| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7603: initialize global station WCID
mt7603 uses a driver-private global station WCID for frames that have
neither a station nor a vif, including frames injected through a monitor
interface. Unlike the core global WCID initialized by
mt76_register_device(), this WCID is published without ever being passed
to mt76_wcid_init().
Since commit 0335c034e726 ("wifi: mt76: fix race condition related to
checking tx queue fill status"), mt76_tx() queues every such frame on the
WCID's tx_pending or tx_offchannel queue and links its tx_list. The first
injected frame therefore reaches __skb_queue_tail() with an uninitialized
sk_buff_head and dereferences a NULL prev pointer.
Initialize the WCID before publishing it.
The fix was tested on an MT7603 PCIe device. Three wildcard probe requests
were injected through a monitor interface. The hardware queue head and tail
advanced from 0 to 3 and a second radio captured the third request over the
air. No oops or reset occurred. After restoring AP mode, a 150 MB transfer
also completed without a reset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: account only unread bytes in read_skb()
After a partial stream receive, rx_bytes tracks the unread suffix while
buf_used and peer credit still cover the whole packet.
virtio_transport_read_skb() dequeues that packet but passes pkt_len for
both counters, underflowing rx_bytes.
On a connected CID_LOCAL stream with an SK_SKB verdict, a 40-byte read
from a 100-byte packet made SIOCINQ report -40, an empty recv return
ELOOP, and poll report the empty socket readable. After verdict detach,
receiving 40 bytes wrapped the counter to zero and hid those queued bytes
until one more byte arrived. The fixed run kept the counter balanced
and exposed all queued data immediately.
This was found during an LLM-assisted manual source audit of VSOCK
receive accounting while re-evaluating virtio_transport_read_skb() after
CVE-2024-50169.
Subtract only skb->len minus the VSOCK offset from rx_bytes. Retain the
full packet length for buf_used and peer credit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm ioctl: don't let data_start run past the buffer
struct dm_ioctl has seven bytes of trailing padding, so the smallest
buffer userspace is allowed to ask for, offsetof(struct dm_ioctl, data),
is seven bytes shorter than sizeof(struct dm_ioctl).
get_result_buffer() sets data_start to sizeof(struct dm_ioctl) without
looking at how big the buffer actually is. Ask for the minimum and
data_start ends up seven bytes past the end. Callers add it to
data_size, and ctl_ioctl() copies that much back to userspace:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0xad/0xd0
Read of size 312 at addr ffff8880169e4c00 by task repro-dm/140
ctl_ioctl+0x5e3/0xcb0
dm_ctl_ioctl+0x25/0x40
allocated 305-byte region [ffff8880169e4c00, ffff8880169e4d31)
A DM_LIST_DEVICES with data_size set to 305 is enough to hit it, and the
seven bytes that leak are whatever sat next to the allocation.
Clamp data_start to the buffer size.
Note that this is not a security bug because the out-of-bounds read can
only be triggered by root. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cipso: adjust cached option offsets when removing CIPSO
cipso_v4_skbuff_delattr() removes the CIPSO bytes but does not adjust
cached offsets for options that follow them.
For example, with a valid 10-byte CIPSO option followed by a seven-byte
RR option, parsing records rr at offset 30. Removing CIPSO moves RR to
offset 20, while the cached offset remains 30. Consumers such as
ip_forward_options() and __ip_options_echo() then access the wrong bytes;
the latter may interpret packet data as the option length and copy it into
fixed-size option storage.
Mirror cipso_v4_delopt() and subtract cipso_len from the srr, rr, ts and
router_alert offsets when they follow CIPSO. cipso_len is the distance
the first memmove() shifts those options. The later header move and
network-header reset relocate the bytes and their offset base together. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/cpuset: Handle cpu hotplug race in guarantee_active_cpus()
With commit 2125c0034c5d ("cgroup/cpuset: Make cpuset hotplug processing
synchronous"), the cpuset hotplug operation becomes synchronous. That
commit also removes the code that handles race between cpuset_hotplug_work
and cpu hotplug notifier with the assumption that race is now gone.
Later commit 7a0aabd9ce69 ("cgroup/cpuset: Always use cpu_active_mask")
updates the cpuset code to always use cpu_active_mask instead of
cpu_online_mask in some places including guarantee_online_cpus() which
is renamed to guarantee_active_cpus() in that commit.
In the case of CPU offline operation, cpu_active_mask is updated
first in sched_cpu_deactivate() to remove the offline CPU before
cpuset_handle_hotplug() is called to update the effective_cpus of the
affected cpusets. The cpu_online_mask is updated after that near the end
of the offline operation to remove the offline CPU. As a result, the race
comes back and the top cpuset may not have any active CPU leading to NULL
pointer dereference during the race window when guarantee_active_cpus()
is called after cpu_active_mask is updated to remove the CPU to be torn
down but before cpuset_handle_hotplug() is able to properly update the
effective_cpus of the top cpuset.
Fix this by adding back the NULL cs check to avoid this problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: dev: init_can_skb(): restore skb header initialization
Commit 9f10374bb024 ("can: remove private CAN skb headroom infrastructure")
removed the skb_reset_mac_header()/skb_reset_network_header()/
skb_reset_transport_header() calls from init_can_skb(). As a result, RX
skbs from alloc_can_skb() and friends again carry mac_header = 0xFFFF.
When such an skb reaches packet_rcv_spkt() (SOCK_PACKET), the push length
calculation overflows and triggers skb_under_panic -> kernel BUG -> full
machine panic.
The same issue was originally reported in 2014 on linux-can and fixed by
commit 969439016d2c ("can: add missing initialisations in CAN related
skbuffs"). packet_rcv_spkt() itself has never been hardened: only
packet_rcv() and tpacket_rcv() gained dev_has_header() checks in
commit d549699048b4 ("net/packet: fix packet receive on L3 devices
without visible hard header"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Check PSC request indices against the actual size of the buffer
When processing Page State Change (PSC) requests, validate the PSC buffer
against the effective size of the scratch area, which could be less than
the maximum size if the guest provided a pointer that isn't exactly at the
start of the GHCB shared buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Use READ_ONCE() when reading entries/indices from PSC buffer
Use READ_ONCE() when reading entries/indices from the guest-accessible
Page State Change buffer to defend against TOCTOU bugs.
Don't bother with READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for cases where KVM is writing
(and not consuming the result!), as the guest isn't supposed to touch the
buffer while it's being processed. I.e. using READ_ONCE() is all about
protecting against misbehaving guests. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc2: Fix use after free in debug code
We're not allowed to dereference "urb" after calling
usb_hcd_giveback_urb() so save the urb->status ahead of time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macsec: fix replay protection at XPN lower-PN wrap
In macsec_post_decrypt(), when pn is U32_MAX, pn + 1 overflows u32 to 0
and the first branch never fires. If next_pn_halves.lower is also in the
upper half, pn_same_half(pn, lower) is true and the XPN else-if does not
fire either, leaving next_pn_halves unchanged. An attacker that captures
the legitimate frame carrying pn == 0xFFFFFFFF on an XPN association
can then replay it indefinitely, since lowest_pn never rises above
the captured pn and macsec_decrypt() reconstructs the same IV.
Extend the XPN else-if to also fire when pn + 1 wraps to 0, so receipt
of pn == U32_MAX advances next_pn_halves to (upper + 1, 0). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: validate body pcifunc in rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify
rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify() in drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/
octeontx2/af/rvu_rep.c queues a sender-controlled REP_EVENT_NOTIFY
request body verbatim, and rvu_rep_up_notify() then forwards
event->pcifunc (the nested body field, distinct from the
AF-normalised header pcifunc) into rvu_get_pfvf(), rvu_get_pf() and
the AF->PF mailbox device index without any bounds check.
A VF attached to a PF that has been put into switchdev
representor mode reaches this path: the VF mailbox handler
otx2_pfvf_mbox_handler() forwards every message id including
MBOX_MSG_REP_EVENT_NOTIFY to AF without an allowlist, and the AF
dispatcher rewrites only msg->pcifunc, leaving struct
rep_event::pcifunc attacker-controlled. The sibling
rvu_mbox_handler_esw_cfg() refuses requests whose header pcifunc
is not rvu->rep_pcifunc; this handler has no equivalent gate.
An out-of-range body pcifunc selects an &rvu->pf[]/&rvu->hwvf[]
element past the allocated array and, for RVU_EVENT_MAC_ADDR_CHANGE,
turns into a six-byte attacker-chosen OOB ether_addr_copy() target
inside the queued worker; KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds write
in rvu_rep_wq_handler.
Reject malformed requests at the handler entry by gating on
is_pf_func_valid(), which is already the canonical PF/VF range check
in this driver; expose it via rvu.h so callers in rvu_rep.c can use
it instead of open-coding the same range arithmetic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh after handling HAO option
ip6_parse_tlv() caches skb_network_header(skb) in nh while walking
IPv6 TLVs.
ipv6_dest_hao() may call pskb_expand_head() for a cloned skb, which can
move the skb head and invalidate the cached network header pointer.
Refresh nh after ipv6_dest_hao() returns so any trailing padding or TLVs
are parsed from the current skb head.
This matches the existing pattern used in ip6_parse_tlv() after helpers
that can modify skb header storage. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_siocdevprivate().
After patch 1/2 in this series, vti6_update() unlinks and relinks
the tunnel through t->net. vti6_siocdevprivate() still uses
dev_net(dev) for the collision lookup. For a tunnel moved through
IFLA_NET_NS_FD, dev_net(dev) is the new netns, not t->net.
SIOCCHGTUNNEL on a migrated tunnel then runs:
net = dev_net(dev) /* migrated netns */
t = vti6_locate(net, &p1, false) /* misses target in t->net */
...
t = netdev_priv(dev)
vti6_update(t, &p1, false) /* mutates t->net's hash */
A caller in the migrated netns picks params that match a tunnel
in the creation netns. The lookup in dev_net(dev) finds nothing.
vti6_update() prepends the migrated tunnel at the head of the
creation netns hash bucket for those params. Later lookups in
the creation netns resolve to the migrated device. xfrm receive
delivers the matched packets through a device the caller controls.
Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user
--map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts.
Switch the SIOCCHGTUNNEL path on a non fallback device to use
t->net for the lookup. The lookup now matches the netns
vti6_update() operates on.
Also add ns_capable(self->net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) before
the lookup. The check at the top of the case is against
dev_net(dev)->user_ns, which after migration is the attacker's
netns. A caller there can pick params absent from self->net,
the lookup returns NULL, t becomes self, and vti6_update()
inserts the device into the creation netns hash. The new check
requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the creation netns user_ns too.
SIOCADDTUNNEL and SIOCCHGTUNNEL on the fallback device keep
dev_net(dev), which equals init_net there. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg
ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR}
cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the
on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length.
The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(),
etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after
parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is
in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040
bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an
unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged
slab-out-of-bounds read:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540
put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540
udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250
sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190
____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620
Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which validates that at least two bytes
are accessible before reading the hdrlen field, then checks the
computed length against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on
failure. Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by
pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct
bound.
Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five
standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR)
and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop
(DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default). AH retains an inline bounds check
because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2).
The walk loop also gets a pre-read bounds check at the top to
validate ptr before any case accesses ptr[0] or ptr[1].
When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the
function instead of continuing to process later socket options. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: input: hold netns during deferred transport reinjection
Transport-mode reinjection stores a struct net pointer in skb->cb and
uses it later from xfrm_trans_reinject(). That pointer must stay valid
until the deferred callback runs.
Take a netns reference when queueing deferred reinjection work and drop
it after the callback completes. Use maybe_get_net() so the queueing
path does not revive a namespace that is already being torn down.
This keeps the existing workqueue design and fixes the netns lifetime
handling in one place for all users of xfrm_trans_queue_net(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: handle set_blocksize failures
ntfs3 uses buffer_heads, which don't handle block size > PAGE_SIZE well.
Without this, mounting we will hit the
BUG_ON(offset >= folio_size(folio));
in folio_set_bh on the first __bread_gfp call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: chips-media: wave5: Add range checks for dec_output_info
If the driver's dec_output_info contains invalid data the driver can
write in invalid memory. Add a range check for that.
This fixes this smatch error:
drivers/media/platform/chips-media/wave5/wave5-vpuapi.c:588 wave5_vpu_dec_get_output_info() error: buffer overflow 'inst->frame_buf' 64 <= 127 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: core: Add validation for host-provided max_segs
The max_segs field is of type unsigned short, and if a host driver
sets an excessively large value, it may be truncated to zero. This
can cause mmc_alloc_sg() to call kmalloc_objs() with a zero size
allocation request, which leads to undefined behavior.
Under the SLUB allocator, kmalloc(0) returns a special pointer
(ZERO_SIZE_PTR). The subsequent 'if (sg)' check will evaluate to
true, and sg_init_table() will then attempt to access invalid memory,
resulting in a crash:
dwmmc_rockchip 2a310000.mmc: Successfully tuned phase to 133
mmc1: new UHS-I speed SDR104 SDHC card at address aaaa
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000001ffffffff0
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000102c88000
[0000001ffffffff0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 102 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6-next-20260331-00013-g4d93c25963c5-dirty #80 PREEMPT
Hardware name: Rockchip RK3576 EVB V10 Board (DT)
Workqueue: events_freezable mmc_rescan
pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : sg_init_table+0x2c/0x50
lr : sg_init_table+0x24/0x50
sp : ffff8000837db710
x29: ffff8000837db710 x28: 000000000000c000 x27: 0000000000000300
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000040 x24: ffff0000c46a0000
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff0000c0c73c00 x21: 0000000000000010
x20: 0000000000000010 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 000000000000002c
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000001 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000400 x13: ffff8000837dc000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: ffff0000c0c73ca0 x10: 0000000000000040 x9 : 459ec1f0abbdbb00
x8 : 0000001fffffffe0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
x5 : 0000000000035579 x4 : 0000000000000901 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000010
Call trace:
sg_init_table+0x2c/0x50 (P)
mmc_mq_init_request+0x64/0x90
blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs+0x3ac/0x480
blk_mq_alloc_set_map_and_rqs+0x98/0x1e0
blk_mq_alloc_tag_set+0x1c0/0x290
mmc_init_queue+0x120/0x370
mmc_blk_alloc_req+0x150/0x420
To prevent this, add a validation check in mmc_mq_init_request() to
detect when sg_len (derived from max_segs) is zero. If sg_len is zero,
we return an error and print an error message, allowing host driver
developers to identify and fix incorrect max_segs configuration.
This is a defensive measure that ensures the MMC core fails gracefully
when host drivers provide invalid max_segs values, rather than crashing
with a page fault. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: return error early if file xattr cannot be changed
During early boot, the filesystem is read-only and any changes
to xattrs are not allowed. This fails in case of ext4 because
changing xattr starts an ext4 transaction which fails with the
following warning.
WARNING: fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:75 at ext4_journal_check_start+0x63/0xa0 [ext4], CPU#1: systemd-sysroot/561
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 561 Comm: systemd-sysroot Not tainted 6.19.12-1-default #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) openSUSE Tumbleweed c2dfc3c9d9f6f1233251c5d4410574fe82a348ee
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
RIP: 0010:ext4_journal_check_start+0x63/0xa0 [ext4]
Call Trace:
__ext4_journal_start_sb+0x3e/0x180 [ext4 6d025f3bc52c89a957b89a89d211fadf5e9434e1]
ext4_xattr_set+0x104/0x150 [ext4 6d025f3bc52c89a957b89a89d211fadf5e9434e1]
__vfs_setxattr+0x9a/0xd0
__vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x76/0x1f0
ima_appraise_measurement+0x23e/0xe40
ima_d_path+0x5a/0xd0
process_measurement+0xb29/0xc40
? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x21/0xe0
? fscrypt_file_open+0xc0/0xe0
? ext4_file_open+0x60/0x490 [ext4 6d025f3bc52c89a957b89a89d211fadf5e9434e1]
? bpf_prog_31efb7c56239148b_restrict_filesystems+0xab/0x126
? __bpf_prog_exit+0x23/0xd0
? __bpf_tramp_exit+0xd/0x50
? bpf_trampoline_6442530367+0x9f/0xea
ima_file_check+0x57/0x80
security_file_post_open+0x50/0xf0
path_openat+0x493/0x1650
do_filp_open+0xc7/0x170
Detect the state of the file early and return the error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gma500: return errors from Oaktrail HDMI I2C reads
xfer_read() waits for the HDMI I2C transaction to reach
I2C_TRANSACTION_DONE, but it ignores both timeout and signal returns from
wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(). If the interrupt never
advances the transaction state, the loop can wait forever.
Return -ETIMEDOUT when the completion wait expires, propagate interrupted
waits, and make the I2C master_xfer callback return the first transfer
error instead of reporting a successful message count. |
