| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The NXP ENET-QOS Ethernet driver's receive work handler eth_nxp_enet_qos_rx() in drivers/ethernet/eth_nxp_enet_qos hands each processed descriptor back to the DMA by writing desc->read.control = rx_desc_refresh_flags, which sets OWN_FLAG and BUF1_ADDR_VALID_FLAG. RDES0 of a receive descriptor is the DMA buffer address in read format, but the hardware write-back aliases that word with the VLAN tag fields (or, for a context descriptor, the timestamp low word), so it is destroyed on every completion. The success path rewrites desc->read.buf1_addr before re-arming; the four drop paths — errored or non-first descriptor, net_pkt_rx_alloc() failure, invalid descriptor length, and net_pkt_get_frag() failure — did not, re-arming the ring slot with the write-back residue as its DMA target address.
The drop paths are driven entirely by received traffic and need no privilege or special configuration. With the defaults for this driver (CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE of 128 and 16 receive descriptors) a single full-size frame consumes twelve ring slots and twelve K_NO_WAIT fragment allocations, so a short burst of frames sent to the device exhausts the receive pools and reaches the allocation-failure paths; a frame with a receive error, or any frame whose first descriptor was already dropped, reaches the non-first-descriptor path.
Once a slot has been poisoned, the DMA writes the next frame received in that slot to an address derived from the frame's VLAN tag fields rather than to a receive buffer. On the supported MCX SoCs that address falls in flash or reserved space, so the transfer raises a fatal bus error that the driver only logs — there is no reset or recovery path — and reception stops permanently until the device is rebooted; where the write is silently discarded instead, the untouched buffer is later handed to the network stack with a length, delivering stale buffer contents as if they were a received frame. A single triggering event is enough to make the condition persistent, so an attacker able to send traffic to the device can permanently disable its network interface. |
| OpenHuman is an open-source agent harness available as a desktop application and Rust library. Before version 0.57.13, an attacker who can send messages to a configured external channel can cause the agent to create persistent shell cron jobs without human approval. The scheduler later executes these jobs with the privileges of the OpenHuman runtime user. Command validation also permits leading environment assignments that can redirect allowed commands to executable helpers. The demonstrated exploit requires a suitable helper executable already present on the host. This can lead to unauthorized persistent command execution and compromise data and resources accessible to OpenHuman. This issue is fixed in version 0.57.13. |
| Usermin through 2.570 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Read Mail module that allows authenticated users to execute commands through unsanitized IMAP folder names. Attackers can create a folder containing shell metacharacters via an external IMAP client, then delete it in Usermin to run commands as their system account, bypassing webmail-only restrictions. |
| fast-agent is a framework for building, running, and evaluating AI agents with Model Context Protocol support. Prior to 0.7.21, fast-agent serve uses HTTP transport bound to 0.0.0.0 on port 8000 without authentication, allowing any network client that can reach the /mcp endpoint to invoke the exposed agent tool. When the server is started with --shell, the agent can call the local execute tool implemented by tools/local_shell_executor.py, so an unauthenticated remote client can cause operating-system commands to run as the server user; without --shell, the client can still consume the operator's model and configured MCP tools. The defaults are defined in cli/commands/serve.py and mcp/server/agent_server.py, and the non-interactive server permission prompt does not prevent the described access. This issue is fixed in version 0.7.21. |
| FFmpeg through 9.0.2 contains an uncontrolled memory allocation vulnerability in the Interplay ACM decoder that allows attackers to exhaust memory via an attacker-controlled block size. Attackers can supply a crafted ACM file with maximum level and row count in extradata, making decode_init() allocate nearly a gigabyte and deny service. |
| FFmpeg 9.0 through 9.0.2 built with liblcevc_dec fails to validate LCEVC enhanced output dimensions against max_pixels in libavcodec/decode.c before frame allocation. Attackers can supply crafted H.264, HEVC or VVC streams declaring huge LCEVC resolutions to force oversized get_buffer2() allocations and exhaust memory. |
| Bridge is affected by an out-of-bounds write vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. |
| FFmpeg through 9.0.2 contains an uncontrolled memory allocation vulnerability in sbg_read_header() in libavformat/sbgdec.c that derives an unbounded default frame size from the script's sample rate. Attackers can supply a crafted SBaGen script declaring a very high -r sample rate so the wavesynth decoder allocates enormous audio frames, exhausting memory and causing denial of service. |
| Bridge is affected by an out-of-bounds write vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. |
| The RTIO submission-queue verifier rtio_vrfy_sqe() in subsys/rtio/rtio_syscalls.c (subsys/rtio/rtio_handlers.c before v4.3.0) accumulated the results of K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() into its valid_sqe flag with &=. That macro returns nonzero on failure (it is built on K_SYSCALL_VERIFY_MSG(), which yields !(expr)), so every buffer permission check contributed the opposite of its result. A submission whose tx.buf, rx.buf or txrx.tx_buf/txrx.rx_buf pointer was not accessible to the calling thread was accepted, while a legitimate, thread-owned buffer caused the calling thread to be killed with a kernel oops.
The verifier runs on behalf of the rtio_sqe_copy_in_get_handles() system call (also reached through the inline rtio_sqe_copy_in() wrapper), so it is driven directly by untrusted user-mode input on any image built with CONFIG_USERSPACE. A user thread that has been granted an RTIO context and an rtio_iodev object — the intended usage of RTIO userspace support, established via rtio_access_grant() — can submit an SQE whose buffer pointer and length name arbitrary kernel memory; the object check on sqe->iodev is unaffected and still passes, and the crafted SQE is forwarded to the bus driver unchanged.
Downstream consumers dereference the pointer with supervisor privilege. The generic I2C and I3C RTIO fallback handlers (drivers/i2c/i2c_rtio_default.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_rtio_default.c) copy sqe.rx.buf/sqe.tx.buf into struct i2c_msg and call i2c_transfer(), and the vendor SPI/I2C RTIO drivers behave equivalently. An RTIO_OP_RX submission therefore has peripheral data written into kernel memory of the attacker's choosing (arbitrary kernel write), an RTIO_OP_TX submission clocks kernel memory out over the bus (kernel memory disclosure), and a pointer to unmapped memory faults the kernel. This is a full escape from the user-mode isolation boundary that CONFIG_USERSPACE exists to enforce.
The defect was masked for years because the in-tree user-mode RTIO tests only exercise RTIO_OP_NOP and mempool-backed reads, neither of which reaches the affected checks. The fix negates each K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() result and additionally validates the TXRX transmit buffer read-only, matching the SPI, I2C and I3C handlers. |
| The nRF link-layer receive paths of the open-source Bluetooth LE Controller did not validate the on-air LENGTH field of a received PDU against the maximum receive length that was used to program the radio. isr_rx_pdu() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/nordic/lll/lll_conn.c enqueued any non-empty data PDU after only the sequence-number and (for encrypted links) MIC checks, and the corresponding isr_rx() handlers in lll_central_iso.c, lll_peripheral_iso.c, lll_sync_iso.c and lll_scan_aux.c did the same for ISO and extended-advertising PDUs. The nRF radio stores the received header verbatim and truncates only the payload at PCNF1.MAXLEN, so a frame declaring more octets than were configured leaves a node buffer whose len field describes more data than the buffer holds.
An attacker within radio range that can emit a hand-crafted link-layer PDU — for a connection, any peer that establishes an unencrypted LE connection to a connectable advertiser; for CONFIG_BT_CTLR_SYNC_ISO, any broadcaster the device is synchronised to — can set the length byte up to 255 while the controller has programmed a much smaller maximum (lll->dle.eff.max_rx_octets, which is 27 until a Data Length Update, or the negotiated cis_lll->rx.max_pdu). No pairing, authentication or user interaction is required. On encrypted links the CCM MIC check normally rejects such a frame first, so the exposure is on unencrypted traffic, which is why the added check is placed after decryption.
The unchecked length reaches hci_acl_encode() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/hci/hci.c, which performs net_buf_add(buf, pdu_data->len) followed by a memcpy() of that many bytes out of the node_rx pool element. Because CONFIG_BT_CTLR_DATA_LENGTH_MAX and CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE both default to 27, this is an out-of-bounds read of up to roughly 228 bytes past the received PDU and a corresponding out-of-bounds write past the HCI ACL buffer into neighbouring buffers of the same pool; the tailroom test in net_buf_simple_add() is only enforced when CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING (or CONFIG_ASSERT) is enabled. On the ISO paths the same unchecked length makes isoal_rx_append_to_sdu() read past the ISO node buffer and emit adjacent controller RAM to the host as ISO data. The practical result is remote memory corruption and controller crashes, plus disclosure of controller memory into the host data path.
The fix rejects any received PDU whose length exceeds the value that was used to configure the radio reception. Note that lll_sync.c (periodic advertising sync reception) was not changed and still enqueues received PDUs without an equivalent bound. |
| The user-mode syscall verifier z_vrfy_i2s_configure() in drivers/i2s/i2s_handlers.c copies the caller's struct i2s_config in from user memory and then, when cfg->frame_clk_freq is 0 (the API's "unconfigure the stream" request), jumps straight to z_impl_i2s_configure() without performing the K_SYSCALL_OBJ(config.mem_slab, K_OBJ_MEM_SLAB) ownership/type check or the block_size sanity check. The mem_slab field is a struct k_mem_slab *, so on that path a completely unvalidated, user-chosen pointer reaches driver code that is entitled to trust it as a real kernel object.
Any thread running under CONFIG_USERSPACE that has access to an I2S device object can trigger this with a single i2s_configure() call. Most in-tree drivers special-case frame_clk_freq == 0 and never store the caller's structure, but drivers/i2s/i2s_litex.c does not: i2s_litex_configure() only logs a warning for a mismatched frame clock, then memcpy()s the caller's config into stream->cfg and marks the stream I2S_STATE_READY. A subsequent i2s_trigger() with I2S_TRIGGER_START enables the FIFO interrupt, and the interrupt handlers i2s_litex_isr_rx() / i2s_litex_isr_tx() then call k_mem_slab_alloc() and k_mem_slab_free() on the attacker-supplied pointer in supervisor context.
The result is an arbitrary-pointer read/write primitive executed by the kernel on behalf of an unprivileged thread — k_mem_slab_alloc() takes a spinlock at slab->lock and reads and writes slab->free_list and the link word inside the returned "block" — which defeats the CONFIG_USERSPACE isolation boundary entirely. The same missing validation is a hazard for out-of-tree I2S drivers that retain the configuration on the unconfigure path. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are unaffected, since the verifier is not used.
The fix zeroes config.mem_slab and config.block_size on the unconfigure path so the driver can never receive an unvalidated pointer, while still allowing a stream to be unconfigured by a caller that does not own a memory slab, as the API documents. |
| VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. Prior to 1.26.30, the Unix, macOS, and FreeBSD serialization paths in src/Platform/Serializer.cpp and src/Volume/VolumePassword.cpp accept untrusted length and count values when deserializing data that can cross from the unprivileged GUI or CLI to the root CoreService helper. Serializer::DeserializeWString allocates floor(size / sizeof(wchar_t)) elements but reads size bytes, so a non-aligned size can overflow the heap allocation. VolumePassword::Deserialize accepts PasswordSize values larger than the fixed 128-byte PasswordBuffer, allowing downstream DataPtr() and Size() consumers such as the KDF to read beyond the buffer. DeserializeString, DeserializeWString, and the string and wide-string list readers also lack allocation and collection bounds, which can exhaust memory, and a zero-length DeserializeString can access an empty vector. Windows uses a different path, and the immediate CoreService pipe writer is the same-user parent process, so the documented exposure is a local defense-in-depth boundary rather than a remote attack. This issue is fixed in 1.26.30. |
| Two RTIO syscall verifiers, in subsys/rtio/rtio_syscalls.c (subsys/rtio/rtio_handlers.c before v4.3.0), did not validate user-supplied pointers before the kernel wrote through them.
z_vrfy_rtio_sqe_cancel() performed no validation at all. It passed the caller's struct rtio_sqe pointer straight to z_impl_rtio_sqe_cancel(), which converts it with CONTAINER_OF to a struct rtio_iodev_sqe, ORs RTIO_SQE_CANCELED (BIT(3)) into its 16-bit flags field in supervisor mode, then loads its next pointer and repeats until that pointer is NULL. The syscall takes no RTIO context argument, so it needs no object grant: any user-mode thread on a CONFIG_USERSPACE build can set that bit in a 16-bit word at an address of its choosing in kernel memory, and the kernel continues the write along whatever pointer chain it finds at the corresponding offset. Setting chosen bits in kernel data structures, such as object permission or thread state fields, can be used to escalate privilege from user mode.
z_vrfy_rtio_sqe_copy_in_get_handles() validated its RTIO context and the input SQE array, but only NULL-checked the handle out-parameter before writing a kernel SQE pointer through it, with no K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE check. A user thread that holds a granted RTIO context can therefore make the kernel store a pointer value at an arbitrary address.
The fixes validate the handle out-parameter as writable, bound the cancel handle to real submission-pool storage, and require permission on the RTIO context that owns the matching pool. Without that last check a bounded handle still let any user thread cancel submissions belonging to other contexts, silently aborting their I/O. Systems built without CONFIG_USERSPACE or without CONFIG_RTIO are unaffected. |
| Node Version Manager (nvm) is a POSIX-compliant shell function for managing multiple node.js versions. In versions 0.39.6 through 0.40.8, `nvm ls-remote` (and other commands that refresh remote LTS aliases) store the version column of the mirror's `index.tab` in `$NVM_DIR/alias/lts/` without validating it, and `nvm_normalize_lts` later evaluates any suffix of an `lts/-N` value inside shell arithmetic `$((N+1))`. Under bash and zsh, arithmetic evaluation expands command substitutions in array subscripts, so a stored value such as `lts/-10*path[$(cmd)1]` runs `cmd` as the user when the alias is later resolved by purely local commands (`nvm ls`, `nvm alias`, `nvm use --lts`, `nvm which lts/`), and in every new shell when the `default` alias is `lts/*`. Exploitation requires the victim to use a hostile mirror -- via a compromised mirror or CDN, a network man-in-the-middle of an `http://` mirror, or a maliciously configured `NVM_NODEJS_ORG_MIRROR` -- and to run an affected command. The same sink is also reachable from a project `.nvmrc`, which is treated as hardening. dash is not affected. Version 0.41.0 only passes an all-digit `lts/-N` offset to arithmetic and drops `index.tab` rows whose version is not a valid version string. |
| radare2 is a UNIX-like reverse engineering framework and command-line toolset. Prior to 6.2.2, attacker-controlled data from several binary format plugins could reach RBinInfo->bclass. Opening or analyzing a crafted Pebble or Sega Mega Drive binary could place a dbg:// URI in bclass, causing radare2 to reopen the input through the debug input/output plugin and ultimately pass attacker-controlled arguments to execvp(). This could execute commands with the privileges of the radare2 process without an explicit debugging command. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.2. |
| musl libc before 1.2.7, when an untrusted regular expression is used with regcomp, has multiple integer overflows, possibly leading to incorrect allocation sizes and out-of-bounds heap writes. |
| TinyUSB through 0.21.0, fixed in commit e85c2b8, contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the MTP device class helper mtp_container_get_string() in src/class/mtp/mtp.h that allows a malicious USB host to corrupt adjacent memory by supplying a crafted MTP string with an unbounded character count. Attackers can exploit the unchecked memcpy operation copying up to 510 bytes into a fixed-size destination buffer to achieve code execution or cause a denial of service on the TinyUSB MTP device. |
| Issue summary: An application trying to decrypt CMS messages encrypted using
password based encryption can trigger an out-of-bounds read and write.
Impact summary: This out-of-bounds read may trigger a crash which leads to
Denial of Service for an application. The out-of-bounds write can cause
a memory corruption which can have various consequences including
a Denial of Service or Execution of attacker-supplied code.
Although the consequences of a successful exploit of this vulnerability
could be severe, the probability that the attacker would be able to
perform it is low. Besides, password based (PWRI) encryption support in CMS
messages is very rarely used. For that reason the issue was assessed as
Moderate severity according to our Security Policy.
The FIPS modules in 3.5, 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this
issue, as the CMS implementation is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module
boundary. |
| virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.7.13, the generated activate (bash and zsh) and activate.fish scripts place values already escaped by shlex.quote inside an additional quoted context. In the bash and zsh script, a crafted virtual environment path reaches __VIRTUAL_ENV__ when a relocated environment's recorded directory is absent; in the fish script, crafted Tcl or Tk library paths reach __TCL_LIBRARY__ or __TK_LIBRARY__. The surplus quotes can terminate the data-only quoted run and leave shell metacharacters parsed as commands when a user sources the activation script, allowing code execution with that user's privileges. This issue is fixed in version 21.7.13. |
