| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Reserved in error; never associated with a vulnerability. |
| Reserved in error; never associated with a vulnerability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: core: prevent unregistering a power supply while a callback runs
Once a power supply is registered, its callbacks can immediately start
firing from other contexts, such as external_power_changed() triggered by
the TCPM stack. If a power supply is unregistered while the callback is
still running, the driver data can already be freed when the callback
tries to access it, leading to a use-after-free.
This happens e.g. when the hardware bus carrying the power supply device
malfunctions (e.g. I2C is hogged down by another malfunctioning device)
immediately after the power supply is registered, and thus the core is
still processing the callbacks which were queued up when the driver
starts the removal, leading in some cases to a kernel crash, e.g.:
[ 11.645942] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000005
[ 11.646751] Mem abort info:
[ 11.647006] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 11.647338] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 11.647806] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 11.648077] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 11.648356] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 11.648785] Data abort info:
[ 11.649041] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 11.649524] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 11.649981] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0
[ 11.650390] [0000000000000005] user address but active_mm is swapper
[ 11.650955] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
[ 11.651460] Modules linked in:
[ 11.651742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 144 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc6-g62a9297af2cd #1 PREEMPT
[ 11.652553] Hardware name: Flipper One rev. F0B1C2 (DT)
[ 11.653024] Workqueue: events power_supply_changed_work
[ 11.653511] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 11.654135] pc : __power_supply_is_supplied_by+0x18/0x100
[ 11.654624] lr : __power_supply_am_i_supplied+0x40/0xb8
[ 11.655098] sp : ffff80008192bb30
[ 11.655399] x29: ffff80008192bb30 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 11.656049] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 11.656695] x23: ffff0000c19f4200 x22: ffffdb2232ba4ea8 x21: ffff80008192bc28
[ 11.657344] x20: ffff0000c1eef000 x19: ffff80008192bc18 x18: 00000000a0886e62
[ 11.657991] x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 04500072b5503510 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 11.658639] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000220 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 11.659286] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff0000c1fdb2b0 x9 : ffffdb2232ba5590
[ 11.659934] x8 : 00000000e5b906e6 x7 : ffff0000c2502778 x6 : ffffdb22339793d0
[ 11.660581] x5 : ffff80008192bc18 x4 : ffff0000c19cbca0 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 11.661228] x2 : ffff0000c1fdaf40 x1 : ffffffffffffffed x0 : ffff0000c1eef000
[ 11.661878] Call trace:
[ 11.662103] __power_supply_is_supplied_by+0x18/0x100 (P)
[ 11.662596] __power_supply_am_i_supplied+0x40/0xb8
[ 11.663040] psy_for_each_psy_cb+0x20/0x40
[ 11.663416] class_for_each_device+0x110/0x150
[ 11.663825] power_supply_am_i_supplied+0x68/0x100
[ 11.664262] bq257xx_external_power_changed+0x58/0x140
[ 11.664733] __power_supply_changed_work+0x60/0x80
[ 11.665170] psy_for_each_psy_cb+0x20/0x40
[ 11.665545] class_for_each_device+0x110/0x150
[ 11.665953] power_supply_changed_work+0x98/0x1b8
[ 11.666382] process_one_work+0x164/0x4c0
[ 11.666758] worker_thread+0x19c/0x320
[ 11.667104] kthread+0x138/0x150
[ 11.667408] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 11.667744] Code: d503233f a9bd7bfd 910003fd a90153f3 (f9400c34)
[ 11.668294] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Add a read-write semaphore between external_power_changed() and
power_supply_unregister() to prevent the latter from returning (and thus
the driver from freeing its data) while the callback is still running. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: reset skb headers before unicast and multicast filtering
Socket filters can use SKF_NET_OFF and SKF_LL_OFF to read relative to
an skb's network and MAC headers. Netlink producers may reserve
headroom without resetting those headers, allowing a receiving socket's
filter to read data before the initialized message.
For example, IWPM HELLO replies are allocated with dev_alloc_skb(),
which reserves NET_SKB_PAD bytes. An unprivileged NETLINK_RDMA user can
attach a classic socket filter and disclose this headroom through the
length of the delivered reply. The resets in netlink_dump() do not help
because IWPM sends a separately allocated skb through netlink_unicast().
Reset both headers before running the receiver's filter in unicast and
broadcast delivery, as is already done for dump skbs. This also covers
other netlink producers that reserve headroom without changing their
allocation or message-building code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: skip eviction of a BO with no resource
xe_evict_flags() switches on tbo->resource->mem_type to choose an
eviction placement. An xe BO can reach eviction with no ttm.resource,
e.g. an imported dma-buf BO whose resource was freed during teardown
while its attachment is still live: the exporter then invalidates it via
xe_dma_buf_move_notify() -> xe_bo_evict(), and the switch dereferences a
NULL resource and faults.
A BO with no resource has nothing placed or mapped, so there is nothing
to evict. Return an empty placement (num_placement = 0), mirroring the
handling already used for non-xe scatter-gather BOs just above;
ttm_bo_validate() then takes the pipeline-gutting path and returns 0.
Without the fix the xe_dma_buf@xe_test_dmabuf_move_notify_no_resource
dynamic live selftest will fail with below stack.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
RIP: 0010:xe_evict_flags+0xf4/0x140 [xe]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
xe_bo_evict+0x40/0xa0 [xe]
? ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting+0x71/0x180 [ttm]
xe_test_dmabuf_move_notify_no_resource+0x182/0x440 [xe]
xe_dma_buf_kunit+0x387/0x580 [xe]
v2: Add Fixes tag and failure info in commit text (Matt Brost)
(cherry picked from commit dbcfaac6331f1fcb0c2fe3ad3e9adb1e5d43ec0c) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: avoid hashing the network namespace pointer
The netlink rhashtable key includes a raw struct net pointer and a
user-controlled port ID. Both /proc/net/netlink and socket diagnostics
expose the table's bucket order. By binding and rebinding chosen
NETLINK_USERSOCK port IDs, an unprivileged reader can distinguish equal
buckets and recover the low bits of the Jenkins hash. Its 32-bit seed
and the limited set of kernel-image slides can then be searched offline
to recover the address of init_net.
Use the namespace's unique, non-address net_cookie in the comparison
key instead. It is assigned before the per-net initializers run and
remains unchanged for the namespace's lifetime. The lookup key and
object hash are still built by netlink_compare_arg_init(), keeping
lookup, insertion, removal and rehashing consistent while preserving
namespace separation. Neither public table walker needs to change.
Reading the socket's namespace cookie in netlink_compare() is safe
under RCU, including during namespace teardown. netlink_release()
removes the socket from the hash table and defers its final put with
call_rcu(). cleanup_net() runs the per-net exit methods and waits for
outstanding RCU callbacks with rcu_barrier() before freeing namespace
storage.
Unlike ns.ns_id, net_cookie is also available and initialized during
setup_net() in older stable kernels, making the change straightforward
to backport to v5.15 and later. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hisilicon: hisi_femac: Move setting of netops to fix crash
hisi_femac_drv_probe() connects the PHY before dev->netdev_ops is
assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads
dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in
question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when
CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled.
phy_link_topo_add_phy from phy_attach_direct+0xec/0x37c
of_phy_get_and_connect from hisi_femac_drv_probe+0x1f4/0x558
Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit
7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: aeroflex: move setting of netops to fix crash
greth_of_probe() calls greth_mdio_init(), which connects the PHY,
before dev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() ->
phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through
netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes
with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled.
Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit
7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
watch_queue: Fix note pool publication race in watch_queue_set_size()
There is a race between watch_queue_set_size() and post_one_notification().
watch_queue_set_size() publishes wqueue->notes, notes_bitmap, nr_pages and
nr_notes with plain stores, and post_one_notification() reads them with
plain loads under a different lock, so nothing orders the four stores
against the poster's loads: depending on the build, notes can be stored
last (gcc 14 on x86-64 does this). Since keyctl_watch_key() lets a watch
attach to a queue before it is sized, post_one_notification() can already
be running on another CPU at that moment: it reads nr_notes > 0, passes
its bounds check, and then reads notes while it is still NULL,
dereferencing notes[0].
An unprivileged user triggers this reliably by watching one of its own
keys through a notification pipe and racing ioctl(IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE)
on that pipe against keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM) on the key from another CPU,
triggering:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:post_one_notification.isra.0+0xa2/0x1e0
Call Trace:
__post_watch_notification+0x148/0x180
keyctl_setperm_key+0x119/0x130
do_syscall_64+0x108/0x4c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Fix this by publishing nr_notes last with smp_store_release(), and by
reading it once with smp_load_acquire() in post_one_notification() before
the bitmap and the page array are touched. A poster that observes a
non-zero nr_notes then also observes the pool behind it; one that observes
zero drops the notification as before. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: free the sbi after a grace period
ext4_get_link() follows a symlink that keeps its target in a data block
in rcu pathwalk mode with ext4_getblk(EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CACHED_NOWAIT).
That reads s_mount_state in the ASSERT() of ext4_getblk() and again in
ext4_es_lookup_extent(), and the lookup bumps the extent status hit or
miss counter, all through sb->s_fs_info.
ext4_put_super() destroys those counters, clears sb->s_fs_info and frees
the sbi without waiting for a grace period. A pathwalk that is still in
ext4_get_link() when the last reference to the mount goes away then
dereferences a NULL s_fs_info, the freed sbi or the destroyed percpu
counters.
With a pathwalk held up in ext4_get_link() while the last reference
goes away:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000a8-0x00000000000000af]
RIP: 0010:ext4_getblk+0xf0/0x640
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ext4_get_link+0x26c/0x410
pick_link+0xf96/0x1780
step_into_slowpath+0x9b8/0x1250
path_lookupat+0x484/0xb00
filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0
vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0
vfs_fstatat+0x4d/0x90
__do_sys_newfstatat+0xa0/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x10e/0x5e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
So far that has been hard to hit. umount(2) waits for a grace period in
namespace_unlock() before it drops the mount, so only a mount whose last
reference goes away elsewhere, like the close of a file or a chdir out of
a lazily unmounted directory, can race a walker.
Keep sb->s_fs_info and free the sbi together with the extent status
counters after a grace period. Split the counters out of
ext4_es_unregister_shrinker() for that. The shrinker still gets wasted
in ext4_put_super(), the counters go with the sbi. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rds: fix uninitialized trans dereference in CM event handler
rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() assigns trans only when the RDMA
device is an InfiniBand CA (RDMA_NODE_IB_CA). On any other device
type, e.g. an iWARP RNIC such as siw, trans stays uninitialized, but
the event switch dereferences it: unconditionally in the
RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST case via trans->cm_handle_connect(),
and (with a connection context) in the ROUTE_RESOLVED and
ESTABLISHED cases.
An RDS listener on an iWARP device therefore crashes the kernel as
soon as a connect request arrives: with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
the wild load becomes a NULL dereference at offset 0xa0
(&trans->cm_handle_connect) in the iw_cm_wq workqueue.
GCC masks the bug in default builds by folding the uninitialized
load into &rds_ib_transport; Clang-built kernels take the real
uninitialized path and oops.
The active side can land on a non-IB device too: the id that
rds_ib_conn_path_connect() creates is not restricted to a node type,
so rdma_resolve_addr() binds it to whichever device serves the local
address, and an iWARP RNIC on the same netdev qualifies. The crash
there is different: resolving a route on an iWARP id never fills in
cm_id->route.path_rec, and the ROUTE_RESOLVED case writes
path_rec[0].sl before it calls into the transport.
The iWARP transport was dropped long ago and IB is the only
transport left, so make that explicit: initialize trans to
&rds_ib_transport at declaration, drop the conditional assignment,
reject a connect request that arrives on a non-IB device, and drop a
connection whose address resolved to one instead of resolving a
route on it. The rejection is limited to RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST
on purpose: a non-zero return from the handler makes rdma_cm destroy
the id the event was delivered on, which is right for the request's
freshly created id but would free a connection id that RDS still owns
for any other event. On the active side the id stays ic->i_cm_id and
the connection's shutdown destroys it, so that case returns 0.
[achender: reject only on RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST instead of
bailing out for every event on a non-IB device, so that rdma_cm does
not destroy connection ids RDS still tracks; drop a connection whose
address resolved to a non-IB device before a route is resolved on it;
changelog adjusted] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: revalidate output stream after association connect wait
When message interleaving is enabled, the first send waits for association
establishment before building its data chunks. The wait drops the socket
lock, and handshake processing can reduce the output stream count to the
peer-advertised inbound stream count. sctp_stream_init() then frees the
extension of every removed stream.
The sender resumes with the stream that it checked before the wait. If the
peer removed that stream, sctp_outq_tail() later dereferences its NULL
extension. Fatal-oops policies then panic the host.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x38-0x3f]
RIP: sctp_outq_tail+0x49e/0xaa0
Call Trace:
sctp_primitive_SEND
sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc
sctp_sendmsg
A range check alone is insufficient. Stream reconfiguration can grow the
output count again while the lock is released without recreating extensions
freed by the earlier shrink. The stream can then be in range while its
extension remains NULL. The send-buffer wait has the same issue.
Factor the range and extension checks into a helper and repeat both after
each send-path wait that drops the socket lock. Once the lock is
reacquired, the validation remains stable through data creation and
queueing.
If validation fails after the connect wait, the auto-created association is
already established. Return ESRCH so the existing caller path keeps it
under state-machine ownership instead of freeing it directly, which would
leave protocol, counter and socket state inconsistent. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/histograms: Reject non-stacktrace fields for synthetic stacktrace fields
In check_synth_field(), when a synthetic event field is a stacktrace
(field->is_stack) and the histogram field is not a "long[" stacktrace
array, validation falls through to the generic size and signedness
comparison.
Because parse_synth_field() sets a stacktrace field's type to
"__data_loc unsigned long[]", its size is sizeof(u64) and
synth_field_signed() marks it as signed. Consequently, any 8-byte
signed scalar histogram field passes the fallback check, and its scalar
value is subsequently dereferenced as a kernel stacktrace pointer in
get_field_size() and trace_stack().
Furthermore, checking strstr(hist_field->type, "long[") is insufficient
because tracepoint fields defined with __bitmask() or __rel_bitmask()
also have type "__data_loc unsigned long[]" or "__rel_loc unsigned
long[]", whilst create_hist_field() treats them as 4-byte scalar values
without HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE.
Propagate HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE to variable references and field
variables (whilst excluding variable aliases from per-element
stacktrace capture), and reject any mismatch between
HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE and field->is_stack in check_synth_field(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: shared: fix use-after-free bug when adding shared proxies
The GPIO lookup table can stay alive for longer than the kobject whose
name string's address we're assigning to lookup->dev_id. Fix a potential
UAF by duplicating the string. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Do not show buffer_meta for CPUs without a buffer
The per_cpu/cpuN/buffer_meta files are created for every possible CPU,
but buffer->buffers[cpu] is only allocated once that CPU comes online.
Reading the file of a CPU that never came online dereferences a NULL
cpu_buffer in rbm_start().
Fail the open with -ENODEV when the CPU has no buffer, as the other
per CPU ring buffer interfaces do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: bsg: Pass reply_len to bsg_setup_queue() to fit UFS ARPMB replies
bsg-lib allocates a 96-byte (SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE) reply buffer per
job, but struct ufs_rpmb_reply is 104 bytes: a 40-byte struct
ufs_bsg_reply followed by a 64-byte EHS. When an Advanced RPMB command
returns an EHS, ufshcd_advanced_rpmb_req_handler() copies it right after
the 40-byte header and writes 8 bytes past the end of the buffer.
Let each BSG transport pass its reply buffer size to bsg_setup_queue()
and have ufs_bsg request sizeof(struct ufs_rpmb_reply), so the full
reply reaches user space. Other transports keep SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: keep the eviction fence until the last handle is closed
amdgpu_gem_object_close() detaches the user queue eviction fence from
the BO before it checks bo_va->ref_count, so closing any handle of a BO
removes the fence, even when the file still has another handle to the
BO and the bo_va with its GPU mappings stays. The BO can then be evicted
without suspending the user queues of the file, which keep accessing it
through mappings that are only marked for update.
Seen on navi31 with a SDMA user queue: a BO opened twice in the same
file (GEM_FLINK + GEM_OPEN) loses its eviction fence when the second
handle is closed (traced attach/detach of the fence):
attach bo=ffff8c78a6c84c00
GEM_CLOSE handle=7
detach bo=ffff8c78a6c84c00
while handle 6 and the mapping are still in use.
Only detach the fence when the last reference to the bo_va goes away,
matching amdgpu_gem_object_open(), which attaches it only when the
bo_va is created. With this the fence stays until the file is closed.
(cherry picked from commit 8387982f03d4026b7dc11b0b5e3118298eee4d6a) |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain Virtual Edition, Feature Release versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.8, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.80, LTS2025 release versions 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.40, LTS2026 release versions 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.20, contain an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Command execution. |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, Feature Release versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.8, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.80, LTS2025 release versions 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.40, LTS2026 release versions 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.20, contain an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Command execution. |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, Feature Release versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.8, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.80, LTS2025 release versions 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.40, LTS2026 release versions 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.20, contain a Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Denial of service. |
