| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd/viommu: Release the igroup lock on the vdevice_size error path
iommufd_vdevice_alloc_ioctl() takes idev->igroup->lock, then validates the
driver's vdevice_size against the core structure size with a WARN_ON_ONCE.
On failure that guard jumps to out_put_idev, below out_unlock_igroup, so it
skips the mutex_unlock(), leaving the igroup lock held and deadlocking the
next vDEVICE operation on that group.
Jump to out_unlock_igroup instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: migrate_device: fix pte_pfn/pte_dirty called on non-present PTE
pte_pfn() and pte_dirty() have undefined behaviour when called on a
non-present PTE. In migrate_vma_collect_pmd(), these functions may be
invoked on non-present entries (e.g., device-private entries), leading
to potential crashes from pte_pfn() or incorrect dirty folio accounting
from pte_dirty(). Fix both by guarding with pte_present() checks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/util: don't read __page_2 for order-1 folios in snapshot_page()
snapshot_page() currently reads __page_2 after checking nr_pages > 1, but
it should only do so when nr_pages > 2.
If an order-1 folio is allocated at the end of a vmemmap section,
__page_2 will not exist and reading it will cause a fault.
During DLPAR memory remove on a 22 TB ppc64le LPAR, snapshot_page() oopsed
on the page isolation path while reading an order-1 folio's __page_2 from
an adjacent absent section (unmapped vmemmap).
Fix this to avoid reading memmap that doesn't exist (e.g., a vmemmap
hole). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: pci: Fix NULL dereference on AIBV allocation failure
The airq_iv_create() can return NULL on failure, but the return value was
never checked. If it fails, zdev->aibv will be NULL and fail when
dereferenced in kvm_zpci_set_airq(). Add a NULL check and free the
previously allocated AISB bit and zdev->aisb on failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: SCO: give the socket its own sco_conn reference
sco_conn_del() drops a reference it does not own. It takes one transient
reference via sco_conn_hold_unless_zero() and releases it with the
sco_conn_put() that follows sco_sock_hold(); the additional put in the
!sk branch releases a second one:
conn = sco_conn_hold_unless_zero(conn);
...
sk = sco_sock_hold(conn);
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
sco_conn_put(conn);
if (!sk) {
sco_conn_put(conn);
return;
}
When close() races the controller's Disconnection Complete, sco_chan_del()
clears conn->sk and drops the socket's reference while sco_conn_del() is
running. sco_conn_del() then sees sk == NULL, its own put drops the count
to zero and frees the conn, and the second put writes to the freed kref:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190
Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881099dec74 by task kworker/u17:3/413
Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190
hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0
hci_event_packet+0x54a/0x650
hci_rx_work+0x321/0x3d0
Allocated by task 413:
sco_conn_add+0x72/0x1a0
sco_connect_cfm+0x88/0x670
Freed by task 413:
sco_conn_del.isra.0+0x3f/0xf0
hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
The root cause is that the socket stores the connection without holding a
reference of its own. __sco_chan_add() does:
sco_pi(sk)->conn = conn;
so the socket borrows whatever reference its caller happened to hold, and
the callers paper over that with ad-hoc holds and puts. Give the socket a
counted reference instead: __sco_chan_add() takes one and it is released
together with the channel (sco_chan_del()) and in sco_sock_destruct().
With the socket holding its own reference, sco_conn_del() no longer needs
the extra put and the redundant hold in sco_conn_ready() goes away.
Making the socket own its reference means the connection is now actually
freed on the error paths of sco_connect() where it used to leak, which in
turn runs sco_conn_free() and its hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon). To keep the
hci_conn accounting balanced, make that ownership explicit as well:
sco_conn_add() consumes one hci_conn reference and the sco_conn owns it for
its lifetime. sco_connect() hands over the reference returned by
hci_connect_sco() and no longer drops it on the error paths;
sco_connect_cfm(), which is not given a reference, takes one with
hci_conn_hold() before handing it to sco_conn_add() (and drops it again if
the allocation fails); and the explicit hci_conn_hold() in sco_conn_ready()
is removed. Every reference then has a single, clear owner. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv/mm: use physical alignment for vmemmap_start_pfn
RISC-V computes vmemmap_start_pfn by rounding phys_ram_base down to
VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. That alignment must therefore be expressed in the
physical-address domain.
Commit 476849b0fba4 ("riscv/mm: align vmemmap to maximal folio size")
attempted to account for the maximal folio alignment by feeding
MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN directly into VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. However,
MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN is measured in bytes of struct page storage,
whereas VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN is used to align a physical address.
The mask-based compound_info encoding requires pfn_to_page(0) to be
naturally aligned to MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN. Commit 9f94db4c7eaa
("mm/sparse: check memmap alignment for compound_info_has_mask()") added a
check for that requirement and exposed the unit mismatch on systems such
as QEMU virt, where the DRAM base is not aligned to MAX_FOLIO_NR_PAGES *
PAGE_SIZE.
Here is the log:
[ 0.000000][ C0] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 0.000000][ C0] WARNING: mm/sparse.c:365 at sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe, CPU#0: swapper/0
[ 0.000000][ C0] Modules linked in:
[ 0.000000][ C0] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 7.2.0-rc3-g1d8304bdd65f #2 PREEMPT
[ 0.000000][ C0] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 0.000000][ C0] epc : sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] ra : sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] epc : ffffffff86851c88 ra : ffffffff86851c88 sp : ffffffff88807a30
[ 0.000000][ C0] gp : ffffffff8a3bf240 tp : ffffffff88842080 t0 : ff600000ffab6000
[ 0.000000][ C0] t1 : 000000017fab6000 t2 : 65203a6573726363 s0 : ffffffff88807bc0
[ 0.000000][ C0] s1 : 000000000e000000 a0 : 0000000000000007 a1 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] a2 : 0000000000000002 a3 : ffffffff86851c88 a4 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] a5 : ffffffff88843080 a6 : 0000000000000003 a7 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] s2 : ff60000000000000 s3 : 0040000000000000 s4 : 0004000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] s5 : ffffffff8a4d92e0 s6 : ff600000ffab55e0 s7 : ffffffff88384d00
[ 0.000000][ C0] s8 : 0000000000000003 s9 : ffffffff88384cc1 s10: ffffffff88384cc0
[ 0.000000][ C0] s11: ffffffff8a4daae0 t3 : ffffffff915e8b20 t4 : ffffffff915e8b20
[ 0.000000][ C0] t5 : ffffffff915e8b20 t6 : ffffffff915e8bc8 ssp : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: ffffffff86851c88 cause: 0000000000000003
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff86851c88>] sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff8683d396>] mm_core_init_early+0x116/0x1e30
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff86801edc>] start_kernel+0xd2/0x848
Convert MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN to the equivalent physical alignment
before using it in VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. This keeps the existing
round_down() logic while making the resulting vmemmap base satisfy the
mask-alignment requirement. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: re-fetch eth header after route_shortcircuit()
Before route_shortcircuit(), the eth header pointer is cached from eth_hdr(skb).
Inside route_shortcircuit(), pskb_may_pull() can be called, which may
reallocate skb->head.
In this case, returning to vxlan_xmit() leaves the cached eth pointer pointing to
freed memory, leading to a use-after-free when dereferencing eth->h_dest.
Fix this by updating eth = eth_hdr(skb) after calling route_shortcircuit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: amd-mp2: Unregister callback on adapter add failure
amd_mp2_register_cb() stores the platform I2C context in the MP2 PCI
driver's callback table before the adapter is registered. If
i2c_add_adapter() fails, probe returns and devres frees the context,
but the PCI driver can still dereference the stale pointer from its IRQ
and system-sleep callbacks.
Unregister the callback before returning the adapter registration error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/dasd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
dasd_release_space() checks the implementation of the is_ese()
discipline function before calling it to determine if a given device is
an ESE DASD.
The current usage of the logical AND operator will lead to a NULL
pointer dereference as the function is called even if the function
pointer is NULL.
Fix this by using the logical OR operator. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: imx: Fix slave registration race and error handling
In i2c_imx_reg_slave(), the slave pointer was assigned before
pm_runtime_resume_and_get(). If pm_runtime_resume_and_get() failed,
the error path returned without clearing i2c_imx->slave, leaving it
non-NULL and causing all subsequent registration attempts to fail
with -EBUSY.
Additionally, because this driver uses a shared IRQ, the interrupt
handler i2c_imx_isr() can execute concurrently and, after acquiring
slave_lock, dereference i2c_imx->slave. The previous fix attempt
added a lockless i2c_imx->slave = NULL on the error path, but that
could race with the ISR under the lock and still cause a NULL pointer
dereference.
Fix both issues by deferring the assignment of i2c_imx->slave and
i2c_imx->last_slave_event to after a successful resume, and by
performing the assignment inside the slave_lock critical section.
This guarantees that the slave pointer is never left stale on the
error path and is always valid when observed by the interrupt handler. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver core: use READ_ONCE() for dev->driver in dev_has_sync_state()
dev_has_sync_state() reads dev->driver twice without holding
device_lock() -- once for the NULL check and once to dereference
->sync_state. Some callers only hold device_links_write_lock, which
doesn't prevent a concurrent unbind from clearing dev->driver via
device_unbind_cleanup().
Fix it by reading dev->driver exactly once with READ_ONCE(), pairing
with the WRITE_ONCE() in device_set_driver(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Drivers: hv: vmbus: use generic driver_override infrastructure
When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus' match()
callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the
driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF.
Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking
care of proper locking internally.
Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock
held is intentional. [1] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader
The loader verifies map->sha against the metadata hash in its
instructions. map->sha is calculated when BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD is
called on the frozen map.
While the map is frozen, the /signed loader/ must also ensure the map
is exclusive, as, without exclusivity (which a hostile host could just
omit when loading the loader), another BPF program with map access can
mutate the contents afterwards, so the check passes on stale data.
With the extra check as part of the signed loader, it now refuses to
move on with map->sha validation if the host set it up wrongly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: bound the look-ahead attribute-list entry in ntfs_external_attr_find()
When resolving an attribute lookup with a non-zero @lowest_vcn,
ntfs_external_attr_find() peeks at the next $ATTRIBUTE_LIST entry to
decide whether to keep searching, but bounds that not-yet-validated
entry only with "(u8 *)next_al_entry + 6 < al_end" (which proves just
bytes 0..6 are in range) and "(u8 *)next_al_entry + length <= al_end"
with an attacker-controlled, non-8-aligned length. It then reads
next_al_entry->lowest_vcn (an __le64 at offset 8) and the name at
next_al_entry->name_offset, both of which can lie past al_end -- the
exact end of the kvmalloc'd attribute-list buffer (allocated at the
on-disk attr_list_size, no rounding). A crafted on-disk $ATTRIBUTE_LIST
whose last entry sits a few bytes before al_end therefore yields a slab
out-of-bounds read when the inode is read.
Validate the look-ahead entry with ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid() (added
in patch 1/3) before dereferencing lowest_vcn and the name, so the same
fixed-header, length and name bounds the main attribute-list walk uses now
guard this read too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Disable xfrm_decode_session hook attachment
BPF LSM programs can currently attach to xfrm_decode_session(). That
hook may return an error, but security_skb_classify_flow() calls it
from a void path and triggers BUG_ON() if an error is returned.
Disable BPF attachment to the hook to prevent a BPF LSM program from
turning packet classification into a full panic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: use conntrack GC to reap expectations
This patch replaces the timer API by GC worker approach for
expectations, as it already happened in many other subsystems.
Use the existing conntrack GC worker to iterate over the local list of
expectations in the master conntrack to reap expired expectations.
Check IPS_HELPER_BIT to run GC for expectations, set it on for nft_ct
expectation which nevers sets it. Hold the expectation spinlock while
iterating over the master conntrack expectation list to synchronize with
nf_ct_remove_expectations(). This also performs runtime packet path
garbage collection through the expectation insertion and lookup
functions while walking over one of the chains of the global expectation
hashtables. Unconfirmed conntrack entries are skipped since ct->ext can
be reallocated and dying are skipped since those will be gone soon.
Set on IPS_HELPER_BIT if the helper ct extension is added, then the new
GC worker does not need to bump the ct refcount to check if the ct->ext
helper is available.
This removes the extra bump on the refcount for expectation timers, this
allows to remove several nf_ct_expect_put() calls after the unlink,
after this update only refcount remains at 1 while on the expectation
hashes.
This patch implicitly addresses a race with the existing timer API
allowing an expectation to access a stale exp->master pointer which has
been already released when expectation removal loses races with an
expiring timer, ie. timer_del() reporting false.
Add a new NF_CT_EXPECT_DEAD flag to reap this expectation via GC. This
is needed by nf_conntrack_unexpect_related() which is called in error
paths to invalidate newly created expectations that has been added into
the hashes. These expectactions cannot be inmediately released as GC or
nf_ct_remove_expectations() could race to make it. On expectation
insert, the runtime GC reaps stale expectations before checking the
expectation limit set by policy.
Set current timestamp in nf_ct_expect_alloc(), then add the expectation
policy timeout (or custom timeout specified added on top of this) to
specify the expectation lifetime. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: LAG, MPESW, Fix missing complete() on devcom error
mlx5_mpesw_work() returned without calling complete() when
mlx5_lag_get_devcom_comp() returned NULL. A caller that queued the
work and waited on mpesww->comp would block indefinitely.
Funnel the early-return path through a new "complete" label so the
waiter is always woken. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: sco: Fix a race condition in sco_sock_timeout()
sco_sock_timeout() runs asynchronously and lock_sock(sk). If the socket
is closing while the timer is running, it holds the same lock
(lock_sock(sk)) twice, leading to a deadlock.
CPU 0 CPU 1
==================== ======================
sco_sock_close()
sco_sock_timeout()
lock_sock(sk) // <-- LOCK
__sco_sock_close()
sco_chan_del()
sco_conn_put()
sco_conn_free()
disable_delayed_work_sync()
lock(sk) // <-- SAME LOCK
Fix this by moving disable_delayed_work_sync() outside of lock_sock(sk),
ensuring that no lock_sock(sk) is held before sco_sock_timeout().
Lockdep splat:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.13.0-rc4 #7 Not tainted
syz-executor292/9514 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8881115d5070 ((work_completion)(&(&conn->timeout_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: rcu_lock_acquire sect/v6.13-rc4/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:337 [inline]
ffff8881115d5070 ((work_completion)(&(&conn->timeout_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: rcu_read_lock sect/v6.13-rc4/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:849 [inline]
ffff8881115d5070 ((work_completion)(&(&conn->timeout_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: start_flush_work sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4137 [inline]
ffff8881115d5070 ((work_completion)(&(&conn->timeout_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xd1/0xc40 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4195
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88807db3a258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock sect/v6.13-rc4/./include/net/sock.h:1623 [inline]
ffff88807db3a258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sco_sock_close+0x25/0x100 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:524
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x520 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x130 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/core/sock.c:3622
lock_sock sect/v6.13-rc4/./include/net/sock.h:1623 [inline]
sco_sock_timeout+0xbe/0x270 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:158
process_one_work sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa99/0x18f0 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x8a9/0xd80 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2c6/0x360 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4e/0x80 sect/v6.13-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 sect/v6.13-rc4/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&conn->timeout_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
check_prevs_add sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
validate_chain+0x1888/0x5760 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
__lock_acquire+0x13b4/0x2120 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x520 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
touch_work_lockdep_map sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:3909 [inline]
start_flush_work sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4163 [inline]
__flush_work+0x70f/0xc40 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4195
__cancel_work_sync sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4351 [inline]
disable_delayed_work_sync+0xbb/0xf0 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4514
sco_conn_free sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:95 [inline]
kref_put sect/v6.13-rc4/./include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
sco_conn_put+0x18f/0x270 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:107
sco_chan_del+0xe2/0x210 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:236
sco_sock_close+0x8f/0x100 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:526
sco_sock_release+0x62/0x2d0 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/blueto
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Inject SEA if kvm_translate_vncr() can't resolve PFN
kvm_handle_vncr_abort() assumes that s1_walk_result conveys an abort
when kvm_translate_vncr() returns -EFAULT. This is not always the case
as it's possible to encounter 'late' failures on the output of S1
translation, e.g. a GFN outside of the memslots.
Fix it by preparing an external abort before returning from
kvm_translate_vncr(). Get rid of the BUG_ON() in the fault injection
path while at it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select: Harden daemon pidfile open
Avoid symlink-based pidfile clobbering by opening the pidfile with
O_NOFOLLOW and validating it with fstat() before locking/writing.
The daemon currently uses a fixed pidfile path under /tmp. A local
unprivileged user can pre-create a symlink at that path and cause a
root-run daemon instance to write into an attacker-chosen file. |
