| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In mfc_alloc_enc_roi_buffer of mfc_buf.c, there is a possible out-of-bounds write due to a heap buffer overflow. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In multiple functions of sswrp_cpm.dtsi, there is a possible way to modify voltage control registers from non-secure software due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In getCarrierRestrictionStatus of PhoneInterfaceManager.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| A vulnerability has been found in rmalright TR-VISION HOME 2.0.5. Impacted is the function sub_11504 in the library WFanManager.sys of the component IOCTL Handler. Such manipulation leads to incorrect default permissions. The attack must be carried out locally. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| A flaw was found in Podman. If an attacker can pass a crafted tar archive to the `podman load` command, they can create files on the host machine with the privileges of the user running Podman. |
| An attacker who gains the ability to execute arbitrary code on a system with TrueConf Server (Linux) versions from 4.7.2 up to, but not including, 5.5.6 installed, running as the user trueconf (by exploiting some other vulnerability), can elevate their privileges to root. |
| During an internal security assessment, a potential vulnerability was discovered in Lenovo PC Manager, distributed exclusively in the Chinese market, that could allow a local user to escalate privileges. |
| An improper permissions vulnerability was reported in Lenovo System Update that could allow a local authenticated user to execute code with elevated privileges. |
| Incorrect default permissions in the Windows installer of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.7 allow a local authenticated user to run code as the administrator who installs the product, when it is installed into a new program folder in a location whose permissions let every user write, such as the root of a drive. 6.3.7 fixed CVE-2026-107571 by giving the program folder, Bin and ControlPanel permissions that only administrators may change, but its setup lets Inno Setup make a new program folder first, with the permissions the folder above hands down, and replaces them only afterwards, tens of milliseconds later (33 to 139 milliseconds in the project's test runs). In that time any local account may make files and folders in the new folder, which keep that account as their owner, among them the Bin folder that setup then copies the programs into. Setup runs programs from Bin with the administrator's elevated rights, registering the service among them, before its hardening at the end of setup takes such a folder back, and those programs load a library placed in Bin in place of the system's. The default installation under Program Files, whose folders give ordinary users read and execute only, is not affected. |
| Incorrect default permissions in the Windows installer of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.7 allow a local authenticated user to run code as the administrator who runs setup, when the server is installed into a program folder that is already there and that accounts other than the administrators could write, such as a folder made beforehand at the root of a drive, or when such an installation is upgraded or repaired. 6.3.7 fixed CVE-2026-107571 by giving the program folder, Bin and ControlPanel permissions that only administrators may change, but for a folder that is already there it does so only at the end of setup: setup first copies the programs into Bin, which every user may still write, and runs programs from Bin with the administrator's elevated rights, registering the service among them, before that hardening, so that a library another account places in Bin meanwhile is loaded in place of the system's. A handle an account opened on such a folder while it could write it keeps that access after the hardening. The default installation under Program Files, whose folders give ordinary users read and execute only, is not affected. |
| Improper access control in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Privilege escalation in the DOM: Navigation component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 153.7, Thunderbird 160, and Thunderbird 153.7. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From version 3.30.0 until version 4.2.1, StrictSoftFileLock and AsyncStrictSoftFileLock on POSIX systems create coordination and claim directories without applying the caller’s restrictive lock mode. A permissive umask or inherited default ACL can leave these directories writable by another local user, allowing that user to delete an active holder’s claims. Another authorized process can then acquire the lock while the original holder remains in its critical section. An attacker can also plant malformed claims to prevent acquisition. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| Incorrect default file permissions in Kiro CLI (formerly Amazon Q Developer CLI) before version 2.27.0 on macOS and Linux might allow other local users on the same host to read a user's session transcripts and prompt history, including any credentials or source code they contain. The CLI created its local session storage files with permissions that made them readable by all local users.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to Kiro CLI version 2.27.0 or later and launch it once. Users who ran Amazon Q Developer CLI 1.16.0 through 1.19.x should also delete the ~/.aws/amazonq/.cli_bash_history file or restrict it to the owner. |
| Vikunja before 2.7.1 contains an insecure file permissions vulnerability that allows local users to read stored data because localStorage.Write creates blobs world-readable. Local attackers on a shared host can read attachments, project backgrounds and exports, and copy the SQLite database to crack password hashes offline. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tun: Require CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach to an ownerless device
Twenty years ago I made creating a tuntap device require CAP_NET_ADMIN
in commit ca6bb5d7ab22 ("[NET]: Require CAP_NET_ADMIN to create tuntap
devices.")
The idea was to allow the permissions on /dev/net/tun to be relaxed to
0666 and thus allow owners of tun devices assigned with TUNSETOWNER to
actually open it and get at their devices.
What we missed at the time was that persistent devices with *no* owner
were already essentially world-consumable, and anyone who could open
the device node could also attach to those.
Even then, using persistent devices with no explicitly set owner — on
the (false) presumption that CAP_NET_ADMIN would be required to open
them — wasn't an egregious userspace bug. There are cases where it does
make sense to separate the creation/configuration of the netdevice, from
the process which shovels packets into it.
Since then, TUNSETGROUP was added a year later in commit 8c644623fe7e
("[NET]: Allow group ownership of TUN/TAP devices."). Its commit message
noted that if both uid and gid are set, both have to match (in itself a
bizarre choice) — but still not that with *neither* set, no permission
at all was required.
Then in 2012 commit c8d68e6be1c3 ("tuntap: multiqueue support") allowed
new queues to be attached to a device from the moment of its creation,
with no way for userspace to close the race between creation and a
subsequent TUNSET{OWNER,GROUP}.
In 2024, commit 3ca459eaba1bf ("tun: fix group permission check") tried
to fix things to be saner: only require the user *or* the group to
match, in line with standard POSIX permissions, and require
CAP_NET_ADMIN if neither the user nor group authorised the access
(although it put the CAP_NET_ADMIN check first, and would wrongly have
reported the capability as having been used even when it was not).
That fix was reverted in commit a70c7b3cbc06 ("tun: revert fix group
permission check") due to allegedly causing a regression in an selinux
test suite which *expected* the attachment to succeed when authorised
by none of user, group, nor CAP_NET_ADMIN:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAFqZXNtkCBT4f+PwyVRmQGoT3p1eVa01fCG_aNtpt6dakXncUg@mail.gmail.com/
We should not break UAPI. But we don't have to consider an selinux test
case which deliberately exercises a security flaw to be UAPI worth
preserving either. To which end, I have fixed it in selinux-testsuite
commit b2f894f0016b ("tests/tun_tap: set an owner on the device for the
relabel tests").
So: fix the lack of CAP_NET_ADMIN check on devices which *haven't* been
assigned an owner or group, while leaving the weird tun ownership model
as it was (user *and* group have to match, if both are set). If someone
still wants to fix the latter (which wasn't actually the reason the
previous attempt was reverted), they can do it under separate cover.
Permit attaching to an existing device only if an owner and/or group was
set and the caller matches all that were set, or if the caller has
CAP_NET_ADMIN. The only behavioural change is that a device with no
owner or group now requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach — precisely the
loophole we want to close.
And put the CAP_NET_ADMIN check in the right place this time. |
| Incorrect default permissions for the Intel(R) VTune(TM) Profiler software within Ring 3: User Applications may allow an escalation of privilege. Unprivileged software adversary with an unauthenticated user combined with a high complexity attack may enable escalation of privilege. This result may potentially occur via network access when attack requirements are not present without special internal knowledge and requires no user interaction. The potential vulnerability may impact the confidentiality (low), integrity (low) and availability (low) of the vulnerable system, resulting in subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (none) and availability (none) impacts. |
| Insecure inherited permissions for some Intel(R) Graphics Driver software installers within Ring 3: User Applications may allow an escalation of privilege. Unprivileged software adversary with an authenticated user combined with a high complexity attack may enable escalation of privilege. This result may potentially occur via local access when attack requirements are present without special internal knowledge and requires active user interaction. The potential vulnerability may impact the confidentiality (high), integrity (high) and availability (high) of the vulnerable system, resulting in subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (none) and availability (none) impacts. |
| Incorrect default permissions for some Intel(R) Graphics Driver software installers within Ring 3: User Applications may allow an escalation of privilege. Unprivileged software adversary with an authenticated user combined with a high complexity attack may enable escalation of privilege. This result may potentially occur via local access when attack requirements are present without special internal knowledge and requires active user interaction. The potential vulnerability may impact the confidentiality (high), integrity (high) and availability (high) of the vulnerable system, resulting in subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (none) and availability (none) impacts. |
| Incorrect default permissions for some Intel(R) Graphics Driver software installers within Ring 3: User Applications may allow an escalation of privilege. Unprivileged software adversary with an authenticated user combined with a high complexity attack may enable escalation of privilege. This result may potentially occur via local access when attack requirements are present without special internal knowledge and requires active user interaction. The potential vulnerability may impact the confidentiality (high), integrity (high) and availability (high) of the vulnerable system, resulting in subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (none) and availability (none) impacts. |
