| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows NTFS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| An out-of-bounds read was found in the NC-SI OEM response handler of libslirp. A truncated NC-SI OEM Ethernet frame causes ncsi_rsp_handler_oem() to read up to 4 bytes beyond the supplied packet length and reflect the value into the response sent to the guest, resulting in guest-observable disclosure of adjacent host process memory. |
| PoDoFo is a C++17 PDF manipulation library. From version 1.0.0 until 1.1.1, processing a crafted PDF with an Indexed color-space image can cause a heap out-of-bounds read in PdfColorSpaceFilterIndexed::FetchScanLine in src/podofo/main/PdfColorSpaceFilter.cpp. PODOFO_INVARIANT does not perform a runtime check, so a pixel index greater than or equal to m_MapSize can address beyond m_lookup. PdfColorSpaceFilterFactory::TryCreateFromObject also validates hival with an incorrect conjunction and no upper bound, allowing malformed Indexed color-space metadata outside the expected range. The resulting read can disclose adjacent heap data or crash the processing application. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.1. |
| Netcore NR255-V version 1.5.130703 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in filter_arp_put_file.cgi caused by improper use of a string handling API. Attackers can trigger an unterminated buffer over-read by exploiting this flaw in the affected component, potentially exposing adjacent memory contents. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Spaceport.sys allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Spaceport.sys allows an authorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows exFAT File System allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| In do_sss_aes_gcm_256_op of crypto-aes.c, there is a possible out-of-bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local information disclosure with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In gf_algo_get_cached_dump_data of gf_algo.c, there is a possible out-of-bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Win32K allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows SMB Client allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Text Shaping allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Port Driver allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information with a physical attack. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Spaceport.sys allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Error Reporting allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Image Acquisition allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/ras: Fix cxl_rch_get_aer_info() out-of-bounds AER register read
cxl_rch_get_aer_info() copies the RCH Downstream Port AER capability from
the RCRB MMIO block using a readl() loop bounded by sizeof(struct
aer_capability_regs). This struct is a software layout and its embedded
struct pcie_tlp_log is larger than the on-wire AER capability. As a
result the loop reads past the mapped AER register block.
The over-read also populates the software-only tail fields including
header_log.header_len. An out-of-range header_len passed to
pcie_print_tlp_log() can then loop past the header log buffer and cause
a second out-of-bounds read.
The read was correct when introduced, but struct pcie_tlp_log has since
grown (Header Log and TLP Prefix Log sizes, header_len and flit fields),
so sizeof(struct aer_capability_regs) no longer matches the physical AER
capability.
Bound the read to the physical AER registers, header through the 16 byte
Header Log. Zero the destination first so the software-only fields are
deterministic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: validate sockaddr length per family in listener_set
nfsd_sock_nl_policy declares NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR as a bare NLA_BINARY
attribute with no minimum length. A CAP_NET_ADMIN caller can send a
16-byte NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR with sa_family=AF_INET6, causing a 12-byte
OOB read across three consumers (rpc_cmp_addr_port, svc_find_listener,
kernel_bind).
nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() also parsed and validated each listener
entry inline in two separate loops, interleaved with mutating the
running listener configuration. The validation was duplicated, used an
open-coded "nla_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr)" check that was too short
for AF_INET6, and handled a malformed entry inconsistently depending on
which loop noticed it.
Add an nfsd_nl_validate_listeners() helper that walks the entire list
once and confirms each entry parses, carries both an address and a
transport name, and is long enough for its address family
(sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) for AF_INET, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)
for AF_INET6, -EAFNOSUPPORT otherwise). Call it before taking
nfsd_mutex or creating the serv, so a malformed request fails cleanly
with no side effects.
Since every entry is known valid by the time the two existing loops
run, drop the redundant presence and per-family length checks from
both, leaving only the nla_parse_nested() call needed to extract the
data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: widen nfsd_genl_rqstp address fields to sockaddr_storage
struct nfsd_genl_rqstp declares rq_daddr and rq_saddr as plain
"struct sockaddr" (16 bytes). When an IPv6 NFS client is connected,
nfsd_genl_rpc_status_compose_msg() casts these fields to
"struct sockaddr_in6 *" (28 bytes) and reads sin6_addr at offset 8..24,
which extends 8 bytes past the end of the 16-byte sockaddr field into
the adjacent rq_flags member. The 16-byte nla_put_in6_addr then ships 8
bytes of truncated IPv6 address followed by 8 bytes of rq_flags to
userspace via the NFSD_A_RPC_STATUS_SADDR6/DADDR6 netlink attributes.
This is reachable by any unprivileged process in the network namespace
because NFSD_CMD_RPC_STATUS_GET uses GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP without
GENL_ADMIN_PERM.
Fix by widening rq_daddr and rq_saddr to struct sockaddr_storage so the
IPv6 casts operate within bounds, copying sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
bytes in the memcpy calls so the full address is captured, and
zero-initializing the genl_rqstp stack variable to prevent leaking
uninitialized tail bytes through netlink. |
