid. Return NULL if such an skb is passed to skb_copy or
skb_copy_expand, in order to prevent a crash on a potential later
call to skb_gso_segment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix UAF in error path
Sam Page (sam4k) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported
a UAF in the tipc_buf_append() error path:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0
linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804d2a7c80 by task poc/8034
CPU: 1 PID: 8034 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.8.2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:377
print_report+0xc4/0x620 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0xda/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:601
kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183
skb_release_data+0x5af/0x880 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1026
skb_release_all linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1094
__kfree_skb linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1108
kfree_skb_reason+0x12d/0x210 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1144
kfree_skb linux/./include/linux/skbuff.h:1244
tipc_buf_append+0x425/0xb50 linux/net/tipc/msg.c:186
tipc_link_input+0x224/0x7c0 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1324
tipc_link_rcv+0x76e/0x2d70 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1824
tipc_rcv+0x45f/0x10f0 linux/net/tipc/node.c:2159
tipc_udp_recv+0x73b/0x8f0 linux/net/tipc/udp_media.c:390
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xad2/0x1850 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2108
udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x131/0xb00 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2186
udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x165/0x3b0 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2346
__udp4_lib_rcv+0x2594/0x3400 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2422
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x30c/0x4e0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e4/0x520 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314
NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308
ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
dst_input linux/./include/net/dst.h:461
ip_rcv_finish linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449
NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314
NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308
ip_rcv+0x2c5/0x5d0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5534
__netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5648
process_backlog+0x101/0x6b0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5976
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 linux/net/core/dev.c:6576
napi_poll linux/net/core/dev.c:6645
net_rx_action+0x95a/0xe90 linux/net/core/dev.c:6781
__do_softirq+0x21f/0x8e7 linux/kernel/softirq.c:553
do_softirq linux/kernel/softirq.c:454
do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 linux/kernel/softirq.c:441
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 linux/kernel/softirq.c:381
local_bh_enable linux/./include/linux/bottom_half.h:33
rcu_read_unlock_bh linux/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:851
__dev_queue_xmit+0x871/0x3ee0 linux/net/core/dev.c:4378
dev_queue_xmit linux/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3169
neigh_hh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:526
neigh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:540
ip_finish_output2+0x169f/0x2550 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235
__ip_finish_output linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:313
__ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295
ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323
NF_HOOK_COND linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:303
ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433
dst_output linux/./include/net/dst.h:451
ip_local_out linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129
ip_send_skb+0x3e5/0x560 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492
udp_send_skb+0x73f/0x1530 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:963
udp_sendmsg+0x1a36/0x2b40 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:1250
inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x140 linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850
sock_sendmsg_nosec linux/net/socket.c:730
__sock_sendmsg linux/net/socket.c:745
__sys_sendto+0x42c/0x4e0 linux/net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2203
__se_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2199
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 linux/net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:52
do_syscall_
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: fix vf may be used uninitialized in this function warning
To fix the regression introduced by commit 52424f974bc5, which causes
servers hang in very hard to reproduce conditions with resets races.
Using two sources for the information is the root cause.
In this function before the fix bumping v didn't mean bumping vf
pointer. But the code used this variables interchangeably, so stale vf
could point to different/not intended vf.
Remove redundant "v" variable and iterate via single VF pointer across
whole function instead to guarantee VF pointer validity. |
